The child custody laws in Lebanon fall under clerical judicial authority and each religion has its own religious court that determines family law. As Shi'a, the al-Amin family are subject to the Jaafari court that represents Twelver Shi'ism in Lebanon. Sharia law in Shi'ism permits the award of custody to the mother for males until the age of two, and to females until the age of seven (however this can vary). But the issue of child custody is one of a number of challenges faced by women across all the religions in Lebanon and which grassroots organisations have attempted to overcome.

Until very recently civil marriage was forbidden in Lebanon, but sustained popular pressure to legalise it has gained traction in recent years. In 2013 a couple wed in a civil ceremony and with the help of their lawyer invoked a previously unused French colonial-era law from 1936 which permits civil unions outside the country's 18 official sects. With the help of activists they subsequently pressured the Lebanese Government into registering their civil marriage as legal in Lebanon. Inspired by this ruling many more couples since have had civil marriages, but despite protests none have been approved to date and civil marriage continues to be condemned by the religious authorities.

Were civil marriage to be instituted legally in Lebanon, it would raise the important question of how child custody battles would be resolved without recourse to religious law and what rights such a law would grant women. It would in fact be ground-breaking for a country in the Middle East to consider family law on a civil basis.

Another pressing issue for women in Lebanon is the constant irritant that they are not allowed to pass on their nationality to their children. In Lebanon, only if your father is Lebanese can you obtain citizenship. Aside from the obvious resentment this policy generates, this is ostensibly not such a problem if you happen to be a citizen of another state. However it creates enormous problems for the children of Palestinian fathers and Lebanese mothers because it renders them effectively stateless (the Ministry of the Interior estimates that around 16,800 Lebanese women are married to Palestinians). This issue arises from a law dating back to 1925 that states the children of Lebanese women who marry non-Lebanese men are foreigners in their own country: thus far three attempts to overturn it have failed. In part this law continues to be justified by politicians on the basis of the need to maintain the delicate sectarian balance – the fear being that nationalisation of children of Palestinians will significantly increase the number of Sunnis in the country.

What is impressive about Lebanon is that women's grass roots movements continue to debate important issues in the public space, such as the legality of rape and violence within marriage. Currently an online reporting tool is trialling in Beirut which tracks where and when sexual harassment takes place. However, lack of social and legal change can often be attributed to the paralysis that occurs as a result of the sectarian political system.

Photo by Ratib Al Safadi/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images

I also agree with White's position that the interests of Japan and Australia do not always align. An undeniable gap exists between Japan and Australia in terms of how they view China. For instance, the recent Darwin port lease issue highlights the gap between Japanese and Australian threat perception. It is difficult to imagine a similar deal in Japan, with or without close US consultation. That said, given the geopolitical proximity of Japan to China, tensions over the Senkaku Islands, and the number of Japanese Self-Defense Force scrambles conducted against Chinese aircraft at an all-time high, the existence of this gap in threat perception is unsurprising.

However, this 'China gap' is narrowing. In my reading of the 2016 Australian Defence White Paper, Australia's concerns regarding China have increased substantially compared to the 2013 White Paper, as exemplified by this statement: 'Australia is particularly concerned by the unprecedented pace and scale of China's land reclamation activities'. Furthermore, the joint-statement of the latest Japan-Australia summit meeting in December 2015, aptly titled 'Next steps of the Special Strategic Partnership,' states that 'the Prime Ministers reaffirmed the special strategic partnership between Japan and Australia, based on common values and strategic interests.' This signals that Australia is also interested in stepping up its relationship with Japan and is prepared to stand up to China's likely complaints about such developments. 

In addition, White seems to be overreacting to the submarine deal. Extrapolating that buying the subs implies Japan is receiving 'clear understandings that Australia will support Japan politically, strategically and even militarily against China' reads too much into the sale. Why does a defense acquisition deal — albeit one that shares 'ultra-sensitive' technology — immediately conjure up a Japan-Australia alliance with mutual defense obligations? White seems to be referring to such an alliance with the following question: 'How willing would we be, ultimately, to take Japan's side in a war, and send our forces — including our submarines — to fight alongside them against China?'

Japan and Australia have been pursuing an incremental deepening of their relationship since the early 1990s. This has been exemplified more recently through the signing of a series of agreements: Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (2007), the Acquisition and Cross-servicing Agreement (2010), General Security of Military Information Agreement (2012), and Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology Agreement (2014). Throughout this process, there have been calls for a 'quasi-alliance' between Japan and Australia or a strengthening of a trilateral security relationship between Japan, the US and Australia, but I have yet to see any government documents or prominent strategic thinkers arguing that a submarine deal signals Canberra's willingness to enter into a full-fledged alliance, which would be necessary if we expect Australia to do what White described. I am aware of no serious intellectual discussions currently taking place about what a Japan-Australia mutual defense treaty should look like or whether such an arrangement is necessary or not in either the Japanese Government or policy community at large. The submarine deal is not predicated on the eventual conclusion of such an alliance – it should be seen as another step in the incremental deepening of the relationship, not a great leap forward.

White's latest rejoinder quotes John Maynard Keynes on our reluctance to squarely face possible future changes and warns us that 'we simply do not know how Asia's strategic system will evolve, what role Japan will play, what hard choices Australia will face, and how far those choices might take us from an alignment with Japan three or four decades from now.' True enough, but his claim that the submarine deal will semi-permanently lock both countries into a full-fledged alliance is a stretch.

In short, White's concerns may be akin to that of an overly-protective parent who tells his daughter that she shouldn't go on a date with one of her good friends, because he will now expect her to accept a proposal, get married and have three kids. Admittedly, the restaurant that he reserved is a little too expensive for a first date, so he's definitely hoping for a second date – but this doesn't mean that he expects her to plan their next three or four decades together. Such a commitment is scary for her date as well. One of them seems to be relatively more eager than the other, but both are nevertheless thinking of moving the relationship forward. Yes, the future is uncertain, circumstances may change, and their interests will likely ebb and flow. Yet, the dinner is neither an engagement ring nor a marriage certificate, much less a joint bank account for the college education fund of their three future children.

Let's take a deep breath, step back and observe whether this new closer relationship will be good for the both parties in this uncertain environment. After all, they can still go back to being good friends, if things don't work out as expected.

Photo courtesy of the Australian Defence Image Library.

In any case, we also have seen the effects on our exports. Look at this graph from the RBA:

Iron ore, coal and LNG volumes have grown impressively. Services and manufacturing have been relatively more subdued. And those resource lines haven't finished going up. Here is what the RBA has to say:

Exports of iron ore are expected to continue to grow over the next couple of years, albeit at a slower pace than over the past few years, as production from the larger, low-cost producers continues to expand. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports are expected to increase substantially over the next few years as a number of LNG projects currently under construction begin production.

That green line should start going crazy soon. Australia will become the world's largest exporter of the stuff, overtaking Qatar, perhaps some consolation for missing out on hosting the World Cup.

This all sounds like a substantial effect on the Australian economy. Why is the mining boom hard to see in the top line numbers? One reason is that the Australian dollar plays a remarkably good stabilising role. 

For example, as Australia's terms of trade (the price of our exports relative to the price of our imports) has fallen since 2011, so has the value of our dollar, cushioning any adverse impacts on economic activity. You can see this clearly in service imports, again courtesy of the RBA:

The RBA note that the decline in services is in large part due to a decline in tourism and business service imports. Tourism imports are just Australians taking a holiday overseas. So with a lower value of the dollar, fewer Australians are going abroad to sun themselves – they are staying at home and visiting the lovely beaches on their own shores.

So, yes, the China boom has affected the Australian economy. It's just the economy looks like it has been flexible enough to deal with it without large effects on aggregate activity. Although for a slightly contra view, see this paper by Peter Tulip, Peter Downes and Kevin Hanslow who find that the rise in commodity prices increased GDP by 6% in 2013 compared to a counterfactual.

That paper makes a further point that there is a difference between activity and what we can afford. The terms of trade boom means we could buy a lot more with our output. The authors show that increase in purchasing power was also worth around 6% of GDP. That boom may have passed.

One important place where the terms of trade effects show up is in taxation receipts. The mining boom led to nice juicy profits for the miners, and high wages for those working for them, and those proceeds got taxed. Also, those same patterns would have been seen in other mining related sectors. One of the best graphs I've seen on this effect comes from Grattan, who show how the terms of trade boom has affected the budget (ignore the other bars this time):

So the terms of trade boom helped prop up the government budget. We probably can't rely on that forever.

And then there is the investment angle. My colleague, Steve Grenville, discussed that earlier in the week, in the context of what the rules of the game look like. Notably, on Monday, KPMG and Sydney Uni released a report saying that Chinese investment grew by 60% in 2015. Yikes! There's no need to panic though. That kind of investment is needed in our economy.

So the effects of the Chinese boom have been there to see. However, it doesn't mean that if China enters a downturn, we are destined to follow.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user Konrad Lembcke.

This is a good illustration of the dangers of relying on bilateral intelligence sharing in the current counter-terrorism environment. The Paris/Brussels network consisted of at least 36 individuals of different nationalities, located across Europe and the Middle East. Using national responses to counter a growing transnational threat was likely to succeed for only so long.

The ISIS threat to Europe revealed by Paris and Brussels needs not just 'information exchange' but also an increasingly coordinated, multilateral response. A response led by an organisation with access to intelligence feeds from all member states; the ability to look strategically across these feeds to identify common threads and links; and most importantly, with the mandate to coordinate action across Europe when threats are identified.

Worryingly, Europe already has an organisation with such a mission statement – the European Union Police Force (Europol).

Europol, as with any multilateral organisation, can only be as good as its members allow. The el-Bakroui example suggests that Europol may not have been receiving the data it required. 

But perhaps the clue is in the name? As a police force, Europol focuses on arrests, seizures and interdictions. It does not triage new intelligence leads, or develop intelligence access into terrorist networks. And terrorism is just one priority for an organisation of less than 1000 staff and fewer than 150 analysts. 

Over the last three weeks, authorities across Europe have warned that further attempts at coordinated and complex terrorist attacks are likely. Surely now is the time for Europe to empower Europol to do its job effectively? Or preferably, establish a new body with the clout and resources to maximise Europe's combined counter-terrorism expertise.

This will be no easy task. Trust is central to successful intelligence sharing relationships – it will not come easily after years of European nations spying on each other. A new organisation would also need to work closely with non-EU partners with a more chequered track record in the fight against ISIS, such as Turkey. 

This is where a new organisation without baggage or existing issues might be an advantage. The organisation could be narrowly focused, instead of representing one priority of an organisation with a wider, pan-EU remit. And it should also be time-limited to reassure members that this is not 'the new normal'.

Creating an intelligence-driven organisation would be more than an expansion of Europol's existing role. It would have privacy implications, given the potential need for earlier sharing of citizen's data. And it could generate further questions around the role of the traditional guarantor of a citizen's security, the nation state.

But if Europe is serious about countering the current threat, these issues may need to be dealt with sooner rather than later. Because without a more multilateral approach, the success of counter-terrorism in Europe will be determined by the lowest common denominator. And the least competent services, not the most, will continue to set the tone.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user Tijl Vercaemer.

It should be remembered that Mr. Abe was not the first prime minister to start this move to a more active defense and assertive foreign policy, but he has moved things faster and farther than anyone else since Prime Minister Nakasone more than 30 years ago.

The US long wanted Japan to be a more active ally and to play a more substantial defense role. Unfortunately, the US Government wasted a year after Abe's election, keeping him at arm's length for his views of history, comfort women and his reputation as a 'rightist'. However, the Americans finally got over this and got what they wanted – as evidenced by last year's revision (and improvement) of US-Japan Defense Guidelines, and Prime Minister Abe's successful passage of measures broadening what Japan can do under the doctrine of 'collective self-defense.' 

It's worth noting that Abe does not snap his fingers and get what he wants. He has always faced considerable domestic opposition. Abe can't ignore public opinion, and consequently he has endeavored to explain his policies, even if imperfectly, better than earlier prime ministers.

Besides challenges from opposition parties, Abe has plenty of enemies within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). There is even a sizeable LDP bloc opposing Abe's active defense policies, not to mention many politicians of all parties favoring a more accommodating stance towards China. And of course Japan's bureaucracy drags its feet on occasion. Indeed, for all his success, Prime Minister Abe has been unable to meaningfully increase defense spending — given the Ministry of Finance's outsized influence — but he has at least prevented further cuts.

One should not assume this trajectory towards a more assertive Japan will continue. Abe is practically Otto von Bismarck himself compared to many of his predecessors – who seemed to view a Japanese prime minister's primary purpose as recycling money from the central government to favored supporters and back again. For them, foreign affairs and military matters were better left to risk-averse bureaucrats.

The US Government should fear a return to the 'status quo ante Abe' when Japanese officials proclaimed most things related to national security as 'too hard', or only changeable at a glacial pace. With Abe's departure, the US will have lost its best chance in decades for Japan to develop into a more useful ally – while injecting a needed degree of 'equality' into the bilateral relationship. And Japan will have squandered its opportunity to be taken seriously on the world stage for something other than its money.

Moreover, forget about Japan increasing defense spending – to which many of the JSDF's shortcomings can be traced. As for resolving the Okinawa basing issues: Prime Minister Abe has made an effort to look at Japan's defense from a national perspective, rather than the viewpoint of Okinawan activist and outsider-incited opposition. He nobly tried to finally push through the replacement for the Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station after repeated promises by Tokyo to do so went unfulfilled. When Abe eventually goes, expect a return to constant friction and hapless and unsuccessful central government efforts to placate a noisy local opposition with huge payoffs and concessions that guarantee degradation of US forces combat capabilities and overall deterrence.

A word about the economy: Abe is regularly savaged by critics — especially foreign ones — for the perceived failure of 'Abenomics'. Prime Minister Abe deserves a pass on this, not least since none of his predecessors over the last 25 years had any greater success reviving the economy. Indeed, one might fairly argue that Mr. Abe's biggest mistake was failing to listen closely to the Ministry of Finance and Bank of Japan – and then do precisely the opposite of what the bureaucrats recommend.

The world needs an assertive, active Japan. Representing as it does a higher manifestation of individual liberty, consensual government and rule of law, the world needs the proactive, engaged, militarily capable nation that Prime Minister Abe, for all his shortcomings, has tried to create.

If Japan returns to form — with a rapid succession of 'money shuffling' prime minsters — and retreats back into its shell while timid bureaucrats run the show, the world and the region will be worse off.

More than anyone, the US Government will miss him.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user Day Donaldson.

In 1990 China constructed a 2700 meter runway on Woody Island, long enough to handle any Chinese combat aircraft currently in service. And China has not limited their construction to a runway on Woody, having built a large radar system and left room for missile launchers. China has already deployed modern combat aircraft and H-9 long-range anti-air missiles to the Island. From Woody Island, Chinese fighters can cover almost the entirety of the South China Sea. Further south in the Spratlys, the airfields and associated anti-air defences being built on Subi Reef and Fiery Cross Reef are nearing completion, in addition to other Chinese installations such as radars and missile launchers. From these island air bases, even older Chinese fighters can join a potential fray and strike against Malaysian and Filipino bases almost at will, both of which lack major anti-air capabilities.

The combined airfields and missiles create a network of overlapping zones that can actively deny opponents the ability to strike against Chinese held islands. While having been primarily focused on naval denial, the anti-air version of China's anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) is similar, helping to keep any potential threat away from their island bases. Despite some analysts arguing that these island bases and the associated Chinese air and naval forces are sitting ducks, this assumes that the US would be involved militarily in a potential conflict – yet Vietnam and Malaysia cannot count on US assistance. The Philippines has defence treaties with the US, but recent planning within the Philippine Air Force suggests a desire to improve their own capabilities.

Challenging China

The aerial strength of the countries around the South China Sea remains unbalanced in China's favour, so much in fact that these countries would likely not be able to hold off sustained attacks from China. At the most, they could slow China down. To have a fighting chance, Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines all need to reinforce and strengthen their air forces and their anti-air capabilities. These countries are aware of this, and have all been preparing accordingly in different ways.

For instance, in November 2015, Malaysia held a significant aerial exercise involving their Su-30MKMs, their American F/A-18Ds and their British BAE Hawks. They practiced aerial combat, suppression of anti-air defences, and precision bombing – all operations that would likely be targeted against one enemy in particular. Indeed, the exercise was launched from Labuan Air Base – just south of the Spratly Islands. This is in addition to the ongoing wish to buy new advanced fighters to upgrade and strengthen the Malaysian Air Force.

Vietnam has also realised their weakness in the air, and has announced an intention to acquire a dozen more Sukhois, likely of the newer Su-35 design. Hanoi has also bought Russian S-300 anti-air missile systems, and aims to buy the upgraded S-400 version in addition to lighter shoulder-mounted Igla-1s. But Vietnam has not stopped there – they have also decided to copy Chinese A2/AD and bought additional Russian anti-ship missiles.

The Philippines has the furthest to go to prepare for any conflict against China, in the air or on the water. The Philippine Air Force's long-term planning aims to acquire not only new advanced fighters by 2021, but also airborne early warning systems — something the other countries have not publicly announced — and ground based anti-air missiles and radars.

New potential aircraft are the same for all of them: the Saab JAS-39 Gripen, the Eurofighter Typhoon, the Dassault Rafael, the upgraded F-16V, and the Sukhoi Su-35. Which plane any of the countries will buy has not yet been decided, but with Vietnam's history of buying Russian weapons, a purchase of the Su-35 is the most probable for Hanoi. The Philippines seem to favour the JAS-39, while for Malaysia and their history of buying a mix of Russian and Western fighters means the choice is much more uncertain and can fall either way.

Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines have all seen the threat, not only from the sea, to which RAND suggests to counter with a network of anti-ship missiles, but also in the air. If these countries are able to obtain, learn how to use and deploy the weapons effectively, they can counter and threaten China's encroachments through more than just words and delaying tactics – they can challenge Beijing in the air and support their naval force modernisation.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user Dmitry Terekhov.

What principles emerge from this history? What nefarious activity would SOEs carry out that foreign investors like tax-avoiding reclusive Zug-based Glencore (sole owner of Xstrata) wouldn't do in its own market-oriented self-interest? The outrageously successful effort to torpedo the resources super-profit tax in 2009-10 was orchestrated and fronted by Aussies. When we have second thoughts about allowing China to have a lease of Darwin's port, what exactly did we think that the Chinese might do that could harm our security? None of this is transparent in the present system.

That said, letting foreigners own essential services has legitimate sensitivities. To disallow Chinese-maintained equipment into vital areas of our telecommunications might make sense, given their reputation for eaves-dropping. And yet, we don't mind Singapore owning one of the key telecoms companies, despite its reputation for official intrusiveness. Would these issues restrict China from owning key services like electricity? We've already sold off quite a bit of this utility to foreigners. Might the Hong Kong owners of the Latrobe Valley power stations be pressured into turning off the lights at some dark moment in the future? Might the Canadians who have a long-term lease on Sydney's desalination plant try to blackmail us into paying more for their water when we have a serious drought?

There seem to be some fanciful elements in some of these security-based arguments. The foreign-owned assets are physically here in Australia, subject to Australian regulation and law. Surely we can protect our own interests in these circumstances? 

The starting point for policy might be to sort out some of the ambivalence:

• Yes, we want foreign investment, but since the float of the dollar in 1983 removed the external constraint, we should not have to beg or offer special incentives to foreigners to fill the nation's saving/investment gap. Our openness to foreign investment is an opportunity given to foreigners to join with us in taking up the many profitable opportunities which our resource-rich, well-governed, secure country offers – a benefit we are bestowing on the foreigners as much as it is a favour they are doing for us.
• In exchange, the foreigners should make an explicit undertaking to be good corporate citizens. This means paying a fair amount of tax in Australia, not arranging their affairs to have the profits accrue in tax-avoidance centres like Ireland or Singapore. Australian shareholders make such a contribution through income tax, so it is not only fair. It is also economically efficient (competitively neutral) to expect foreigners to pay the same. Foreigner's profits come, to large degree, from the benefit of being able to exploit Australia's natural endowment and to sell into this well-functioning market with intellectual property protected and legal rights enforceable through due process. We don't want companies that are unwilling to contribute to the cost of running this governance infrastructure.
• Sensitive areas should be either clearly off-limits or subject to negotiated safeguards. In most cases, the owners of vital service sectors can't do us much harm without doing more harm to themselves. Let's try to put a bit of realism into these nebulous security arguments.
• Perhaps the greatest opportunity for a change in the mindset would be if we stopped thinking of the Foreign Investment Review Board's job in terms of allowing foreign investment unless a problem can be identified (a negative focus). Instead, we should ask the foreigners to set out why their proposal is positively good for us. This might actually change the nature of the proposals. Rather than tweaking them to get around the downside objections, foreigners could make proposals more inclusive and beneficial for Australia. Does the proposal open up markets in the foreign investor's home country? This should be particularly relevant for China, which needs to set up supply-side security in basic commodities – minerals, energy and food. How can they help us break into their huge market? It might be beneficial to have a substantial Australian partner. Don't try to take over our icons or national champions.
• The trickiest issue is to articulate why we might want to discriminate between different foreigners on the basis of 'community concerns'. This has something to do with not wanting to be dominated by overly-powerful foreigners. The issue for China is that they are huge relative to us, and even modest proposals will easily overwhelm us: the 'elephant in the canoe'. This might be hard to explain to the Chinese, but the Prime Minister might begin the task.

Of course the Prime Minister has a winning rejoinder in the unlikely event that he is backed into a corner on this topic: the Chinese don't allow open investment in their own country, so any restrictions we apply are just reciprocity – tit for tat. But a better long-term answer is to develop some principles.

Photo: Lowy Institute/Peter Morris.

Jabhat al-Nusra, the al Qaeda-aligned group initially sent into Syria at the behest of ISIS leadership, provides an interesting comparison to ISIS. The organisation has crafted a web of alliances with fellow Syrian rebel groups. For example they play a prominent role in the Jaysh al-Fatah and Dar al-Qada'a coalitions, whose members include Jaysh al Islam and Ahrar al Sham – two powerful Islamist players in the Syrian landscape. These coalitions also integrate Jabhat al-Nusra into broader networks of support, with Jaysh al Fatah supported by Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. This allows Jabhat al-Nusra to benefit from regional sponsors without being part of the direct supply chain. 

Jabhat al-Nusra has even made placatory overtures towards minorities and the West (two groups that in the past have been key targets of al Qaeda – Jabhat al-Nusra's affiliate). In his last interview with Al Jazeera in May 2015, Jabhat al-Nusra's leader, Abu Mohammad al-Joulani, reassured the West that they were not a target (albeit with the ominous caveat of 'at this stage'). Al-Joulani went on to guarantee that the Shi'ia, and even regime supporters, would be welcomed as brothers if they repented their ways. Rather than indicating a substantive change in attitude, this shows Jabhat al-Nusra's awareness that softer messaging will help their prospects of survival.

Jabhat al-Nusra has also managed to win the support of some local Syrians in rebel-held territory. Outreach programs and flexibility regarding local norms, have proved effective ways of ingratiating itself with local populations.

Jabhat al-Nusra's approach has its own challenges, however. It must tread a fine line between forming strategic alliances and maintaining legitimacy as an authoritative voice of Islam. ISIS has for some time accused Jabhat al-Nusra of consorting with apostates, indicating ISIS's willingness to exploit this weakness. 

In the case of Syria and Iraq, it is pragmatism that will likely prove the best strategy. This is because the dilemma facing Jabhat al-Nusra is likely only a short-term one – the tension between flexibility and legitimacy will no longer be relevant if it outlasts ISIS. If ISIS falls, Jabhat al-Nusra and its parent organisation al Qaeda will be the most radical game in town, likely absorbing what fighters remain. Whereas irrespective of whether Jabhat al-Nusra survives or not, ISIS will still be encircled by enemies. ISIS has painted itself into a corner where modifying its approach based on strategic grounds would deal a potentially fatal blow to its credibility. In contrast, Jabhat al-Nusra's ability to form strategic alliances when required, even when these do not fit in with their long-term goals, shows a cunning malleability that may be the key to its survival.

It seems that in this case, it is far better to make friends than enemies, and international security agencies must plan accordingly.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user Day Donaldson.

The protests highlighted the Timorese people and their friends' strong feelings about the issue. It is a response to the Australian Government's approach to not delimit a permanent maritime boundary. When Australia can do it with its other neighbours, it is bewildering as to why it can't with Timor-Leste?

While some have tried to link the protests to the Timorese Government, there should be no doubt that these protests grew out of the strong feelings held by the Timorese and were neither government led, nor government incited. The forceful, yet peaceful, protests were organised by Timorese civil society.

Speaking at the conference on Maritime Boundaries held by the Associacao Dos Combatentes Da Brigada Negra on 16 March, former Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao applauded the Timorese for standing strong for their sovereignty, which might have mistakenly been interpreted as instigating the protests against the Australian Government. 

Xanana Gusmao has never been to any formal university, but he knows international politics and diplomacy. Thus, any contemplation of Xanana inciting the demonstrations does him a great injustice. Similarly, it amounts to an insult to the people's will and determination to achieve full sovereignty for Timor-Leste. Timorese know what is right and wrong.

Timor-Leste had refrained from protests and other action on this issue for some time in order to see what would transpire with the Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea agreement (CMATS) which states that the agreement is made without prejudice to either party's claims to maritime boundaries. However, given the deadline for the approval of development plans as set out in Article 12 of CMATS  had come and gone, and given the further lack of goodwill after it became known that Australia spied on Timor-Leste during the negotiations, as well as Australia's refusal to sit at the table to settle maritime boundaries, Timorese decided enough is enough.

What is now obvious is that the government and people of Timor-Leste are speaking one language; sovereignty, which remains incomplete with a neighbour who refuses to negotiate the delimitation of the maritime boundary.

The people of Timor-Leste are now more determined than ever in demanding their just rights in the Timor Sea. The demonstrations in March have also proved that the Timorese are prepared to take this new fight to all corners of the world, so long as the Australian Government holds on to its position of refusing to negotiate for a permanent maritime boundary in the Timor Sea.

The Waltzing Matilda might take some time still.

The views expressed here are the author's own and do not represent any institution he is affiliated with.

Lagarde delivered a similar speech prior to the September 2015 IMF/World Bank annual meetings, with the title 'Managing the Transition to a Healthy Global Economy'. It was the same story prior to the April 2014 IMF meetings when the Managing Director warned that the global economy could be heading for years of sub-par growth if there is not sufficient policy ambition. Lagarde's speech prior to the April 2013 IMF meetings had the same message, warning that global growth is not expected to pick-up and 'we are seeing new risks as well as old risks'. She gave her usual call for more decisive policy responses by all countries.

As noted, part of the established lead-up to IMF meetings is the Fund lowering its forecasts for global growth. Again true to form, the IMF has signalled that it will likely do the same prior to this year's meetings.

The IMF's forecasting record is embarrassing. The chart below, which comes from the 2016 Economic Report of the US President, illustrates the IMF's persistent downward revision to its forecasts since 2010. It has been described as the 'most depressing chart in the world'. 

The other regular feature of the IMF meetings is that notwithstanding the Managing Directors repeated calls for more decisive policy action, it has had little or no impact on the policy choices of countries. Things will be no different this month.

Why haven't countries heeded the IMF's warnings and followed its policy prescriptions?

In some cases this is because countries do not agree with the Fund. For example, Germany is solidly opposed to the Fund's call that it should adopt more expansionary fiscal policy. But in the majority of cases the problem is that governments cannot win the domestic political battles needed to implement the IMF's policy recommendations. This is particularly the case with structural reforms, such as liberalising product and labour markets and introducing reforms to domestic tax systems.

However the IMF is not always helping its cause. Steve Grenville has observed that more accurate forecasts by the IMF could have improved the policy debate and resulted in better outcomes. In addition, the IMF's predictable and repeated warnings about global risks has seen its message blunted over time – a case of the boy who cried wolf.

This is unfortunate, because the risks to the global economy currently identified by the IMF Managing Director are real and are rising – particularly in the political domain. As Lagarde has warned, the global economy is beset by an array of political risks, from terrorism to the UK's potential departure from the EU. The IMF's chief economist, Maurice Obstfield, has warned of the trend in Europe to reject economic integration in favour of national solutions. But this trend is not limited to Europe. The call at the moment is to build walls between countries rather than take them down. 

A key risk not mentioned by Lagarde is the US presidential elections. The Donald Trump phenomenon maybe on the wane, but the inward looking policies and protectionist pressures he is advocating are rising in the US and elsewhere. The IMF Managing Director says now is the time for 'leadership and cooperation'. However in the current political climate it is difficult to see the US providing the leadership necessary to engender greater cooperation. This is a risk that should be exercising the minds of finance ministers when they meet in Washington this week. Unfortunately, it will likely be a case of 'deja-vu all over again'.

Photo courtesy of Fickr user International Monetary Fund.

Trump's prescription is a radical departure from the longstanding norm but does reflect one school of thought in American defence circles. Some nuclear strategists argue that just as America benefitted from the UK and France having nuclear weapons during the Cold War, so will it in East Asia against China. 

Moreover, America can hardly be held responsible if a country chooses to violate their NPT obligations. If anyone is liable it's North Korea, which levels explicit nuclear threats in flagrant violation of international law.

Underlying all this is Trump's central objective: to get allies to pay their fair share, especially when the ally is the principle beneficiary of America's commitment. 

This brings me to Australia. 

Australia's most accomplished figure on these matters, former Defence Minister and Ambassador to the US, Kim Beazley, has already invoked the Nixon period to provide a nuanced prognostication, and suggests a Trump presidency could mean a reassertion of 'self-reliance' in Australian defence policy. 

I would associate myself closely with Beazley's historical comparator. However given the changes in strategic landscape since self-reliance was developed, specifically the centrality of the Asia Pacific to America's strategic future, I differ on what it means for Australia today. 

If I'm reading the tea leaves correctly, either a Trump or Clinton presidency will result in greater emphasis being placed on Australia in America's strategic calculus. I believe this to be even more so if the US were to draw down from Japan and Korea, since pulling back from the first island chain would require a corresponding reinforcement of America's presence in the greater Pacific Rim. 

Moreover, I don't think Trump's views on Australia are likely to reflect those of the other allies I've mentioned for several reasons. First, because for over a hundred years Australia has proved itself willing to invest blood and treasure in American wars in ways other allies have not; second, because America's military presence in Australia is at least of equal benefit to itself; and third, because Trump has never mentioned it and would hardly be shy in doing so. 

Some may believe that I'm a Trump supporter given I'm defending him as a Nixon-Kissinger realist. One of the many wonders of being an Australian is that I don't need to express a view on whether I personally like an American presidential candidate or not. 

But for clarity in explaining Trump's worldview, it's not that I relish the prospect of a Trump presidency – I just don't happen to fear it.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user Gage Skidmore.

Whether, after having received such a national or strategic assessment, the Howard Government would have changed its mind on supporting one of the worst policy decisions in living memory is not the issue here. What is of concern is that like a muscle left unused, policy and analytical capacity inevitably withers when not called upon. To what extent are Defence, DFAT and other parts of the national security apparatus today able to develop penetrating policy analyses evaluating the costs and benefits of military operations? Are they doing more than simply facilitating their implementation? The Defence White Paper’s crude and tendentious characterisation of the state of the rules-based global order does not inspire confidence.

Hugh White followed up on a post from Michael Heazle last week:

The reality is we simply do not know how Asia's strategic system will evolve, what role Japan will play, what hard choices Australia will face, and how far those choices might take us from an alignment with Japan three or four decades from now. But there are clear signs that the reassuring certainties evoked by Michael Heazle are already passing. The Japan we see today is already very different from the Japan we have known for decades past, as Malcolm Cook's recent Interpreter post so neatly shows ('Mugabe in Tokyo: The Warping of Japanese Foreign Policy'). And the America we see today is not the America we used to know either.

Is the global financial 'safety net' being neglected? Tristram Sainsbury:

The more challenging the path for Plan A, the more attention needs to be paid to the Plan B. And we should begenuinely worried that the IMF thinks that the global financial safety net is not adequate. Global financial defences haven't kept up with the growth of external debt, and a negative global shock has the potential to overwhelm the safety buffers. Current safety net arrangements are costly, not structured to provide the right incentives for countries to pursue sound macroeconomic policies on their own accord, and newer regional elements such as theBRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement, are of doubtful effectiveness. 

Collin Koh Swee Lean wrote on what 'militarisation' actually means in the South China Sea. I agree that militarisation involves spurring on arms race dynamics, which are not always apparent in the short-term:

With these systems, China enhances its ability to assert military control through denying access in and over the South China Sea. More importantly, given the threat these missiles pose to foreign aerial and naval assets, their deployment may prompt regional rivals to acquire both defensive and offensive countermeasures such as better electronic warfare systems, long-range air- and sea-launched standoff weapons, and specialist armaments for suppression of enemy air defences – thereby fuelling further militarisation of the South China Sea.

Robert E. Kelly on South Korea's domestic politics:

All 300 seats in South Korea's unicameral National Assembly are up for election on 14 April. 246 members are elected in single-member, first-past-the-post (FPP) districts, while the remaining 54 seats are elected on a separate ballot via proportional representation (PR). The vote comes amid a tense security situation on the peninsula. North Korea's many provocations this year, including a fourth nuclear test in January, have made national security much more salient than normal. Elsewhere, Korea's export-driven growth continues to stumble amid a cooling-off period in Chinese development and a weaker yen. Youth unemployment remains high.

Sem Fabrizi, Ambassador and head of the EU Delegation to Australia, wrote an op-ed for The Interpreter on the EU policy towards terrorism and migration:

The attacks in Europe are part of a global terrorist threat that knows no boundary, no religion, creed or human decency. They are also attacks on our open and democratic European society. The global migration crisis has its own causes and dynamics, and we are addressing this crisis with comprehensive policies. We must take care to avoid jumping to simplistic conclusions about how terrorists are motivated and enabled or to criminalise migrants or refugees. Our resolve is stronger than before to preserve peace, justice and security for our citizens and to stand up for our values through more, not less, Europe.

Stephenie Andal saw the Apple/FBI dispute as part of a larger trend:

I would argue the Apple/FBI conflict should not be seen in isolation but in the context of various other government efforts to shore up national security in the race for cyber security dominance. Examples include: Britain’s proposed 'snooper’s charter' that could force tech companies to overstep their own encryption measures; moves to amend French anti-terrorism laws by bolstering the ability for intelligence services to access personal data; China’s recent push for greater control over foreign technology products and services; and the public vilification of encrypted communications by European governments in the wake of recent terrorist attacks. 

Was Russia's 'successful' intervention in Syria the first sign of a new emerging multipolar world order? Matthew  Dal Santo:

From Russia's victory at Palmyra also flows a certain retrospective vindication of its belief that beating back the Western-backed 'moderate rebels' to shore up Assad's Government was in fact a crucial part of building the conditions in which ISIS could be defeated. Moreover, by saving Assad and then pressing him to negotiate, Russia has played a crucial role in brokering that patchwork of cessation of hostilities agreements that has brought a measure of hope that a negotiated conclusion to Syria's five-year old civil war might year be achieved. 

Catriona Croft-Cusworth reported on the Panama Papers and Indonesia:

Tempo, the only Indonesian publication involved in the international investigation, produced its own in-depth report. The first of the names mentioned by Tempo include corruption case fugitive Djoko Soegiarto Tjandra, 'gasoline godfather' Muhammad Reza Chalid — who last made an appearance in a corruption scandal involving Freeport Indonesia — and a prospective candidate for governor of Jakarta, Sandiaga Uno. A follow-up report by Tempo also named Lippo Group owner James Riady and Indofood Director, Franciscus Welirang, as having connections to Mossack Fonseca. 

There seems to be some progress in Libya regarding a unity government, says Casper Wuite:

Western countries will undoubtedly welcome the growing support within Libya for the unity government. However, its bet to support the GNA may not prove as successful as it may envisage. The GNA is unlikely to sanction the kind of intervention to target ISIS now being discussed in Western capitals. There is little support for such a move within Libya, and it would further jeopardise the GNA's legitimacy while it is negotiating the transfer of power with its two rival governments. A limited intervention (air strikes, commando raids, and advice by Special Forces to vetted armed groups) without GNA approval would also reflect poorly on its legitimacy.

Trump may be a Nixon/Kissinger realist, says Crispin Rovere:

To many, 'the Nixon Doctrine' meant a return to pre-World War II isolationism. And just as with Trump, this is inaccurate. In fact, the notion of a so-called 'isolationist streak' in contemporary American culture is somewhat fallacious. Rather, since the end of World War II the US has oscillated between 'interventionism' and 'realism'. At times of national greatness (such as the end of the Cold War) Americans become idealistic and are keen to export their exceptionalism to the world. When severely bitten, such as in Vietnam and Iraq, America swings towards realism, where realpolitik approaches to great-power relations prevail for a time.

A recent joint event between The Lowy Institute and the Council on Foreign Relations in Singapore analysed Southeast Asia amid growing US-China competition. Euan Graham attended and wrote on some of the outcomes:

We heard that competition isn't all bad either, especially in economics. Southeast Asians are adept at channeling great powers desire for influence to their advantage. High-level attention from China and the US creates opportunities as well as risks. However attached Southeast Asians are to 'ASEAN centrality', there is also a growing resignation that it is beyond Southeast Asia's collective capacity to 'tame the elephants'. Concern about being trampled underfoot has grown now that China's diplomacy toward the region has lost its smile. To coin a Southeast Asian metaphor, the rattan stick is now brandished alongside the durian. 

The latest entries in our embassy series featured a raft of former diplomats defending the lasting relevancy of the diplomatic outpost. First, a former UK Ambassador to North Korea, David Slinn:

I visited some of the then still well-hidden local markets. I saw that crime existed (I was also a victim: my car was broken into in front of one of the main hotels one evening). Locals told me about examples of corruption. I was told that some North Koreans listened to foreign radio broadcasts and I regularly got to talk to young North Koreans learning English at a school in Pyongyang. It was low-level, tactical engagement, but it all helped to build the socio-economic picture, a job made easier by the regular comparing of notes with the other EU embassies, which during my posting came to include Poland, Czech Republic and Romania.

Kishan Rana wrote on embassies and the digital age:

At its core diplomacy is still about trust-based communication between authorised state actors, and that trust is a product of relationships constructed and nurtured with foreign interlocutors. As Paschke observed in his 1999 report for the German government, interchanges between ministers and high home officials that meet continually at conferences produces an ‘illusion of familiarity’. The craft of relationship building rests on trust, predictability and integrity and embassies ground those relationships.

And finally, Daniel Woker on the ambassador as not only a conduit for public engagement, but also as an analyst:

It is of course true that 'His Excellency' the diplomatic envoy, moving in the rarified atmosphere of high politics, carrying top secret messages while denying doing so, insisting on never taking sides or positions, saying nothing while talking in elaborate phrases, is dead. This figure was killed by instant worldwide communication (and the leaking thereof), by the incessant spotlight of the media and citizen reporters, and by the multiplication of non-state actors in international relations: business and finance representatives, media moguls, non-government organisations and many more.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user Adria vidal.

It is now two-and-a-half years since a case of alleged corruption began against the head of one of Papua New Guinea's biggest legal firms, Paul Paraka of Paul Paraka Lawyers. In 2013, Paul Paraka was arrested and charged with 18 counts of receiving about AUS$30 million in allegedly fraudulent payments from the PNG Finance Department for legal work his firm claimed it had performed for the PNG Government.

The following year he was hit with another 32 charges of conspiracy to defraud, money laundering and misappropriation.

Paraka contests the charges and is still out on bail. In fact, he is now claiming even many more millions from the PNG Government in interest charges for money he says his firm is still owed. Lawrence Stephens, chairman of Transparency International PNG, says the bills for legal work arose out of what was touted to be fee-free.

'Step One,' he says, 'lawyers offering pro-bono services and sending lawyers out into jails around the country to assist people. This is portrayed as pro-bono support – work the Public Solicitor should be doing anyway. But it's said that these lawyers are helping out. These lawyers have to fill in their time sheets which are then sent back to headquarters. Headquarters then puts the time sheets together and presents them to the Government asking for payment for the alleged pro-bono work. So out the door goes multiple millions in what was dressed up as a gift to PNG.'

An indication of just how complicated the Paraka matter has become are two other related cases that the Supreme Court ruled on in February. This was all to do with whether the two anti-corruption police officers trying to get to the bottom of the matter could have their own legal representation.

In these two cases the appellant was listed as the Finance Minister, James Marape. But there were no fewer than seven respondents: Prime Minister O'Neill; PNG's Attorney General, Ano Pala; Paul Paraka; PNG's police force; the Independent State of PNG; Director of the National Fraud and Anti-Corruption Directorate, Matthew Damaru; and his Deputy, Timothy Gitua.

Nine lawyers appeared representing the various parties.

The court ruled that as police officers, Damaru and Gitua had to get the approval of the Attorney General to engage their own lawyers. But because they were taking legal action against the Attorney General in another related case he referred the matter to another senior PNG bureaucrat who said they could not retain their own lawyers.

They represented themselves anyway and won the subsequent Supreme Court ruling that they could continue their investigations. 'Now we can do our job,' Mr Damaru said. But, in the wake of his latest legal action, the final word probably belongs to Prime Minister O'Neill: 'It will take time before this issue is resolved.'

These days, it appears, every day is a field day for PNG's lawyers.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user APEC 2013.