Lowy Institute

AGE: anti-government elements; PGF: pro-government forces. (Source.)

In reaction to the despicable killing of over 100 school children in Pakistan whose only 'crime' was attending an army school at a time when the army was battling the Pakistani Taliban (TTP), the Afghan Taliban expressed 'sorrow over the tragedy and grief for the families of the victims.' The killing of innocent civilians, it said, is against Islamic principles. The Afghan Taliban has 'always condemned the killing of innocent people and children.'

This is of course true. Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar has made it a frequent practice in his Eid Statements to proclaim the group does not kill civilians. But, as I have pointed out previously, the Afghan Taliban's definition of 'civilian' diverges from that accepted under international humanitarian law agreed upon by a majority of the civilized world, including Muslim states.

The Afghan Taliban continues this narrative because it needs to portray itself as an insurgency fighting foreign invaders and only really targeting those who deserve it. That the list of 'those who deserve it' is getting increasingly long is illustrated by another recent Taliban statement (by the same Zabiullah Mujahed who voiced the Taliban's rejection of what happened in Pakistan) about an 11 December 2014 suicide attack at a French cultural centre inside a school. The attack occurred during a production that was considered un-Islamic because it dealt with the trauma of – wait for it – suicide attacks:

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Taking the opportunity, the Islamic Emirate warns all the (so called) media sources, and organizations working under the name of civil society, those who publish/show, organize demonstrations, meetings contrary to Islamic values, and spread anti-Islamic music, obscene acts and immorality in the community, and try to mislead the youth, that our Mujahideen will no longer tolerate this, and will uproot such activities through conducting similar actions, till the core of immorality is destroyed.

Data from the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan continues to show a rise in civilian casualties in Afghanistan, a majority at the hands of the Afghan Taliban. Undeniably, Afghan National Security Forces, foreign forces and others also kill civilians, but if you look at the graph above, the facts speak pretty loud. According to the UN nearly 5000 civilian casualties (1564 deaths and 3289 injured) were reported in the first six months of 2014, a 17% increase of civilians killed over the same period in 2013. Of these, 74% are attributed to anti-government elements.

But according to the Taliban, this is all propaganda. The UN has no idea who real civilians are and never checks its facts, the Taliban says. Most people are killed by Afghan Nation Security Forces and international military, it argues. Or, in a concession by a high-ranking ex-Taliban minister, the civilian deaths are mistakes. 

Regarding the Afghan Taliban's claim that it never targets children, this from the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict in a May 2014 report:

At least 545 children were killed and 1,149 injured in 790 documented incidents. Child casualties increased by 30 per cent in 2013 compared with 2012. Armed opposition groups, including the Taliban and Hezb-e-Islami, were responsible for a majority (889) of the recorded child casualties.

In response to the 2013 UN report documenting civilian casualties, the Taliban reiterated that protecting civilians was part of its aim, and that it gives clear instructions to not carry out attacks of any nature near markets, schools and bus stations. But let's look at some more memorable (in the sense of weighing heavily on the psyche of the Afghan population) non-civilian killings:

  • 14 July 2014: at least 42 people killed and dozens injured in a suicide attack at a busy market in eastern Afghanistan's Paktika province, local officials say.
  • 23 November 2014: a suicide bomber kills at least 50 people, wounding another 63, at a volleyball match, again in Paktika province.
  • 14 December 2014: IED on road to school in Nangarhar injures six students. 

When the Taliban insurgency first emerged, I had some sympathy for it. The Taliban was excluded from the Bonn peace agreement, hunted down in many parts of the country and initially tried to respond to communities' dissatisfaction with the Afghan Government. But the Taliban has brought neither security nor justice, as it promised. It also opposes education and development, aiming to keep people out of the 21st century. Few Afghans want this, and few Afghans I have spoken to have bought into the propaganda that the Taliban does not kill civilians.

So let's not rejoice in a simple condemnation of a heinous attack in Pakistan by a group that does more or less the same at home in Afghanistan. Let's see it for what it is: propaganda. Until the Taliban's rhetoric starts matching its actions, peace talks will be empty. We can only find peace if the facts come out and all sides practice what they preach.


By Anna Kirk, an intern in the Lowy Institute's Melanesia program.


The Indo-Pacific is a strategic system encompassing the Indian and Pacific oceans, reflecting the expanding interests and reach of China and India as well as the enduring role of the US. The Lowy Institute's International Security program presents a weekly selection of links illuminating the changing security picture in this increasingly connected super-region.

  •  What are the views of the newly nominated US Secretary of Defense, Ash Carter, on Asia?
  • India's first indigenously produced nuclear ballistic missile submarine, the INS Arihant, conducted its first sea-trials in the Bay of Bengal this week.
  • Construction of the largest coast guard vessel in the world, at 10,000 tons, is nearing completion in a Shanghai dockyard. The largest coast guard vessels are currently operated by Japan, at 6500 tons. The Chinese ship will reportedly be ready for commissioning sometime next year.
  • Vietnam has filed a 'statement of interest' with the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague regarding the Philippines arbitration case against China in the South China Sea. This follows position papers issued by China and the US outlining their respective legal positions on the issue of SCS territorial disputes last week.
  • The Lowy Institute's Danielle Rajendram released a new research paper this week on India's foreign policy under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and the country's developing Indo-Pacific strategy.
  • War is Boring has written on the rise of amphibious forces among Indo-Pacific powers.
  • Is Indonesia's potential role in the Indian Ocean underdeveloped?
  • India has now officially banned the Islamic State.
  • Lastly, Shuja Nawaz says that the Taliban's attack on a school in Peshawar may provoke a 'nationwide civil-military consensus on fighting terrorism' in Pakistan.

 The Lowy Institute International Security Program's work on Indo-Pacific security is supported by two grants from the John D and Catherine T MacArthur Foundation.


It has been a busy year for India in the Asia Pacific. From multilateral summits to bilateral diplomacy, the Modi Government has deliberately moved to step up engagement with its East and Southeast Asian partners.

At this year's India-ASEAN Summit, Prime Minister Modi announced his intention to upgrade India's long-standing 'Look East Policy' to 'Act East'. As I argue in a new Lowy Institute Analysis, this is more than just a rebranding, and signifies India's intention to play a more serious role in the region. 

Look East started primarily as an economic policy, and part of this enhanced effort has to do with the trade and investment opportunities presented by greater integration with the Asia Pacific. China is already India's top trading partner with a value of US$65 billion in 2013-2014, and at approximately US$74 billion, trade with ASEAN as a whole is even larger.

However, Look East shifted to a broader economic and strategic focus about a decade ago, and this has intensified in recent years. Even before coming to power, the BJP made it clear that it intended to pursue a greater global role for India, creating 'a web of allies' to further its interests, and the leveraging of all resources and people to 'play a greater role at the international high table'.

India's Asia Pacific strategy can be viewed as part of this broader drive for an enhanced global presence.

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But in recent years, one of the primary drivers of India's engagement with the Asia Pacific has been its concerns about China. China's assertiveness along the disputed border with India, and increasing influence among India's Indian Ocean neighbours, has driven New Delhi to pursue a strategy of external balancing against China in its own neighbourhood.

China's relations with India have long proceeded along two distinct economic and security tracks. However the recent border incursion during President Xi's visit to Delhi, and the docking of a Chinese submarine in Colombo, represented a significant misreading of India's new leader and served only to reinforce the relevance of this strategy for Modi. China's assertiveness in maritime territorial disputes in the East China Sea and South China Sea has also reinforced the relevance of a more 'involved' India for its Southeast and East Asian partners, which are reaching out to India as a potential strategic counterweight.

At the heart of India's Asia Pacific strategy are practical partnerships with key states and institutions, centering upon Japan, Vietnam, Australia and ASEAN. India has recognised the potential of these partners under previous governments, but has considerably stepped up engagement under Modi.

Modi made Japan the venue for his first trip outside of India's South Asian neighbourhood. This year has also seen an unprecedented level of interaction between Australia and India. Prime Minister Abbott was the first foreign leader Modi welcomed to New Delhi, and Modi made a full bilateral visit to Australia following the G20; the first of any Indian Prime Minister in almost 30 years. The same goes for interactions with Vietnam. Modi sent External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj and President Pranab Mukherjee to Hanoi in August and September, welcomed Prime Minister Dung to New Delhi at the end of October, and has agreed to visit Vietnam at a mutually convenient time. Swaraj and Modi have also both made trips to Naypyidaw for ASEAN engagements this year.

All of these countries offer India opportunities for deepening its engagement with the Asia Pacific.

As the central regional institution, ASEAN has long been at the heart of India's eastward shift in focus. Japan is the most advanced Asian naval power in the region and a potential source of considerable investment and technological assistance. Vietnam's geostrategic position in Indochina and the South China Sea makes it a natural partner for India to balance against China in its own neighbourhood. Australia continues to offer assistance as a source of natural resources and as a partner for naval cooperation. Japan and Vietnam each have tense relations with China, providing additional impetus to their ties with India. And although largely underdeveloped, I've made the case before that India should expend more effort cultivating its partnership with Indonesia. Indonesia's geographic location at the centre of Asia's strategic straits, plus President Jokowi's vision of Indonesia as a 'global maritime axis', serves only to reinforce the relevance of this relationship.

On top of this enhanced diplomatic effort, India's partners in the region can expect greater Indian involvement in regional security, particularly in the areas of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, transnational crime, and joint bilateral naval exercises. However India will be unlikely to engage in any security initiatives that can be perceived as threatening or directly targeted at limiting China's influence.

Should Modi be able to maintain this momentum, there is significant potential to transform India into a consequential actor in the Asia Pacific. If carefully managed, especially with relation to Chinese sensitivities, cautious Indian engagement could act as a stabilising force in the region. More importantly, successfully enhancing its role in East and Southeast Asia could signal the beginning of the pursuit of a more serious role for India across the entire Indo-Pacific region.

Photo courtesy of Reuters/Toru Hanai.


Christmas is a time of year when Indonesia's state motto of 'Unity in Diversity' is really put to the test. The holiday provokes a variety of responses from the Muslim-majority population, ranging from taking selfies with shopping mall Christmas trees and celebrating with Christian friends to refusing to wish others a 'Merry Christmas', or, in extreme cases, violently interrupting church activities.

Christianity accounts for two of the six officially recognised faiths in Indonesia, split into Protestantism and Catholicism. Some pockets of the country are majority-Christian, especially in the eastern islands and in parts of Sumatra, Kalimantan and Sulawesi. Major cities also have substantial Christian populations, including many ethnic Chinese Indonesians. Among communities where Christianity is a long-established faith, Christmas is celebrated openly with a mix of Western and indigenous traditions.

In Jakarta's city centre, Christmas lights can be found everywhere, along with banners wishing citizens a happy Christmas and New Year. Competition is high among the capital's most extravagant shopping malls to out-do one another with their holiday displays, involving forests of spangled Christmas trees, mountains of fake snow and the obligatory pop Christmas albums on repeat.

But in areas where Christianity is seen as expanding into new territory and gaining converts, the atmosphere is entirely different.

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In parts of Java, newspaper headlines regularly warn against 'Christianisation', despite Islam's unquestionable dominance among the Indonesian population as a whole. In Bogor, a town in West Java  that brushes the edges of Jakarta's urban sprawl, a Protestant congregation has been battling for the right to open a church. The planned church building was sealed in 2010 by a former mayor who said it lacked the required permits and community support. Four years and two favourable Supreme Court rulings later, the congregation has still not been allowed to enter their church building. They plan to spend yet another Christmas worshiping on the footpath in front of the sealed church, potentially under threat of confrontation with opponents of the service, as has been the case in past years.

Christmas and New Year celebrations are guarded across the nation by security forces as part of an activity known as 'Operation Candle'. This year, almost 146,000 security personnel will be stationed at churches and other sites for worship and celebration across Indonesia. Throughout the year, churches around Indonesia come under attack by hardliners, usually under the pretext of accusations related to a lack of building permits and community endorsement. One of the major criticisms of former President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's 10 years in office was his lack of action on growing religious intolerance in Indonesia.

During this year's election campaign, rumours calling the now-President Jokowi a closet Christian were designed to detract from his widespread popularity. This in itself signals a poor state of interfaith relations, suggesting that voters were expected to be swayed by a candidate's religion over his credentials. To Jokowi's credit, rather than distancing himself from the rumours surrounding his faith, Jokowi plans to celebrate Christmas in Papua, where Christians are the majority.

These plans were made before a deadly clash occurred between civilians and security forces in the province last week, in which five locals were killed. Now some church leaders have withdrawn their invitation to the President, in protest over his refusal to make a statement on the incident. Nonetheless, government representatives have claimed that the visit will go ahead on 27 December.

It seems unlikely at this point that Jokowi could get away with visiting Papua and not making a statement on last week's deaths. In this way, the visit has the potential to address two important areas said to have suffered under the previous government: religious tolerance and recognition of human rights abuses. The question now is whether Jokowi will take the opportunity to deliver a Christmas message of peace and goodwill among all Indonesians.

Photo by Flickr user Rezwan.


For years, decades even, professional Burma watchers, activists and other commentators have been making assessments about developments in Burma (Myanmar) on the basis of very little hard information. Government statistics could not be trusted, official spokesmen rarely gave away anything of value and the state-run press largely peddled propaganda. Reports generated outside Burma were often highly politicised and had to be treated carefully.

There were some notable exceptions to this rule, but even well-informed analysts tended to refer to Burma as an intelligence black hole.

In such circumstances, gauging the popular mood in Burma was always fraught with risk. Structured surveys of public opinion were forbidden. There were occasional attempts by embassies and international organisations to sound out certain target groups, but access to different parts of the country was difficult and the regime's coercive apparatus was so pervasive that the likelihood of gaining an accurate picture was low.

As a result, Burma watchers of all kinds were heavily reliant on fragmentary information derived from relatively small numbers of personal contacts, anecdotal sources and gossip. Whenever there was a major incident of any kind, the Rangoon rumour mill went into overdrive. This did not prevent educated speculation about what people in Burma felt about certain issues, but such judgements usually lacked hard evidence. 

Since the advent of President Thein Sein's hybrid civilian-military government in 2011, however, the atmosphere within Burma has changed dramatically. There is now much greater freedom of speech, of association and of movement. As a result, it has been possible to conduct comprehensive surveys that give more reliable snapshots of public opinion. Two such exercises, both conducted by US institutions with the support of foreign governments, stand out.

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The first was published in April this year by the International Republican Institute (IRI) and enjoyed the backing of the US Agency for International Development (USAID). Survey of Burma Public Opinion, December 24, 2013- February 1, 2014 canvassed the views of 3000 adult men and women from 208 rural and 92 urban locations in all 14 states and regions of Burma. 

Not surprisingly, the survey showed that there was overwhelming support for democracy as the most desirable form of government, although understanding of what 'democracy' actually meant seems to have differed widely. Those surveyed were also generally supportive of the Government's reform programs, although their views seem to have been influenced by the optimism then prevailing about Burma's future economic development.

Interestingly, when asked about the three biggest problems facing Burma as a whole, the majority of respondents identified unemployment, ethnic or sectarian violence, and high prices. Almost all other issues raised related to daily life, such as poor health care, the lack of electricity and inadequate transportation. Politics only featured at the far end of the scale, with the need to amend the constitution scoring lower even than natural disasters.

The second survey has just been released. It was conducted by the Asia Foundation with help from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs. Entitled Myanmar 2014: Civic Knowledge and Values in a Changing Society, it was conducted in May and June this year. It too sought the views of 3000 respondents across all fourteen states and regions, once again through personal interviews. 

The Asia Foundation survey was more comprehensive than the IRI exercise, and has yielded more nuanced results. It found, for example, that there is very limited knowledge in Burma about the structure and functions of the country's multi-level system of government, particularly at the subnational level. Respondents still hoped for a real democracy, but there was little understanding about the principles and practices that underpin a democratic society.

Also, the survey suggests that Burmese are generally positive about the situation in their country, and welcome the results of the reform programs introduced since 2011, as far as they go. However, there is a pervasive underlying uncertainty about the future, particularly in the peripheral areas where most of the ethnic minorities live. Governments are still viewed with suspicion, political disagreements are deeply polarising and social trust is low. 

Once again, the country's economic fortunes figured prominently in the thinking of those surveyed. As the IRI project also found, economic performance not only serves as a key indicator of how the country is seen, but it also strongly affects popular attitudes towards the central government. There is a high expectation that the government will play a strong role in ensuring economic growth, and an equitable and inclusive society.

None of these conclusions will be surprising to those who have followed Burma closely. Also, there is still a dearth of reliable information about many critical issues, such as the political views of the armed forces leadership. However, these and other surveys can provide the basis for more reliable judgements about the public mood in Burma and the wishes of the Burmese people. They should also result in better informed policy decisions.

If there is an underlying message in both surveys, it is that since 2011 Burma's reforms have had a positive impact. The country is still facing serious problems, resulting in attendant caution, but there are now palpable hopes for a more democratic system of government and (in particular) a higher standard of living. These trends are to be welcomed and encouraged. That will require not just moral support, but also technical advice, practical assistance, and patience.

Photo by Flickr user Francisco Anzola.


An ambitious Chinese initiative to build a series of strategic maritime distribution centres, west to Africa and beyond, has been revealed. This is an extension of the Maritime Silk Road, which in turn complements a plan to revive the terrestrial Silk Road through central Asia.

China's strategic maritime distribution centers  (Courtesy of East by Southeast.)

A 'string of pearls' — bases through the Indian Ocean — has long been denied by Beijing, possibly in deference to India. Recent naval deployments suggest Beijing is less obliging now. 'China's growing investment and its international prestige associated with the Maritime Silk Road must be protected which will in turn demand presence', notes one China watcher. Formal alliances and bases are unlikely for now, but 'fighting terrorism' and guarding African oil overseas has been authorised.

The term 'string of pearls' invokes the British coaling stations of olden times. The Chinese maps today, showing railways and shipping lanes spanning the globe, remind an English friend of mine of the British Empire on which the sun never set: 'This move from China is straight out of the playbook of Queen Elizabeth (the First), who granted a charter to the East India Company to take the City of London's excess savings and "go out." The Company did this until 1857, when some fairly serious corporate governance issues in one of its key assets (the Indian Rebellion) led to the Company's ruin and nationalisation.'

That's a provocative analogy for China, especially given the Company's heinous record as a state-sponsored drug pusher. But it raises fair questions about how nations recycle surplus savings, and also the conduct of their corporate-state-security complexes overseas.

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Jacob Zuma says China can 'help cast off Africa's colonial shackles'. In the Congo, Chinese companies are everywhere, but so discreet behind their ubiquitous ten-foot walled compounds that locals puzzle about their activities. A Peruvian economist marvels at the cohesion of the new conquistadores: 'behind Chinese investment lies the strategy of an entire country.' Elsewhere policies to 'build influence' and 'deploy overcapacity' may meet resistance.

A hundred years ago, after its Civil War, America was in an expansive mood, rough-riding its way to Manifest Destiny. Supposedly Britain acquired empire in 'a fit of absent-mindedness', but as Mark Twain witnessed in the Philippines, the American empire was anything but absent-minded. If there remains an American empire today, as some argue, China might seek something similar. Of course China remains ideologically committed to Marxism, for which 'imperialism' is anathema. But then again, Marx's Bolshevik followers were as keen on territory as the Romanov empire they overthrew.

'Europeans waged a Five Hundred Years War on the rest of the world' writes Ian Morris of the period 1415 to 1915. By then 'they had conquered 84% of the earth's surface', including chunks of China. Notably, it was only halfway through this onslaught, following the Thirty Years War, that they could establish — at least among themselves — how the Westphalia Treaty rules operate. Andrew Phillips at ANU reckons 1915 in turn marked the start of Asia's own Thirty Years War, at which time China made its own transition from celestial kingdom to nation-state. China today is a strong proponent of 'Westphalian sovereignty', yet Westphalia's signatories only respected 'non-interference' at home; arguably it fueled imperial expansion abroad.

Phillips predicts that 'much like the post-Vienna Congress period (another grand intra-European agreement in 1815), the world will be multipolar in its essential form, but informally underwritten by the dual hegemony of the two preponderant powers.' From 1815 to 1915, these were Russia and Britain. The 20th century ultimately saw both diminished. In 2015, Phillips reckons, America and China 'will serve respectively as the maritime liberal and continental autocratic anchors of an uneasy but relatively stable international order. Globally these great powers will compete for influence in major energy producing regions.'

A Chinese historian demurs: 'Westerners fear China dominating the world because they think China will act just like they did. But traditional Chinese civilization never acted that way.' Its tributaries were comfortable in the Sinosphere. Would Tibetans and Uighurs and Mongols agree today, though? 'That's the problem', the historian admits: 'China today is not traditional.' It more resembles the hard-edged Western nation-states which emerged after 1648, the ones who professed sovereignty and non-interference at home but pursued colonialism abroad.


Within China's bureaucratic system, sometimes it is in an agency's interest to compete with others, rather than coordinate, in order to advance its own bureaucratic power and receive more funding.

Linda Jakobson's recent Lowy Report, China's Unpredictable Maritime Security Actors, highlights this phenomenon between maritime agencies. Such a bureaucratic shortfall could explain to some degree China's behavior in the South China Sea, particularly why China's maritime enforcement agencies are increasingly ready to confront vessels of other claimants in disputed waters. 

Jakobson's report argues that China lacks a grand strategy in the South China Sea. However, I would argue that competition or lack of coordination among government agencies is not incompatible with the existence of an over-arching strategy. China's maritime agencies do appear to take actions independent of each other, but they do not aim to contest or alter Beijing's overall strategic objective. That objective is clear, which is to advance Beijing's control of the ocean to the best of its capacity.

This suggests that we should be less concerned about the complex interaction among government agencies and more concerned with understanding the very nature of Beijing's claims.

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Beijing claims a 'historical right' over waters within the nine-dash line. It claims all the features within the nine-dash line as Chinese sovereignty. So far there is no sign that China would compromise these claims for a peaceful resolution with other claimants, even though Chinese leaders have on different occasions acknowledged the existence of disputes and the need for a peaceful resolution.

Additionally, China rejects third-party arbitration. A Ministry of Foreign Affairs position paper on the South China Sea arbitration initiated by the Philippines asserts that it will not shake China's 'resolve and determination to safeguard its sovereignty and maritime rights and interests'. As pointed out by Jakobson, China is evidently building up naval capacity and ramping up civilian enforcement equipment.

Perhaps the best evidence of a grand strategy is that China's domestic legal framework is being constantly updated to expand de facto jurisdiction over the water and features within the nine-dash line. This is likely to embolden Chinese maritime enforcement agencies to take even more resolute actions against other claimant's vessels in the future. 

Jakobson's report is a very good reminder of how China's internal politics run. Often, institutional defects intervene in China's foreign policy-making, and make it difficult to predict China's actions. As Jakobson rightly points out, not every action taken by the government agency rightly reflects the will of China's leaders, even when it's done in the name of protecting China's national interests. This creates problems at a tactical level for Chinese policymakers and may have foreign policy consequences they might not want. But China's leadership does not hide the fact that it has strategic objectives in relation to the nine-dash line, and none of the actions by China's maritime enforcement agencies we are seeing now seem to be at odds with these.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user yuan2003.


Kajaki follows the true story of a patrol of British soldiers guarding a dam in Helmand province in 2006. Corporal Mark Wright was posthumously awarded the George Cross for his actions during the incident. The last British troops withdrew from Helmand in October this year, after suffering a total of 453 casualties since 2001.


The saying 'you have the watches but we have the time' is often attributed to the Taliban (or Mauritanian immigration officials), but it is representative of the fact that indigenous armed groups understand that occupations are temporary, while the population is permanent.

The UK and France learned this in their post-World War II colonial campaigns, the Soviets in Afghanistan, the US in Afghanistan, Iraq and Vietnam. It is a truism of counter-insurgency of course, but not necessarily a law. In some counter-insurgency campaigns the government does win.

In Iraq, the US finds itself in the rather unusual situation where ISIS has all the watches but the Coalition has all the time. While ISIS consists mostly of Iraqis, it also has a growing number of foreign fighters in its ranks. If the Shi'a-dominated Iraqi forces who were in charge before ISIS swept in were seen as occupiers in the Sunni heartlands, the rule of ISIS is now starting to be viewed as something similar, and perhaps worse.

The US has adopted a deliberate campaign to stop ISIS's momentum through the use of air power and then to assist in the retaking of key terrain using Iraqi Government, Kurdish and Shi'a militia forces. At the same time, it has placed pressure on Iraqi politicians to change the prime minister, while assembling a coalition that relieves Washington of the burden of being seen to be going it alone.

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Thus far the campaign plan appears to be working. Granted, with a deliberately light footprint in the air and on the ground, and an Iraqi military that requires significant re-training, the roll-back was always going to take time. And a government reasserting its sovereignty will always fall short of what is expected. Moreover, ISIS remains capable of achieving tactical victories in Anbar province.  

That said, one of the more noteworthy things about the US-led campaign has been Washington's appreciation of time. Once ISIS's momentum was halted, the immediate crisis forced by the disintegration of Iraqi formations and an enemy generating fear and panic through seemingly unchecked advances was over, and a more deliberate approach was possible.

So the last thing anyone in Washington wants is a major reversal that would re-ignite the ISIS campaign and allow it to regain momentum. Hence the desire to tamp down any attempts to rush precipitously to retake Mosul before the Iraqi forces are capable of doing it. This recent article suggests Baghdad is already pushing for just such a move.

Time is on Washington's side in part because, for ISIS, administration of areas under its control becomes more difficult the longer the conflict goes on. Already there are reports of rising prices in Mosul as winter sets in. The problem for the residents of Mosul is that as pressure on ISIS increases, its rule will likely become more brutal and intolerant

One thing Washington will need to be alert to is that media organisations don't share its patience. Degrade missions are rarely media-friendly. They are the military equivalent of water dripping on a rock. There are few spectacular images of the action, as the attacks are against individual targets such as fighting positions and vehicles or logistics facilities, while the advising and assisting is normally conducted in small groups in base locations or at formation level or higher. This US media report is one of many likely to emerge that shows how frustrating a degrade campaign can be for the media. It appears to express concern at the lack of hard data the US military is giving out so that the media can judge mission success.

Another danger is that media commentators will begin to equate any ISIS tactical victories with strategic success, and criticise Washington for 'dragging the chain' without appreciating the nature of the social and political terrain in which the Coalition and the Iraqi Government operates. The last thing Washington wants is be forced to rush into things before it or the Iraqi security forces are ready.

Time is a resource as much as ammunition, personnel and finances. Only this time in Iraq, time favours Washington and Baghdad rather than the insurgents.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user United States Forces Iraq.

  • Arthur Kroeber writes that Xi Jinping has made some progress on economic reforms and that the Party regime is still 'strong, increasingly self-confident, and without organized opposition.'
  • Like many countries, China is grappling with how to ensure privately owned drones don't interfere with commercial airspace.
  • How Walmart made its crumbling China business look so good for so long.
  • Linda Jakobson argues in a new Lowy Institute report that China's approach to maritime security will be unpredictable as it continues to be shaped by a diverse set of actors pushing their own agendas. 
  • Bonnie Glaser responded to Jakobson by contending that the greatest challenge in the South China Sea is  Beijing's determination to advance its sovereignty claims.
  • Hu Shuli states that it is time to move past GDP benchmarks as a the primary measure of China's economic development.
  • Latest Sinica podcast on China and South Africa.
  • China offers to send a working group to Afghanistan to discuss the development plan for Afghanistan's national infrastructure.
  • This short film  follows a Beijing intellectual who, going against the tide of urbanisation (the film claims that 300 villages disappear every day in China), leaves the capital in search of a quieter and cleaner setting for his family in rural Anhui:


It's hard to be shocked by news from a country where 55,000 people have died as a result of terrorism in the past decade, but yesterday's terrorist attack on a school in Pakistan has produced revulsion worldwide.

Pakistani attitudes towards the perpetrators, the Pakistani Taliban, known within Pakistan by the acronym TTP, are complex and evolving. Pew's wide-ranging public opinion survey, published in August, contains some important and disturbing findings.

At the time of the survey, 8% of surveyed Pakistanis held a favourable view of the TTP. This is a small proportion, and belies the notion of widespread popularity. Nonetheless, on a crude extrapolation, it would amount to a staggering 14 million Pakistanis. Although a much larger slice of the population holds negative views of the Taliban (59%), this disapproval rate has fallen steadily from a high of 70% in 2009, a year when the Pakistani army was engaged in intense fighting with the militants in the Swat Valley. Depressingly, it is the lowest level of disapproval in six years.

A second finding is that the TTP is still seen as the lesser of two evils. 51% of Pakistanis say India is the greatest threat to their country, while just half that number say the same of the Taliban. This is in contrast to last year; though India remained the uppermost concern in 2013, the gap had narrowed quite a bit.

More specifically, Pew's survey notes that residents of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa – the province containing Peshawar, the site of Tuesday's school massacre – see India as a greater threat than do most other Pakistanis. Imran Khan, whose party controls the provincial government there, has frequently expressed sympathetic views towards the TTP and associated militants, insisting only three weeks ago that he would not have sent the army into tribal areas.

It should also be noted that a steady stream of army-sponsored nationalist propaganda has persuaded many Pakistanis that India is, in fact, arming and training the TTP. As the journalist Omar Waraich noted on Twitter, 'the problem is less sympathy for the Taliban, of which there is little, but denial among those who believe Muslims don't do this'. One Twitter hashtag circulating yesterday, for instance, read #StopIndianTerrorismInPak.

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Complicating things further, Pakistan's military establishment, and its sympathisers, have long sought to distinguish between militants deemed to be useful to the state and those considered dangerous. Only last month, Sartaj Aziz, the foreign affair advisor to Pakistan's prime minister, asked, with particular reference to the Haqqani Network: 'some (militants) were dangerous for us and some are not. Why must we make enemies out of them all?' This longstanding ambivalence has compromised the state's ability to counter violent extremism across the spectrum, particularly given the complex web of linkages between different Sunni jihadist groups in Pakistan.

How reliable is all this data? The Pew survey was conducted from April to May 2014. This was just months after government-backed peace talks and a ceasefire with the Pakistani Taliban had collapsed, resulting in a spurt of violence. It was, however, before a major military offensive by the Pakistan army into North Waziristan, Operation Zarb-e-Azb, which began in mid-June and has killed 1100 militants in four months, according to the army. It is possible therefore that the past six months of fighting have hardened Pakistani attitudes towards the Taliban, much as occurred in previous rounds of fighting, and that Pew's figures underestimate growing popular opposition.

But it is deeply troubling that, despite a stream of high-profile attacks, negative views towards the Taliban have fallen in recent years, and that a small but not-insignificant minority continue to express support. Moreover, the Line of Control between India and Pakistan has been ablaze for months, so the gap in threat perceptions between India and the Taliban might even have widened over the second half of this year.

Tuesday's attack, relatively novel in its sheer scale and its targeting of children, will undoubtedly hurt the Taliban's reputation further. That the Government has committed to continuing its military offensive, rather than pursue another ceasefire in desperation, is a positive sign. The question is whether the imagery and testimony from Tuesday – a teacher burnt alive in front of students, reported beheadings, and the Taliban's promise that this is 'just the trailer' – will serve as a catalysing moment, reversing the trend in attitudes of the past few years, or whether it will go down in history as just one more vicious attack marking a downward spiral of violence.


As discussed in part 1 of this post, Prime Minister Abe is likely to make the economy his first post-election priority. He wants to pull the economy out of recession and set the basis for long-term growth.

But he cannot ignore national security. Abe's own deep interest, allied with that of a significant section of his support base, will drive the strengthening of national security policy.  This has at its core further strengthening the security alliance with the US and other close partners such as Australia, in the face of China's rise.

The newly elected Diet would need to approve legislation to amend the Self-Defence Law and the Japan Coast Guard Law to provide the necessary legislative basis for the Abe Cabinet's decision of July 1 2014 to reinterpret Article 9 of the Japanese constitution. That reinterpretation allows Japan's self-defence forces for the first time since the end of the Second World War to engage in collective self defence, albeit under strictly limited circumstances.

The reinterpretation of Article 9 remains opposed by a significant majority of the Japanese electorate, according to opinion polls. However, on the basis of his huge election victory Abe is likely to press ahead in the Diet to pursue amendments necessary to allow implementation of the Cabinet's July 1 2014 reinterpretation.*

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Abe will need to persuade his key coalition partner Komeito, a Buddhist-based peace party, to acquiesce in his agenda. This will be a difficult task. The legislative process will demand judicious political management. Abe cannot afford to spend an excessive amount of his newly defended political capital on this national security matter. He must carry the electorate with him as he prosecutes the structural reform agenda under the Abenomics 'third arrow'.

With domestic issues a priority, Prime Minister Abe is unlikely to change his approach to international issues. He has engaged more actively than any other recent Japanese prime minister in regional and international diplomacy. He is keen to highlight Japan's significant contributions to the region and in international cooperation, and to achieve recognition of its leading global role. Relations with Australia are a key element in Abe's style of more activist diplomacy

Japan's relations with China remain delicate and demand careful handling. Prior to the election, at the APEC summit in Beijing, Abe and China's President Xi Jinping held the first high level meeting between the leaders of the two countries in two years. Long overdue, this cautious beginning of a thaw in the tense relations between the two countries is welcome. The ongoing disagreements over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands have unnerved the region as well as seriously dividing, at a political and community level, these two countries that are so deeply integrated at an economic level

The accommodation reached at the summit meeting about how to express the position of the respective sides on the issue of sovereignty of these islands effectively parked the issue. Providing further disputes between the two sides do not emerge, reviving reasons to aggravate tensions, a quiet non-confrontation policy of 'leave well alone for now' can continue.

Prime Minister Abe will continue to face demands from those in his party keen to assert nationalistic perspectives, but is likely to maintain the new status quo agreed upon at the APEC summit meeting as long as he can. His landslide mandate, from an electorate which has a strong pacifist streak, will help him. China's more careful handling of relations with Japan, together with the strategic support Japan enjoys with regional neighbours, none of whom want to see aggressive tactics as part of Japan-China relations, will all assist Abe's management of a changing Japan.

*Note the possibility that the Australian Government may choose Japanese submarine technology for its next generation submarine fleet is not directly affected by the degree of progress Prime Minister Abe makes in the Diet on the passing of legislation to give effect to the reinterpretation of Article 9. However, if such a decision is made by the Australian Government, then the matter may be caught up in the Diet debate on the issues relating to the reinterpretation of Article 9.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user Official U.S. Navy Page.


As haggard negotiators left the UN climate change conference in Lima in the early hours of Sunday morning, many observers noted the contrast between the political acrimony that characterised the final days of these tortured discussions and the sense of optimism that many felt going into the talks just a fortnight earlier.

Foreign Minister Julie Bishop delivering the Australian National Statement at the UNFCCC Conference in Lima, Peru, 10 December 2014

That initial optimism had resulted primarily from the joint announcement by the US and Chinese presidents at the conclusion of the APEC summit in mid-November concerning their national goals for curbing greenhouse gas emissions and expanding non-fossil-fuel energy production. That agreement formalised important strategic shifts in the world's two largest emitters concerning the future structure of their economies, and demonstrated a new-found cooperative pragmatism that has eluded international climate efforts for more than two decades.

But the Lima conference reminded the world that high-level political cooperation on climate change among key countries does not necessarily translate into agreement among environmental officials and diplomats from the 195 countries that participate in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. 'Planet UNFCCC' operates at its own pace, according to its own logic, and in its own opaque language.

So what happened on Planet UNFCCC in Lima?

Optimistic observers had hoped that Lima wold produce a draft agreement text for next year's key Paris conference next year. A draft is being developed, and the final decision in Lima includes an Annex with the 'Elements of a draft negotiating text' (from page 5) which reflects a variety of different options proposed by the parties. There are some promising proposals in there, but it remains to be seen whether the best options will remain after the interests of all 195 countries are reflected in the text.

The more realistic observers expected that the Lima conference would result in a hard decision on one particular set of issues.

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At last year's Warsaw conference, it was agreed that countries must submit their post-2020 emissions reduction targets, policies and measures — their so-called 'Intended Nationally-Determined Contributions' or INDCs (I did warn you about the language!) — in the first quarter of 2015, so as to enable a mutual assessment of countries' ambition well ahead of next year's vital Paris conference. Many expected that Lima would produce a decision on the form of information that countries must provide in their INDCs (the substance is ultimately, as the name suggests, 'nationally determined', though to some extent the form shapes the substance).

However, even this narrower focus opened up decades-long debates about the 'differentiated responsibilities' of developed and developing countries. Many developing countries argued that the developed countries should adopt INDCs far more onerous than those on developing countries, that the assumptions underlying developing-country INDCs should not be subjected to the same degree of transparency and review, and that developed country INDCs should incorporate not only direct emissions reductions but also financial and other assistance to developing countries.

Ultimately, countries could not agree on mandatory rules or guidelines concerning these matters of form. The final agreed outcome from Lima (see paragraph 14) merely lists the matters that parties 'may' include in their INDCs, and (at paragraph 12) 'invites' parties to 'consider' incorporating an adaptation component. There is no mention of incorporating a financial support component (finance is addressed separately in paragraph 4).

The substance of developed-country commitments of support for developing countries was a further key area of contention in Lima. It has long been expected that developed countries will assist developing countries with finance to reduce emissions and adapt to already-occurring climatic changes, and also with clean technology and capacity-building assistance. In 2009, developed countries pledged to mobilise (from a combination of public and private sources) $100 billion annually for this purpose by 2020. Around $10 billion in aggregate was pledged to the Green Climate Fund (the main vehicle for UNFCCC-related finance) as of last week, to be distributed over coming years. Many developing countries remain dissatisfied with this contribution. This issue is likely to remain a sticking point through to Paris.

A number of other issues that were inadequately addressed in Lima will be important if Paris is to be a modest success. The first is agreement on a long-term (aspirational) goal that provides clearer guidance to the world's citizens and investors about the direction of the global economy than the current (ambiguous) 'less than 2°C warming' goal: many (me included) are arguing for a goal of 'net zero global emissions' as early as possible within the second half of this century. An intermediate goal of establishing a zero carbon energy system (or, at least, a zero carbon electricity system) by 2050 would send an even more powerful signal, and should be seriously considered.

Given that the aggregate effect of INDCs associated with any Paris agreement will inevitably fall well short of achieving this goal, it will be important that the Paris agreement contain a framework for the regular review and strengthening of countries' mitigation ambition (and of adaptation and support). Rigorous transparency requirements, so that countries' contributions can be clearly understood and subjected to international scrutiny, will also be important for building mutual trust and confidence. Given that domestic institutions, laws and policies determine the credibility of countries' contributions (much more so than whether these are 'internationally legally binding'), transparency in these areas will be increasingly important.

Leaving Planet UNFCCC, it is clear from Lima that even modest success in Paris next year will require deep engagement by governments throughout the next 12 months (well beyond the UNFCCC inter-sessional meetings). Heads of state/government — many of whom have clearly demonstrated in recent months their desire to contribute meaningfully to a new agreement — will need to be closely involved in negotiations if entrenched positions are to give way to reasonable compromise. And, as I argued in a recent paper, smaller groups of countries should be prepared to announce in Paris cooperative initiatives that complement and go beyond what will be at best a 'broad but shallow' agreement that emerges from the formal UNFCCC process.

This need for narrower, more intensive and politically pragmatic engagement illuminates the extent of the missed opportunity that was the G20 summit in Brisbane last month. By artificially attempting to exclude climate policy from discussions about short- to medium-term economic reforms, the Abbott Government contributed to the continued exile of climate change on Planet UNFCCC. It did so despite the strong evidence that well-designed climate policy can induce local investment in infrastructure, radical improvements in resource productivity, and innovation that grows economies while improving energy security and building healthier, more attractive and less polluted cities — quite aside from the long-term and global benefits of reduced risks from climate change itself.

The Abbott Government refuses to acknowledge these important linkages between national action on climate change and economic and social improvements for the vast majority of the world's people — linkages that, if better understood, would make international cooperation much easier than it seems on Planet UNFCCC. Notwithstanding its reluctant $200 million contribution to the Green Climate Fund, Australia remains a climate change pariah that puts the interests a handful of multinational fossil fuel companies ahead of Australians' medium term economic prosperity, let alone the long-term habitability of the planet.

Progress in Lima was disappointing, but there is a much that can be done over the next 12 months to ensure that Paris yields a decent framework for accelerated climate action. If that fails to happen, few will hesitate to point the finger at countries like Australia, the Colossal Fossil of 2014.

Photo courtesy of Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.


While bureaucratic competition among numerous maritime actors is likely a factor that is contributing to tension and uncertainty in the South China Sea, as Linda Jakobson argues in her report China's Unpredictable Maritime Security Actors, it is probably not the biggest source of instability. Rather, China's determination to advance its sovereignty claims and expand its control over the South China Sea is the primary challenge.

Xi Jinping has clearly signaled that 'protection of maritime rights and interests' and 'resolutely safeguarding territorial sovereignty' are high priorities, which should be pursued even as China seeks to preserve stability and maintain good relations with its neighbors. At the recently concluded Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference, Xi additionally emphasised that China should not 'relinquish our legitimate rights and interests or sacrifice' China's 'core interests.'

As Jakobson relates, uncoordinated actions by local entities have occasionally created policy confusion, for example by releasing competing maps of the nation's South China Sea claims. However, China's most assertive and destabilising actions have appeared to be well coordinated, including the placement of the HYSY-981 oil rig in waters disputed with Vietnam earlier this year and extensive land reclamation projects that are underway in the South China Sea.

In the case of the dredging activities that are rapidly transforming tiny reefs into artificial islands, Jakobson states that these are 'likely to be a tool of legal warfare, intended to solidify China's claims to maritime rights based on so-called land features, rather than an attempt to militarise the South China Sea as some have claimed.' It is likely, however, that China is pursuing both objectives simultaneously.

Beijing is not satisfied with the status quo in the South China Sea and it is amassing capabilities to gradually change the situation to its advantage. It is carefully avoiding the use of force and thereby hopes keep the US at bay. Some experts describe China's strategy as 'tailored coercion.' Others have used the term 'salami-slicing.' Whatever terminology you prefer, the evidence is mounting that Xi Jinping does have a grand strategy. Strengthening China's control over the South China Sea is part of his 'China Dream' of rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user James Vaughan.