Tuesday 17 Dec 2019 | 00:34 | SYDNEY
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About the project

The West Asia program provides original research on developments in the Middle East and Central and Southwest Asia, including as they impact on Australia. Central research issues include relations between West Asia and East Asia, the Arab uprisings and geo-political change in the Middle East and Australia’s relations with the Gulf.

Latest publications

'First we take Aleppo, then we take Idlib'

The gradual isolation and strangulation of Aleppo is part of a much broader strategy that has taken shape over the past year, albeit in the case of Aleppo on a much different scale. The actions follow a familiar pattern: encirclement; cutting off military and life support functions; limited direct military engagement in favour of stand-off weapons to wear down the enemy and punish the civilian population housing them (whether reluctantly or otherwise); then a negotiated exit for fighters (with small arms although no heavy weapons) and their families, as well as unattached civilians. In August this year, when the town of Daraya capitulated, 700 fighters were moved to Idlib and 4000 civilians went elsewhere. In October around 1800 people (including 700 fighters) were removed from Mouadamiya, again to Idlib. This followed the evacuation of two towns to the north of Damascus earlier in October which resulted in 400 fighters and 1600 dependents moving to northern Syria.

These were all supporting lines of operation to the siege of Aleppo. The Assad regime seeks to re-establish control over Syria but knows it can’t generate enough combat power on its own to do so. However, if it demonstrates an inexorable momentum in re-establishing control over the most populated areas (including re-taking Aleppo) then it may well believe that it can cut deals in those areas it can’t reach in numbers. And if it can bottle up as many of the remaining fighters in Idlib as possible, they can be portrayed as either violent jihadis such as the al-Qa’ida-aligned Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, or groups supportive of them. Once they have been isolated in and around Idlib, the Syrian government narrative will focus on the threat posed by terrorist groups and the government's success in corralling them into the one province. The coalition can target the Islamic State terrorists in the east, while the regime does the same to the terrorists in the west.

This narrative will no doubt be presented vigorously and (as with all strong narratives) it will have a foundation in fact. The Coalition has been deploying air assets against radical Islamist targets in Idlib since late 2014, and most recently against a senior al–Qa‘ida cleric in Idlib in October this year. The Syrian regime will also no doubt feel that the more these groups are isolated in one area, where they are subject to air and ground attack, the more likely it will be that their lack of unity will come to the fore. There were instances of internecine conflict in Aleppo and, earlier this year, conflict between al-Nusra and non-Islamist groups in Idlib province. Contrary to the view in some quarters that fighting the common enemy may unify the rebel groups, their lack of unity has been one of the common themes of the civil war; Assad’s regime will not miss a chance to use the government’s momentum to maintain pressure in the hope that it can divide them and weaken their resistance from within.

There is unlikely to be any rush to take Idlib, however. A festering concentration of al-Qa‘ida aligned jihadis, Salafist and Islamist fighters and nationalist groups in the one province will suit Damascus’ purposes. And while Assad works out how to cut deals with Syrian Kurdish groups in the northeast and tribal groups in the east after Islamic State has collapsed, fixing as many armed elements as he can in Idlib will allow him to better concentrate his forces and maintain a coherent narrative for the outside world’s consumption. It will also provide yet another dilemma for the new Trump administration in Syria. Perhaps Damascus even views concentrating Islamist groups within Idlib as an argument Trump could use to present Assad as a force for stability. The battle for Aleppo has been widely covered, but it will be interesting to see how the world’s media explains the future conflict in Idlib and whose narrative ultimately dominates.

Photo: Getty Images/Anadolu Agency

Quick comment: Rodger Shanahan on Neil Prakash

We are learning more about the arrest of the Australian terrorist, Neil Prakash, in Turkey late last week. Writing in The Australian yesterday, Paul Maley revealed the Australian Federal Police anticipated Prakash would try to cross from Syria into Turkey and were on hand in Ankara to help confirm his identity after initial questioning by the Turkish National Police. It seems increasingly likely that Australia will seek to extradite Prakash so he can stand trial in Victoria, where he is charged with membership of a terrorist group and foreign incursion. In this quick comment recorded earlier this week, the Lowy Institute's Rodger Shanahan reviews what we know about Neil Prakash, and considers the likely consequences of extradition.

Photo: Getty Images/Chris McGrath

Quick comment: Rodger Shanahan on why rebel forces should leave Aleppo

It's time for the international community to put pressure on rebel forces to leave Aleppo, says Lowy Institute Research Fellow Rodger Shanahan. As Syrian government forces and allies gain ground in the battle for Syria's largest city, more than 250,000 civilians are under siege in the remaining rebel-held territory. Now the tide is turning in favour of the pro-government forces, it's clear efforts by the rebel forces to break the siege have failed. The rebels' continued presence, embedded among civilians, is therefore serving no military purpose but is prompting Russian and Syrian government to pummel the city, Dr Shanahan says.

Photo by Mamun Ebu Omer/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images

A very Lebanese presidency

Whenever I think the Australian political scene has plumbed new depths of hopelessness I can always be reassured that at least we haven’t reached the level of bloody-mindedness and self-centredness that marks out Lebanese politics. After 29 months without a president, a parliamentary vote this week finally delivered one in the form of Michel Aoun.

Aoun was unable to garner the necessary two-thirds majority to gain the position in the first round. This was a calculated insult to Aoun and an indication that not all were happy with the accommodation made to hand him the presidency and give the prime ministership to Saad Hariri once again. 

One MP (unfortunately it’s a secret ballot) even cast a vote for the provocative Lebanese-Serbian model Myriam Klink. The president doesn’t have to be an MP, only a Lebanese citizen and over 21 years of age, so she would have been eligible. Myriam has dabbled with the thought of politics, promising to run for office in 2013 but then failing to lodge the necessary paperwork in a dramatic, made-for-reality-TV moment. However, given that she is an Orthodox Christian and the presidency is reserved by convention for a Maronite, the vote was ruled invalid. Another vote for Zorba the Greek was also ruled invalid because he was, after all, Greek.

In the second round of voting only a simple majority (65 votes) was required, but somewhat embarrassingly the counting turned up 128 votes despite there being only 127 MPs present. Voting irregularities aren’t anything new to Lebanese politics so people could forgive a simple error, but an unprecedented third attempt again delivered 128 ballots. An even more unprecedented fourth round was required, where MPs individually had to vote under the watchful eyes of two other MPs; this time it delivered a result.

So Lebanon now has a president who spent 15 years in exile in France after making his name as the commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces in a destructive, ultimately quixotic battle against Syrian forces near the end of the Lebanese civil war. Styling himself as the ultimate Lebanese nationalist, he made up with Syria, founded his own political movement and allied himself with Hizbullah in order to gain the presidency. The compromise Aoun made to install Sa’ad Hariri as the new prime minister favours Iranian interests over Saudi ones (Riyadh had backed an alternative candidate).

The deals Aoun has made to secure the presidency will mean that while the political vacuum has been filled, it will be politics as usual in Lebanon. At least the system was robust enough to stop Zorba the Greek from becoming president.

Photo: Getty Images/Anadolu Agency

Michael Keenan on the evolving terrorist threat in Australia

On 26 October, Justice Minister the Hon Michael Keenan MP addressed the Lowy Institute on the evolving terrorist threat to Australia. Mr Keenan’s role within the government is to lead the Commonwealth’s efforts to counter violent extremism and to ensure effective and integrated implementation of Australia’s counterterrorism strategy. He is the primary contact for the Prime Minister for both day-to-day counterterrorism matters and in a terrorism crisis.

Foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq: The day after

In this Lowy Institute Analysis, Research Fellow Dr Rodger Shanahan and Nonresident Fellow Lydia Khalil argue that an increasing number of foreign fighters are likely to leave Syria and Iraq in the coming months and years, especially after the collapse of Islamic State’s caliphate, exacerbating the terrorist threat faced by the international community. Shanahan and Khalil highlight both the scale and nature of the long-term security threat that the foreign fighter cohort will pose, and ways in which the international community can ameliorate the threat.

Photo: Getty Images/John Moore

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