Lowy Institute

It's likely 2016 will be remembered as a year of polls: the Brexit poll this week, the Australian election on 2 July, the US presidential election in November, and even a UN poll to select the next Secretary-General by year end.

The 2016 Lowy Institute Poll, released today, may not be quite on the same scale, but it's an important touchstone on how Australians are thinking about the world. This year, those views appear to be at a critical juncture.

Over the 12 years of Lowy Institute Polling (the first Lowy Poll was taken in 2005), Australians have generally been warm on our close friends in the English-speaking world when asked to rank their feelings towards various countries on a 'thermometer' scale of 0 to 100 degrees. New Zealand, the UK, the US, Canada and Ireland always come top or close to the top when we include them on the thermometer. We have been warm on like-minded nations in Europe and in our region: France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Singapore. We have warm to warmish feelings towards our Pacific neighbours: Fiji, Solomons, East Timor, Papua New Guinea. We have had middling to lukewarm sentiments about a bunch of countries in our region such as Indonesia, India, Malaysia, Vietnam, Taiwan and South Korea. We are cold on the usual suspects: North Korea, Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and Libya. 

And then there is China.

When we ask Australians about China it's always a complicated story. This year, however, it's more complicated than ever, and Australians' attitudes seem to have reached a turning point.

China, our largest trading partner since 2007, is now our 'best friend in Asia', according to Australian adults: 30% nominate China and 25% nominate Japan when we ask them to name our best friend in Asia. Two years ago, when we last asked this question, China and Japan  tied for first place. Yet on the 'feelings thermometer', Australians have always expressed warmer feelings towards Japan than towards China. This year, Japan is rated at 70° and China at 58°. This prompts the question: what exactly do Australians mean by 'friendship', where China is concerned?

China may be our best friend in Asia as of this year, and our largest trading partner since 2007, but it's a friend about which Australians have some serious reservations.

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When asked about positive and negative influences on their views of China, Australians are overwhelmingly positive about the Chinese people (85% saying 'Chinese people you have met' are a positive influence), China's culture and history (a positive for 79%), and China's economic growth (a positive for 75%). However, there are some strong negatives too: 86% say 'China's human rights record' is a negative, 79% say 'China's military activities in our region' are a negative, and 73% say China's system of government is a negative. Its environmental record and investment in Australia are also negative influences.

As an illustration of this high level of anxiety about China, a substantial 74% of Australians are in favour of Australia conducting freedom of navigation operations in response to China's activities in the South China Sea.  

On the other side of the Asia Pacific is our other important partner, the US. Australian support for the US alliance has been one of the most consistent features of our polling. The proportion of the Australian population saying the alliance is either 'very', 'fairly' or 'somewhat' important for Australia's security has never slipped below 90% since we first asked this question in 2005. Australians always rate the US quite warmly on the feelings thermometer, with results ranging from a high of  73° last year to a low of 60° in 2007 (towards the end of the George W Bush presidency). This year, it's 68° — down 5°, making the US the only country to record a fall of any significance on the 2016 Lowy Institute thermometer. The alliance too has lost support: 71% say the alliance is 'very' or 'fairly' important for Australia's security. Still high, but down nine points on last year to a nine-year low in Lowy polling history.

Two years ago, when we asked Australians for the first time which relationship was more important — that with the US, or that with China — the US was the clear leader; 48% said the US, and 37% said China was the more important relationship in 2014. Two years later, however, it's a dead heat: in 2016, exactly the same number say China (43%) as say the US (43%) is the more important relationship.

But it's complicated. The Australian population is split down the middle on this question. Younger Australians (under 45) lean towards China, 51% saying it's the more important relationship, with 35% of that age group saying the US is more important. Older Australians (45 and over) see the US relationship as more important, with only 36% of them choosing China.

While we are divided between China and the US and many of us are anxious about China's intentions, we also appear to be quite concerned about what's going on in US politics at the moment. Nearly half (45%) of us say Australia should distance itself from the US if Donald Trump becomes president. Around half (51%) say we should remain close regardless of who is elected president; not a decisive vote of confidence and a result which suggests that the Trump factor may be having an impact on Australian support for the alliance.

Trump is not at all popular here: only 11% of Australians say they would prefer Trump as president, in results from separate Lowy polling in June; 77% prefer Hillary Clinton. And nearly six in ten (59%) say they would be less likely to support Australia 'taking future military action in coalition with the US under Donald Trump' if he wins the presidency. 

Our 2016 polling also has results on the other big votes this year. On the Australian election, the Liberal-Nationals Coalition wins hands down on foreign policy, with Australians preferring it to handle seven of eight key foreign policy issues including national security, the alliance, the economy and asylum seekers. Labor is preferred only on the issue of climate change. 

Australians are also decidedly against Brexit, with 51% in the 'remain' camp, against only 19% on the side of the  'leavers'. And on the last of the big votes this year, Australians are in two minds about Kevin Rudd as UN Secretary-General: 46% saying he would make a good Secretary-General, and 49% saying he would not.

Drawing on the last 12 years of data, this year's Poll highlights some important shifts in the way Australians are thinking about the world and our major global relationships. Our political leaders have their work cut out for them after 2 July.




A first look at the 2016-17 budget for foreign affairs, aid and defence yields few surprises. For an unsurprising budget, this is a long post, but it’s worth looking deeper at how each of the agencies fared, particularly after the comparatively controversial efforts of the last two Coalition budgets.

Source: Lowy Institute Global Diplomacy Index

Foreign affairs and aid

One of the surprises is a pleasant one for those of us who’ve long argued for a larger diplomatic presence for Australia, with a $42 million budget measure to expand Australia’s overseas diplomatic network by adding a new post in China, presumably in the vast and booming inland. The location is yet to be announced.

This builds on last year’s foreign affairs budget which, if you are partial to surprises, was the big one. It heralded an unprecedented investment of $100 million to increase Australia’s overseas representation, adding five new posts in Doha (Qatar), Macassar (Indonesia), Ulaanbaataar (Mongolia), Phuket (Thailand) and Buka (Bougainville). The Buka post idea has now formally been abandoned, scotched by an awkward communications problem between the Australian and PNG governments. 

In its place is a new post in Lae, as well as the post in China announced yesterday. This makes a total of six new posts for Australia’s still-underdone overseas network, bringing our total to 115 posts. The planned additions will lift our position in the global rankings and OECD nations’ diplomatic networks from 27th to 26th; ahead of the Czech Republic but behind Belgium (117 posts) and Portugal (123 posts).

Overall, the appropriation for DFAT is $1.4 billion this year, up $53 million (4%) on last year’s budget. This doesn’t include the aid budget, which is an administered expense and not included in the department’s operating costs. The bitter pills in the foreign affairs and aid budgets came earlier in the term of this Coalition government: in late 2013 there was a 10% reduction in staffing over the foreign affairs and aid portfolio with the ‘integration’ of AusAID into DFAT, and last year a 20% cut ($1 billion) to the aid budget.
This year's $200 million cut to aid is small by comparison, and it was also expected. As Devpolicy’s Stephen Howes put it today, ‘we’ve got used to aid cuts’; and besides, the average Australian isn’t that fussed: in our polling on the aid cuts last year, 53% were in favour of last year’s $1 billion budget cuts, with only 35% opposed. When it comes to easy budget savings, it appears the aid budget is now low-hanging fruit.

Among the other measures in the foreign affairs budget are:

  • $9.2 million over four years for the government’s people-smuggling prevention program.
  • $2.4 million to bring forward the opening of two new ‘landing pads’ in Singapore and Berlin under the government’s Innovation Strategy, adding to the existing pads in San Francisco, Tel Aviv and Shanghai.
  • $46 million to meet the increased costs of producing passports, which will be more than offset by an additional $173 million in revenue for the government over four years raised by upping the cost of a passport by $20 ($10 for children and seniors).
  • $48 million in revenue from increasing notarial service fees (though sadly this also goes to consolidated revenue, not to the departmental budget).

One of the persistent problems for the foreign affairs and trade portfolio is the relentless demand for efficiencies. Read More

These are always styled by government as ‘business as usual’, with periodic reviews conducted across the whole of the public sector to identify potential cost savings. This year, the ‘efficiencies’ generated by DFAT’s last Functional and Efficiency Review amount to the single biggest budget item for the portfolio, with savings of $74.5 million over five years. These will come from a variety of areas including:‘streamlining business processes’; ‘changing overseas posting arrangements’; and ‘removing consular assistance for dual nationals and permanent residents in the countries of which they are citizens’. This last one was bound to cause consternation, even though it was foreshadowed in the Foreign Minister’s review of consular assistance leading up to its recent Consular Strategy. It is also the practice of like-minded countries such as the UK and New Zealand.

Adding to this efficiency drive is the ongoing public sector ‘efficiency dividend’. This is a government-wide initiative, introduced back in 1987, to reduce the annual costs of departmental operations by a fixed percentage. Some agencies (but not DFAT) are exempt. The dividend has ranged from 1% to a high of 4% in 2012, and now sits at 2.5%. For a department the size of DFAT, with an operating budget of around $2 billion, this means $50 million in savings must be found each year. The 2015-16 budget promised to reduce it to a more manageable 1% in 2017-18; this budget overrides that, maintaining the 2.5% for the next two years, winding it down to 1.5% in 2019-20.

This is all very well for government departments and agencies which have enjoyed ‘historically strong public expenditure growth’ over the last 10-15 years. However, as we’ve argued in the past, DFAT was not one of them. Its share of total government expenditure actually fell from its ‘high’ of 0.43% in 2000-2001 to an historic low of 0.28% just before the AusAID integration. Over the same period, its budget in real terms was almost stagnant. The public sector as a whole grew by 57% between 1998 and 2013, while DFAT grew by only 7%. It did not experience the boom the public sector enjoyed, but it is expected to wear the continuing punishment. The 2010 Incoming Government Brief prepared for the Gillard government by DFAT noted that:

...limited gains are achievable after more than a decade of having to offset the eroding effects of the 1.25 per cent cumulative efficiency dividend... Having exhausted opportunities for reprioritisation and efficiency gains, meeting the challenge of a more complex diplomatic world will require additional funding, with a particular focus on growing the overseas network.

Six years later, that additional funding is materialising, albeit painfully slowly. But if the opportunities for further efficiencies were exhausted in 2010, they must surely be almost non-existent by now.


Defence is of course a different story.

Defence gets $32.3 billion this year and $142 billion over the next four years, in line with the Coalition’s 2013 commitment to reach 2% of GDP by 2020-21 . This is up just 3% up on last year’s budget, but a very substantial 22% increase on the pre-Coalition 2013-14 budget.

This year, Defence operations gets over $616 million for additional operations funding (around half of DFAT’s entire operations budget), and a similar amount over the forward estimates. This funds the continuation of our existing operations in the Middle East, with Operations Accordion, Highroad, Manitou, Okra and Resolute all getting additional money.

It’s full steam ahead on Australia’s naval shipbuilding strategy, with $90 billion over the term of the White Paper invested in the 12 future submarines, offshore patrol vessels and future frigates projects.

Our friends over at ASPI have dissected the Defence budget story, and called it a ‘no surprises budget’. 

In sum: no surprises in a good way for the Defence budget, no surprises for the aid budget which has endured its share of jarring shocks under the Coalition, and a small surprise for the overseas network in an otherwise unexceptional budget.



A few days ago a suggestion was made on Crikey that DFAT, Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, should be scrapped. I was tempted to ignore it, because as far as I can tell, the author, Jason Murphy, based his call largely on the fact that he just doesn't like free trade agreements. 

He's not alone about the TPP, of course. But the rest of the article was a bit puzzling.

The Australian Embassy, Washington, with its permanent sackcloth. (Photo by the author.)

Murphy thinks because we have agencies like Austrade and Treasury and lots of companies operating overseas, and because we are living in a 'hyper-connected' world, people and businesses can make their own way internationally perfectly well. He argues Australia only does FTAs now because DFAT is 'sniffing the winds of budget stringency' and looking for reasons to justify its existence.

Yes, we've done a few FTAs in the last couple of years, but it's likely the impetus behind the rapid sealing of the Japan, Korea and China agreements was the arrival of the Coalition Government and its new priorities in 2013, rather than DFAT defensively shifting its emphasis to trade. Murphy bolstered his argument with the World Trade Organisation's claims that the influx of FTAs is causing 'incoherence, confusion, exponential increase of costs for business, unpredictability' etc. This from an organisation which its own chief  admits has descended into 'paralysis'. It is precisely the failure of processes such as the Doha trade rounds, those multilateral processes which Murphy extols as part of his preferred model of diplomacy, which have pushed nations towards more bilateral and regional or 'minilateral' agreements. 

In a tone laden with sarcasm, Murphy would consider sparing DFAT's consular role from the axe, saying 'If you are 18 and lose your passport while drinking in Mexico City, the Australian Embassy at Ruben Dario 55 is there for you'.

This belittles the gut-wrenching work DFAT does to assist the victims of disasters, crises, serious crime and misfortune abroad. Last year alone, it provided assistance and advocacy for journalist Peter Greste imprisoned in Egypt, and support for Andrew Chan and Myuran Sukumaran executed in Indonesia, as well as their families. If you are the family of one of 38 Australians killed on MH17 last year you would have benefited from the dedication of DFAT staff, as would those caught up in Cyclone Pam, or the earthquakes in Nepal.   

Obviously, some of Murphy's criticisms hit their mark.

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As with many bureaucracies, there are grey (male) heads at the top and lots of admin. DFAT is not known for innovation, although it is even getting better at that, a recent internal 'ideas challenge' generating 392 ideas, the winning two now being developed by the department.

As with many bureaucracies, DFAT is aware of its own failings. In fact, last year's Capability Review conveniently summarised most of them, noting  the staff's 'clear desire to help build on their agency's capability'.

But we wouldn't scrap other government departments because they were a tad bureaucratic, to replace them with a bunch of individual advocates and lobbyists or representatives of other agencies acting on their own account in a free-for-all. Chaos would ensue and I can't imagine much would be achieved that would actually be in the national interest. We already have a taste of how this might work with a proliferation of Australian state offices around the globe competing for attention with each other as well as with Austrade's offices, pitching against each other for slices of foreign trade and investment. This is in nobody's interest.

Before I move on to more positive stuff, I want to dispatch one or two other matters. 

DFAT has a $1.5 billion budget – less than half a percent of annual government spending. This represents the combined budgets of DFAT and the former AusAID. That 'integration' generated efficiencies, of course, with between 600-650 staff cut from the combined department over the last couple of years (from a total of around 4000 Australia-based staff). The 'winds of budget stringency' are nothing new for DFAT; it's had decades of it. In fact, as a percentage of government spending, DFAT's share dropped from 0.43% at the turn of this century to 0.28% just prior to the AusAID integration. What's left is a small amount to spend on the global engagement of one of the most globalised nations on earth.

A figure of $200,000 'per lanyard' is thrown around in the article. I gather that means staff. A cursory look at DFAT's 2015 financial statements shows that its 6102 staff (including 2344 locally-engaged staff at DFAT's embassies and consulates abroad) cost around $740 million overall, including super, leave, redundancies and so on, or on average around $118,000 per head. They'd be better off in the private sector.   

Thirdly, check out the above photo of Australia's most important embassy, in Washington DC. This is the building that is to be renovated for $230 million, a cost Murphy decries. That sackcloth covering the entire facade? It's a  permanent fixture. It's been there for years. Bits of the building keep dropping off, with a risk of hitting pedestrians on the head. Things have gotten so bad there's been talk of hosting meetings at the New Zealand embassy down the road instead.

The Australian embassy houses not just DFAT's staff but many from other Australian government departments with personnel in Washington DC (including Defence, Industry, Agriculture, AFP, Immigration and Border Protection, and so on). When the building is renovated, it will not only be safe but fit to represent Australia in a city where more nations have a presence than any other in the world. Washington DC is the place where nations congregate and negotiate, and where there is a wealth of knowledge and information of which we can take advantage if we're sufficiently well-equipped. Australia has the world's 12th largest GDP, 14th largest defence budget and is a member of the G20. We should stop underselling ourselves and start being confident enough to keep company with the other significant nations of the world.

Arguments like Murphy's come along from time to time. Sam Roggeveen dealt with a similar one here, pointing to the error of playing into 'lazy stereotypes about effete, globe-trotting diplomats'. The Interpreter has engaged in that debate when it arises, particularly when it comes to the increasingly burdensome layers of security at some of our (and others') embassies in dangerous cities. These can curtail the movement of diplomats in the host country, bogging them down with so much security when they do get outside the fortress that they can't form effective relationships and develop the understanding and knowledge of their host country that is crucial for their job.

But they are the exception. In Port Moresby, for instance, reputed to be one of the most dangerous places for diplomats to be posted, there was no evidence that excessive security prevented Australian diplomats from getting out of their compound to find out what was going on during PNG's constitutional crisis in late 2011. They got caught up in the conflict and were threatened and shoved, with automatic weapons pointed at them by disgruntled police who supported Michael Somare and sought his reinstatement as prime minister. 'It got a bit hairy but we're generally OK', an Australian official told reporters later. 

It's the knowledge that can only be gained on the ground and the relationship building that takes time to establish that makes trained diplomats essential. The very people Murphy reckons can do this stuff on their own – the business people – are frequently the ones who most appreciate the work diplomats do on their behalf. As the Australian Industry Group's Innes Willox argued in a 2012 Parliamentary Inquiry into Australia's overseas representation: 

You build relationships and you build influence through relationships. I am not sure you could build them over a telephone line or a videoconference in the long run. You need people on the ground. It can enhance it and quicken the pace.

Or the representative from the Australia Gulf Council:

Doing business in the Gulf States is linked to government connections and networks, similarly with China, and it is often the case that you need to get in the door of government first before anything can happen in terms of business and then the doors really open up.

Or the mining company Coffey International about doing business in Africa:

We certainly value having interaction with a high commission or an embassy in a country because it helps us get a voice at the table on big issues that can impede our business or strengthen our business. I refer to things like labour laws, visas, trade delegations or even getting involved in some policy dialogue with the host nation's government, which does come up a bit with foreign aid work. The Australian missions are a very good source of introduction and public intelligence. We value those resources highly.

I'll leave DFAT Secretary, Peter, Varghese, with the last word:

A subscription to The Economist is no substitute for Australian eyes on the ground. The telephone and text messages cannot substitute for the relationships that embassies build with the power brokers in other countries. A professional diplomatic service matters because we need eyes that can judge events through the prism of Australia’s national interests; which can recognise threats and opportunities; which can make a case for Australian interests that is sensitive to the nuances of culture and history; which can cultivate the networks and relationships without which we simply could not pursue our core interests.

'Eyes that can judge events through the prism of Australia's national interest'. Exactly. 


Foreign Minister Julie Bishop has just announced that Australia will bid for a seat on the UN Security Council in 2029-30.

That's 15 years from the end of our last Security Council seat (2013-14). But it compares against the 27 years between our fourth and fifth outings at the Security Council. In total, Australia has held a non-permanent seat on the Security Council in 1946-7, 1956-7, 1973-4, 1985-6 and 2013-14.

The bid for the 2013-14 seat was riven with controversy from the start, and regarded by some as a Kevin Rudd vanity project. The bid was announced in 2008 while the two other candidates for the seat, Luxembourg and Finland, commenced their pitches in 2001 and 2002. The late start was heavily criticised, as were the reputed costs of the bid. Notionally these were around $25 million, but there were some arguments that Australia's aid to African countries had been ramped up to win support for the bid. If it were valid to account for this somehow, the overall costs would be considerably higher.

The Coalition opposition, under Tony Abbott, proposed to scrap the bid if it won the 2010 election.

It didn't. Australia won the seat. Nonetheless, scepticism persisted through the early days of the tenure, and in the lead-up to his election, Tony Abbott promised a 'more Jakarta, less Geneva'  foreign policy. But MH17 changed all that. The Foreign Minister's intense diplomacy secured a relatively strongly-worded resolution from the Security Council (2166) setting up an investigation and calling for those responsible to be held to account. It won plaudits here and abroad

The Coalition Government now appears to be a Security Council convert.

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Any criticism of this bid would need to come up with something new. Shadow Foreign Minister Tanya Plibersek, while broadly supporting the bid, labelled it 'unambitious'. Looking at the numbers on the periods between our occupancy of a seat (9 years, 16 years, 11 years, 27 years: average = 15.75 years), the 15-year gap sounds pretty good to me, and is a dramatic improvement from the 27-year gap last time.

Ms Bishop has set out her government's reasons for the timing: there is only one applicant for the slot to date (Finland), so the seat is more likely to be uncontested; the length of time means that the costs of the bid can be apportioned across the span and absorbed in the normal operations of the Department of Foreign Affairs.

In an article supporting our last Security Council bid, Michael Fullilove argued that 'the principal reason that Australia is right to run is that the Security Council is the world's pre-eminent crisis management forum.' It is the only international body that can make a decision to authorise the use of force. Australia's 2013-14 experience would appear to have borne out that argument.

Much will no doubt be made of this first major announcement from the Turnbull Government on foreign policy. It may well be that, together with the renewed push for a 2018-20 seat on the UN Human Rights Council, multilateralism is 'back'. This will become clearer over the course of the government under its new leader. In the meantime, what is clear is Australia's renewed enthusiasm for participation in the Security Council as the world's most important multilateral organisation.

Photo courtesy of Minister for Foreign Affairs.


Having just read the joint CSIS-ANU 'audit' of the US alliance, published this week, a few of us here wondered whether the Australian public would support the sort of intensified alliance proposed by the report's authors.

It has been said that the finer points of foreign policy don't decide elections here in Australia. So, does it even matter what the great unwashed thinks about the alliance? As one commentator has pointed out, 'the last mainstream Australian politician to openly criticise United States policy' was Mark Latham, and look what happened to him at the ballot box. The unpopularity of Australia's participation with its alliance partner in the Iraq war must have contributed to some degree to the Howard government loss in 2007.

So, perhaps one shouldn't blithely dismiss the relevance of public opinion on foreign policy generally, and the US alliance in particular.

The report, The ANZUS Alliance in an Ascending Asia, has three main policy recommendations for the alliance:

  1. It should refocus on the Asia Pacific
  2. It should serve as a 'central hub for Asian regional order and architecture'.
  3. It should play a leading role in enhancing maritime security in the region.

The sorts of practical measures proposed include working more closely together with partners such as India and Indonesia in 'minilateral' security processes, along the lines of the increased cooperation between Australia, Japan and the US in the past few years (this week, Japan is for the first time participating in the Talisman Sabre exercise with Australian and US military forces). In the maritime arena, the report recommends Australia and New Zealand provide 'badly needed strategic operating locations' to compensate for the limited US presence in the South Pacific. Other recommendations include sharing Australia's technological expertise and capability (radars, remote sensing), and more combined maritime operations to ensure open sea lines of communication.

None of this should pose much of a problem from the perspective of Australian public opinion.

The report's authors note the strong support for the alliance recorded in Lowy Institute Polls (now with 11 years of data on support for the alliance — check it out on our upgraded interactive tool) and from other polls, including those by ANU.

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Even more persuasive evidence (not picked up in the report) is Australian support for basing US forces here in Australia, regardless of China's condemnation of the 2011 announcement that US Marines would have a permanent presence in Darwin. In 2011, before the Darwin announcement, a majority (55%) of Australians were in favour of 'Australia allowing the United States to base US military forces here in Australia'. Asked again in 2013, support was even stronger, with 61% of us in favour.

It is the first recommendation in the report – the 'refocus' on the Asia Pacific – which may cause problems for the punters, inoffensive as it sounds.

Australians are confident that the US will continue to guarantee Australia's security well into the future, with two-thirds (66%) of the adult population in our 2013 Poll saying it's likely 'Australia will still be able to rely on the alliance in 20 years' time'. However, they are far less enthusiastic about the reciprocal support Australia might be pressed to provide, particularly in inconvenient places like Asia.

In our 2013 Poll, we asked whether Australia 'should act in accordance with our security alliance with the US even if it means supporting US military action' (a) 'in the Middle East, for example, against Iran', or (b) 'in Asia, for example, in a conflict between China and Japan'. Less than half (48%) thought we should support US action in the Middle East. Even fewer (38%) would support US military action in Asia. Three-quarters (76%) thought Australia should only support US military action if it is authorised by the UN. 

In short, most Australians want the US to support us in times of need, but aren't necessarily prepared to return the favour, as Rory Medcalf pointed out at the time.

It's not just public opinion which tends in this direction. As Michael Green et al point out in their report, the Australian Government is free-riding on the alliance as well, with Australia's defence budget in 2012 at its lowest level as a percentage of GDP since 1938. Recognising this, the Abbott Government has begun to redress the imbalance with a significant boost to the Defence budget in 2014 and a more modest one in 2015.

The Asia 'refocus' recommendation is controversial because, reading more closely, it involves some tough prioritising for Australia. The argument made in the report is that Australia's military involvement in the Middle East (which is more palatable to the Australian public) has distracted us and diverted funds from the 'needed geopolitical focus on challenges in the Asia-Pacific' (less palatable to the Australian public). The corollary is that while Australia needs to refocus, the US needs to reconsider its demands on us, because Australia cannot afford significant military commitments in both the Middle East and Asia Pacific. It has to choose.

This all makes perfect sense from a strategic point of view. The soon-to-be released Defence White Paper may well recommend similar policy shifts. But if these are up for serious consideration by Government, it needs to be with the full realisation that they will require persuasive selling to win over a nervous Australian public.

Photo by Flickr user JD Lasica.


The 2015 Lowy Institute Poll was released this morning. It's the eleventh annual Lowy Institute Poll.

It goes without saying that every year there are some fascinating results which shine a light on how Australians feel about critical foreign policy issues. With our established tracking questions, such as those about support for the US alliance or attitudes to global warming, the Poll also points out the longer-term trends in Australians' thinking on some of the complex challenges we face as a nation and a globe.

What is harder each year is to draw out some overarching 'theme', to try to articulate and summarise what the Poll says about the  direction or mood of the nation, at least insofar as it relates to the rest of the world. It's possible, of course, that there is no such theme: that Australians' responses to 30-odd questions about Australia's international relations do not encapsulate the national mood. On the other hand, maybe those responses do in fact give some valuable clues about our worldview. Either way, one of the questions asked around here between March and June is: what does it all mean?

The answer, in 2015, is that the world seems to be a bleak place to many Australians. Fewer Australians feel safe now that any any time during our 11-year polling history. Only 24% of Australian adults say they feel 'very safe' this year, 18 points down from the 42% who felt very safe when we last asked them in 2010.

Apart from feeling more insecure, Australians' optimism about their economy is at its lowest point since our first poll in 2005. Only 63% of Australians are either 'optimistic' or 'very optimistic' about Australia's 'economic performance in the world over the next five years'. This is 23 points lower than the peaks of 86% recorded in 2009-10 at the height of the financial crisis, and the single largest fall in optimism the Poll has recorded.

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One doesn't need to look too far in our other results this year for the probable cause of this bleak outlook. It appears the threat of terrorism is being keenly felt here, after the Martin Place siege late last year and the gruesome scenes and confronting news coming out of Iraq and Syria. Terrorism-related risks rank first, second and third out of eight potential risks to Australia's security in the next ten years, with 69% of Australians rating 'the emergence of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria' as a high risk to our security (the highest-ranked risk), and majorities seeing 'terrorist attacks on Australians overseas' and 'home-grown terrorism in Australia' as high risk. By comparison, risks of conflict in our region rank far lower in Australians' threat perceptions, with 'maritime disputes between China and its neighbours in Asian territorial seas' seen as  high risk by only 26% of Australians.

As speculation grows about Australia making further commitments to the US-led military effort in Iraq, it appears Australians may well back such commitments. Most of them (69%) support Australia's participation in military action against Islamic State in Iraq (air strikes and training and support to Iraqi forces), even though a majority believe that such participation increases the risk of terrorism to Australia now, and only 20% say it makes us safer from terrorism in the future.

Despite the bleak picture painted by Australians in this year's Poll, there is one group among them who have a slightly brighter outlook, and that's the group sometimes known as 'millennials' or generation Y (18-29 year-olds in our polling).

With 70% of Australians aged 18-29 feeling optimistic about Australia's economic performance overall (compared with only 54% of those aged 30 and over), it's clear these younger Australians have a brighter economic outlook. More of them feel a bit safer as well (85%, vs 78% of those older). As a group, their views are quite different from those of their elders in many other ways. In the lead-up to the Paris climate conference later this year, they are more likely to say the Government should make significant commitments on emissions reductions in those negotiations, so that other countries will be encouraged to do the same (70% vs 61% 30+ years). They are less opposed to Chinese investment in residential real estate (55% saying there is too much investment from China, vs 74% of 30+ years). They are less likely to support the recent cuts to the aid budget (33% in support, compared with 58% of 30+ years). They are more likely to say the Australian Government should play an active role in pushing for the abolition of the death penalty internationally (62% vs 50% of 30+ years). Surprisingly, they are more likely to see the US playing a more important and powerful role as a world leader in the future (15% vs 8% of 30+ years).

Their views about world leaders are also revealing. Among our list of ten world leaders, US presidential candidate Hillary Clinton is admired by fewer 18-29 year-olds (59% admire her) than their 30+ years  counterparts (81% of whom admire her). Millennials are much less likely to admire the Pope (56% vs 78% 30+ years). They appear to be less well-informed about international leaders than their elders: 63% of 18-29s 'don't know' Xi Jinping (compared with 50% of 30+ years); 53% don't know Joko Widodo (vs 39% 30+) and 19% don't know Vladimir Putin (vs 5% 30+) when asked whether they admire these leaders.

This is also the age group which has become somewhat notorious in the context of the Lowy Institute Poll for their attitudes to democracy, with less than half of them (49% this year) saying 'democracy is preferable to any other kind of government'.

There is a statement often attributed to Churchill (probably incorrectly) along the lines of 'if you are not a liberal at 20, you have no heart; if you are not a conservative at 30, you have no head'. It's possible these differing attitudes of younger Australians derive from youthful idealism or rebelliousness. It's possible their lack of knowledge, such as their relative ignorance of world leaders' names, derives simply from their youth rather than from any more sinister self-absorption or insularity.

Either way, the more positive and optimistic outlook of these young Australians brings a modicum of relief from the more gloomy worldview of the rest of the Australian population. 

Photo by Flickr user Crawford Learmonth.


The 2015-16 budget for the Foreign Affairs and Trade portfolio evokes A Tale of Two Cities.

For aid, it's a case of the 'worst of times': the Government has cut $1 billion from overseas development assistance this financial year (as announced in the Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook), $1.35 billion in the next, and $1.38 billion in 2017-18. This delivers a total saving of $3.7 billion since the last budget and a hefty $10 billion over the forward estimates since this Government took the reins in late 2013. 

After the last budget, everyone was busy calculating the impact of the Coalition's abandonment of the former government's goal of reaching 0.5% GNI by 2017-18, instead freezing the aid spend at $5 billion and indexing future growth to CPI. In this budget, Australia's foreign aid budget suffers its most significant contraction since its nadir in 2003-4 (dramatically depicted in Devpolicyblog's charts and spreadsheets in December last year). The 2014-15 aid budget was $5.0 billion (roughly the same as the 2013-14 spend, which itself was around $100 million less than the previous year's). In 2015-16, the budget is $4.052 billion. This is a 20% cut overall, with assistance to Indonesia and Africa the most affected. Australia slips to 13th in the OECD rankings of aid donors in the developed world, and 16th in the ratio of ODA to GNI.

Now on to the other tale. It might be an overstatement to call this year's budget the 'best of times' for Australia's overseas representation, but it's up there.

In what appears to be a sweetener for the Foreign Minister in an otherwise unpalatable serving, Australia's diplomatic network (yes, something we at the Lowy Institute may have raised once or twice) gets nearly $100 million to add five new posts to its diplomatic footprint, bringing the total to a nice round 100. The last time Australia got a new diplomatic mission was the Gillard Government's Chengdu post, opened in 2013. The Gillard Government announced another new post in West Africa (Senegal), but that one got scratched in last year's budget.

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The five new posts announced last night are Buka (PNG), Doha (Qatar), Makassar (Indonesia), Phuket (Thailand) and Ulaanbaatar (Mongolia). Interestingly, only two of those were in former DFAT Secretary Dennis Richardson's wishlist, which he put in a submission to the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Joint Standing Committee's 2012 inquiry into Australia's overseas representation. That list was weighted to Africa and Central Europe. 

The mission in Phuket, presumably a consulate-general, was probably the first priority on anyone's list. Phuket is Australians' fourth most popular travel destination, and one of the most demanding places for DFAT to provide consular services, accounting for the largest number of Australian deaths overseas.

The Makassar post, in eastern Indonesia, was also on the Lowy Institute's list, in order to serve Australia's considerable interests there (although the cuts to Indonesia aid trim those interests somewhat). Of the others, the post in Bougainville anticipates the independence referendum sometime in the next five years, the Ulaanbaatar post was in Mr Richardson's top five, and the Doha post is more of a surprise – presumably it's to serve increasing bilateral trade and investment interests.

While the expansion of the diplomatic footprint helps realise one of the Foreign Minister's long-held ambitions, the excitement of this budget measure is somewhat dulled by the more sobering picture the budget paints for the Department overall. 

After its merger with AUSAID, DFAT has had to cope with a reduction of 500 staff since the last budget – nearly 10% of its overall staff. By comparison, the overall public service (the general government sector) has shrunk by only 5% since the 2012/13 financial year (the year this government was elected) and 0.03% since last year, despite much fanfare about 'a smaller more agile public service' in this year's Budget.  

DFAT Secretary Peter Varghese is not given to hyperbole, but his comments in February's Estimates hearings about staff morale following this intense period of post-merger restructuring are telling:

As you would expect, if you go through a merger this big and this complicated you are going to have an unsettled period. Unsettled periods in my experience usually mean a certain cost in morale.

It's hard to deduce from the post-integration budget papers exactly what the impact of the merger has been on the Department's overall budget situation. Excluding equity injections and administered appropriations (aid), and special accounts, DFAT's finances of around $1.4 billion look to be slightly (1.6% or $22 million) improved. But a considerable amount of its budget over the next four years will be consumed by new funding ($106 million) for keeping open the Baghdad embassy to serve Australia's commitments in Iraq, as well as continued funding ($138 million) for the embassy in Kabul.1 The injection of $98 million to open the five new posts includes $37 million in capital funding. As we know from the some of the Government's other budget announcements over the past week, the $389 million in new budget measures for DFAT from last night's Budget won't come out of thin air.They will cause the Department considerable pain.

Clarification: 1. The funding for the Baghdad and Kabul embassies in the forward estimates is for two years only, to 2016-2017, with further funding for consideration at that point. 2. The expense measures for Foreign Affairs and Trade in this Budget (including for the Baghdad and Kabul embassies) are new funding allocated by Government, and do not detract from the Department's overall funding base. The 'pain' to which I refer is that which emanates from the cuts to the aid budget and their impact on the Department. 3. Australia opened an interim embassy in Kyiv, colocated with Canada's, in February.

Photo by Flickr user Bentley Smith.


New Lowy Institute polling released today shows that the Australian Government's data retention ('metadata') laws, which passed the parliament last night, have the support of a clear majority of Australians.

When asked whether 'legislation which will require Australian telecommunications companies to retain data about communications such as phone calls, emails and internet usage, but not their content' is justified, 63% of the adult population say it is 'justified as part of the effort to combat terrorism and protect national security'. Only one-third (33%) say it 'goes too far in violating citizens' privacy and is therefore not justified.'

Younger Australians (18-29) are more likely to say the legislation is not justified (47%), but this age group is divided about the policy, with 50% saying it is justified. 

'Australians appear to accept some infringements on their privacy in the interests of fighting terrorism and protecting national security,' said Lowy Institute Executive Director Dr Michael Fullilove today. 'This result is consistent with 2013 Lowy Institute polling which found that most Australians believed the government had struck about the right balance between protecting the rights of citizens and fighting terrorism.'  

This result is drawn from the forthcoming 2015 Lowy Institute Poll, the full version of which will be released in June 2015. The Lowy Institute Poll is based on a nationally representative telephone survey of 1200 Australian adults between 20 February and 8 March 2015. The Poll's error margin is approximately +/- 2.8%.  For more information see Lowy Institute press release. 


In a new poll conducted by the Lowy Institute on the weekend, 62% of the Australian adult population say that the executions of the two Australian citizens, Andrew Chan and Myuran Sukumaran, in Indonesia should not proceed.

Fewer than one in three (31%) Australians say the executions should proceed.

Most Australians also oppose the death penalty for drug trafficking. A substantial majority (69%) of the Australian population believes that in general, the death penalty should not be used as a punishment for drug trafficking. By comparison, only 26% say that the death penalty should apply to drug trafficking.

As Michael Fullilove has remarked today in a press release on this poll, with the date for the executions of the two Australians appearing to draw closer, 'Australian public and political opposition is crystallising. This Lowy Institute poll is a strong expression of Australian public opinion against the execution of Andrew Chan and Myuran Sukumaran, as well as public opposition to the death penalty for drug trafficking in general.' 

This special Lowy Institute poll reports the results of a nationally representative survey by telephone of 1211 randomly-selected respondents aged 18 years and over, conducted by Newspoll on 13-15 February 2015. The approximate error margin for the poll is +/- 2.8%.

The questions asked in the poll were as follows:

  1. In Indonesia, there is a death penalty for drug trafficking. Two Australian citizens, Andrew Chan and Myuran Sukumaran, are currently facing execution in Indonesia following convictions for drug trafficking. Do you personally think that the executions of these two Australian citizens should or should not proceed?
  2. Around the world, some countries do have a death penalty for drug trafficking, while other countries do not. In general, do you think the death penalty should or should not be used as a penalty for drug trafficking?

The Foreign Minister's new consular strategy, which she wrote about here this morning, signals a harder new direction in the Government's approach to providing consular assistance to Australians in distress overseas.

The new strategy is the culmination of a year's work by the Minister and Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, after the Minister invited submissions in December last year, (here's ours). The basic challenge for Australia's consular services, as the Minister outlined in her speech yesterday at the launch, is that the number of traveling Australians continues to increase almost exponentially – at 9 million trips last year, they've doubled over a decade and are five times the number 25 years ago.

With an increasingly anaemic budget, DFAT cannot continue to provide a gold-plated consular service at this rate of travel growth. And this is what the Minister was referring to when she said: 

I have decided to introduce the scope to limit consular assistance in some circumstances...[where] individuals have acted illegally or have deliberately or repeatedly acted recklessly and negligently and put themselves and others at risk despite warnings [or where there has been] a pattern of behaviour that has required multiple instances of consular assistance in the past.

This is a clear signal of a new and sterner approach. The Minister emphasised that consular assistance is a privilege, not a right, and that priority will be given to the most vulnerable and those in the most difficult circumstances. Assistance will be reduced to 'the absolute minimum level' if Australians 'deliberately or wilfully abuse the system'. Travelers are urged to take more responsibility for their actions, take out appropriate travel insurance, and not flout the laws of other countries.

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Importantly, the Minister left as a 'live option' the idea of introducing a cost-recovery system for consular services. The way she phrased it, an up-front consular levy (which I have proposed in the past) is off the table, but the fall-back option of recovering the cost of services – which could range from hourly charges for advice and assistance to charging for emergency evacuation from crisis zones after traveling against government travel advisories – is a distinct possibility.

Of particular relevance to DFAT's consular work is Australia's overseas diplomatic footprint. Its embassies and consulates are the front line of the consular work and bear the majority of the burden on staff and resources. In the Q&A yesterday, I asked the Minister about the status of the Government's review of its overseas network. This network is  small and overstretched, with limited or no representation in the majority of countries in the world. We have no consulate in Phuket, for instance, one of the most popular overseas destinations for Australian travelers, and in a country where the highest number of Australians die overseas every year. In response to my question, the Minister said the review had been finalised and was being considered by the Government. While the Minister has advocated for increased funding for her department and an expanded diplomatic footprint, this looks increasingly unlikely after the ominous hints in the press yesterday.

Just as well, then, that the Government has introduced a consular strategy that attempts to conserve some of the Department's scarce resources. It will need them.

Photo by Flickr user Jeremy Little.


The $254 million in cuts to the ABC budget, outlined today by ABC Chief Executive Mark Scott after Malcolm Turnbull's statement on Wednesday, have been coming for a long time – at least since the Lewis review which proposed efficiencies to reduce the ABC's annual budget requirement.

Since then, there have been numerous rumours of the steps the ABC will take to implement the cuts, including axing or trimming Stateline and Lateline, and closing its international bureaux in New Delhi and Tokyo (with the result that no Australian media outlet would have a correspondent in Tokyo).

The Minister's statements last week yet again emphasised his view that the cuts would not require programming changes, and could be implemented by driving back room and administrative efficiencies. Mark Scott's announcement today to the ABC staff is in stark conflict with the Minister's view. As rumoured, Stateline is gone, Lateline moves to ABC24, and several regional bureaux are cut.

As for the international bureaux, they will undergo a euphemistic 'shape readjustment'. The Auckland bureau will be entirely closed and others thinned down, with 'multi-platform hubs' installed in their place. London, Washington, Beijing and Jakarta reportedly remain, with no mention yet of the fate of the Tokyo bureau. 

This is 'highly contentious', as Crikey points out today, 'as some believe it exposes journalists to greater risks in hostile environments, but is increasingly becoming the global standard as media companies cut costs'.

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According to some in the ABC, budget surgery on the scale required by the Government could not possibly have been achieved only in administrative efficiencies, so programming changes were inevitable. While the Lewis review set out five broad areas in which, in its view, those administrative efficiencies could be achieved, it did not quantify or itemise those efficiencies. Given the heavy blows inflicted on the broadcaster today by its management and board, it's hard to believe that the cuts could have been made solely by reference to the Lewis recommendations.

One available conclusion, then, is that the Minister has relied on something of a fiction to lay the responsibility and the blame squarely on the shoulders of ABC management, rather than accepting some responsibility on behalf of the Government which is mandating the cuts.

Regardless of where responsibility lies though, the reality of $50 million plus cuts per annum for the ABC — coming on top of the axing of the Australia Network and the massive restructuring of ABC International which resulted in swingeing cuts to Radio Australia and a decimation of its programming to the region – is a severe curtailing of the ABC's ability to cover international news. 

Thinner representation of journalists across international bureaux, with leaner resources, will mean more sparse news coverage, more perfunctory reporting and less analysis. This is to Australia's detriment in a century where everything is global, and where we need to be vigilant that our geographic remoteness doesn't render us geopolitically isolated.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user Sarah_Ackerman.


The latest news from the ABC bunker is that while Lateline may survive the latest round of cuts, the bureaux in Tokyo and Delhi may be shut down.

The ABC Board met yesterday, reportedly to decide on measures to achieve efficiencies of up to $100m following the Budget and the Lewis Review, and in the wake of the Australia Network axing

Many have been shocked by ABC management's post-Budget decisions. The slashing of Asia Pacific News Centre and Radio Australia services, as Jenny Hayward-Jones outlined back in July, has resulted in the decimation of news coverage in and from the region and the exit of veteran international correspondents and journalists such as Sean Dorney, Catherine McGrath and Jim Middleton.

The Minister for Communications, Malcolm Turnbull, insists that the requisite efficiencies can be met through administrative and back-office cuts. Others are less confident and hugely concerned at ABC management tactics.  

The Minister has a deep and abiding respect for international journalism and an understanding of its importance for Australia. Below are some extracts from his speech here at the Lowy Institute in August, at the Institute's annual media awards for foreign policy journalism (you can read or listen to the full speech here):

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Only the ABC now has a substantial international presence with twenty Australian and 35 locally engaged staff overseas; a good example of what a public broadcaster should do in my view. It is, of course, much cheaper to fly in teams to cover specific stories on an on-needs basis. A study by the Media Standards Trust in the U.K. found this has become much more attractive for news organisations to cover locations when there is a specific event or crisis - such as, say, Ukraine. But this comes at the expense of a deep knowledge of the country and the contacts needed to develop stories in depth.


Media companies on digital platforms tend to chase two things to get clicks: cover immediate, breaking news on the one hand; and go for opinion and commentary, the more intemperate the better, on the other, to reap social media shares, likes and retweets. As I have said before, it often feels like the ‘news cycle’ has been replaced by the ‘outrage cycle’.

But there is a genre of news story that lies in the middle on these two extremes -- they are those stories which take a few days to put together, involve the skilful working of contacts and sources, and require a deep and nuanced knowledge of the subject matter. Reuters Editor-in-Chief David Schlesinger describes the new media world as enshrining the ‘dumbbell model’ of journalism -- all the weight has now shifted to the two ends of journalism, leaving not much in the middle.

And while management in media corporations might chase audiences through this 'dumbbell model', there is evidence that the audience itself values genuine foreign affairs coverage:

As one very senior journalist in Canberra’s press gallery told me: ‘There has been a huge amount of complacency, a growing lack of media interest in policy, [and] a function of that is a most conspicuous lack of interest in what other countries are doing in a policy sense, and this is reinforced by the problems of the business models of newspapers’. But interestingly, while there may be more of a focus on less weighty issues, consumers nominate foreign affairs as the most important reason for following the news.

The ABC, according to the Minister, has been the 'standout' in coverage of foreign affairs in Australia:

In recent years, The Australian has closed bureaux in Washington, New York, Los Angeles, London, Bangkok and New Zealand but still has correspondents in Jakarta, Beijing, Tokyo, Southeast Asia, Jerusalem and of course a very extensive network of correspondents to draw upon from the wider News Corp stable.

Fairfax has correspondents in Washington, London, Beijing, Delhi, the Middle East and has reinstated Lindsay Murdoch in Southeast Asia, based in Bangkok. Over the years it has pulled out from Wellington, Tokyo and New York.

The Australian Financial Review no longer has anyone in Tokyo, our second largest trading partner. The ABC is the standout in this area. It has bureaux in Washington, London, New Zealand, Jakarta, Beijing, Bangkok, Jerusalem, New Delhi, Tokyo and stringers in many other locations.

Perhaps no more. If the bureaux in Tokyo and Delhi are closed, there go two of the last remaining sources of first-hand news from two of Australia's most important partners and neighbours in the region: Japan, Australia's second largest trading partner and 'best friend' in Asia, and India, a rising power and Australia's 5th largest export destination, not to mention the soon-to-be recipient of Australian uranium following the recent agreement struck by the Government.

Last year Michael Fullilove touched on this issue in arguing the case for Australian eyes on the world, saying:

The rise of Asia means Australia finds itself a lot closer to the centre of geopolitical and economic action than in the past. It is vital to the national interest, therefore, that Australians understand what is happening beyond our shores...But we cannot simply rely on the homogenised worldview of international wire services...

The big international wire services might bring us news from around the world, but they won't necessarily cover the news that's of significance to Australia, because – gasp – Australia often doesn't figure in global news. When an important source of news and information is lost, so is an important input into the foreign policy debate in Australia. And we are the losers. 

Photo courtesy of Flickr user Brian Smith.


Later today, the 69th session of the UN General Assembly commences. One of Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop's first official duties last year was to address the opening of the 68th session of the General Assembly, nine days after being sworn in as minister.

Bishop had a tough start as minister. First came the Indonesian spying scandal, with angry reactions in Indonesia and pointed criticism from Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. A few days later came a dressing down from China after Bishop denounced Beijing's move to unilaterally establish an air defence identification zone in late November. Ms Bishop then had to deal with breaches of Indonesian territorial waters by stray Operation Sovereign Borders vessels. There has also been the painful process of the Peter Greste case.

Then of course, the MH17 catastrophe. Ms Bishop earned the respect of her international and national peers in brokering a Security Council response to MH17.

Our Foreign Minister has been busy.

Yet amid all this noisy foreign policy action, the Minister has been quietly going about her other business. The New Colombo plan is on track. Relations with Indonesia have stabilised, with agreement reached on a code of conduct in late August. Australia is back in China's good books.

And then there is the MIKTA initiative.

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MIKTA, you ask? As I wrote at the end of last year, this is a fledgling grouping which had its modest beginnings on the sidelines of the September 2013 UN General Assembly session. The acronym represents the five nations – Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey and Australia – who are 'members' of this informal group. They seek to 'strengthen the links between their nations, exchange views, consult and promote coordination on issues of common interest.' Early indications are that these are likely to include global governance reform, G20 work and finding solutions to global challenges such as the post-2015 development agenda. They have met twice this year, and in April spent a full day together in Mexico at the first MIKTA dialogue, resulting in a co-authored opinion piece in Huffpo in which the foreign ministers emphasised their similarities: they are all democracies, members of the G20, with open and dynamic economies, strategically located and each playing strong roles in their regions.

The first indications of how these nations will work together surfaced in the early days of the MH17 response, when the ministers of the five nations issued a joint statement condemning the downing and urging the peaceful resolution of the Ukraine crisis.

In August, Mexico hosted the first MIKTA academic seminar (which I attended) to identify some of the ways in which this diverse group ('a bunch of misfits' was the expression Michael Wesley used in his remarks) might cooperate constructively. While none of these academics spoke for their governments, there was a bundle of ideas, from working collaboratively against protectionist measures to freeing up visa restrictions, creating exchanges of students and journalists, and according each other 'most favoured nation' status.

It's early days, but each of the MIKTA foreign ministers appears enthusiastic about the possibilities of the new grouping. None of the five are part of a natural regional or security bloc, so their thinking is presumably that the grouping can achieve more together than each can achieve alone – the whole being greater than the sum of the parts. And while the parts are significant, the whole is potentially formidable. MIKTA nations are the world's 12th, 14th, 15th, 16th and 17th largest economies. Combined at US$5.8 trillion in GDP, they amount to the third-largest economy in the world after the US and China. Taken together, their populations rank the group as the third-largest in the world after China and India. If they can harness their collective strengths, this could be a useful grouping.

At the opening of the 69th session of the General Assembly, Ms Bishop will again meet with her MIKTA counterparts to progress their agenda. Watch this space. 

Photo courtesy of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.


Almost a year since the Coalition took the reins of government and introduced its policy of 'economic diplomacy', a term which was probably foreign to many Australians at the time, Foreign Minister Julie Bishop and Trade and Investment Minister Andrew Robb launched the Government's Economic Diplomacy policy today at the Lowy Institute. Since the election, it's a term the Foreign Minister has used frequently, along with the 'open for business' mantra and its emphasis on promoting the economic interests of Australia and Australian businesses internationally.

The ministers must have received a considerable amount of feedback about the policy, including questions about what 'economic diplomacy' actually means, because both today went to considerable lengths to explain it. The complexity of the task is illustrated by the length of the ministers' speeches: almost an hour, taken together, and followed by a short Q&A session.

In the Foreign Minister's parlance, 'economic diplomacy' means:

harnessing broader aspects of our international diplomatic work to promote trade, encourage economic growth, attract investment and support business.

To do this, Australia's global network of 95 ambassadors, high commissioners and consuls general, together with 72 trade commissioners, will make economic diplomacy their guiding principle: 'promoting our national reputation as an open export-oriented free market economy (and as a country which is) a great place to invest and with which to do business.' Several times in her speech, Ms Bishop underscored the role of the private sector, particularly small and medium enterprises; she also included players in the broader Australian community: NGOs, think tanks, the arts and sporting people and organisations.

In the increasingly globalised international environment Australia now faces, this economic diplomacy agenda will be a complex one to prosecute: it implies a far greater role for non-government entities, particularly the private sector, and means a much greater involvement for the Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in formulating and facilitating the Australian Government's approach to international trade and foreign investment.

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Because economic diplomacy requires domestic policy settings which reduce barriers to trade, economic growth and investment, DFAT, along with its two ministers, will need to lead a whole-of-government, whole-of-society effort to achieve positive economic outcomes through diplomacy. As Ms Bishop described, the strength and uniqueness of this policy is that it aligns all Australia's international efforts – foreign policy, trade, tourism, investment and development – so that they are 'pulling in the same direction.'

As pointed out by one of the participants in the workshop which followed the Ministers' speeches, this means Australian diplomacy is no longer an 'elite sport' played only by diplomats and government officials. Because it will involve Australians and all kinds of Australian business, economic diplomacy will bring the business of Australia's international engagement much closer to home.

But it also makes Australia's diplomacy much more complex, at a time when DFAT, our principal agency for international engagement, has been resource-strapped for decades. And there are risks in making Australian business and industry the spearheads of our international engagement; the AWB scandal and Indian students' crisis are two examples of aggressive economic 'diplomacy' gone awry. These risks will require careful management by skilled diplomats abroad, and appropriate domestic policy-making and regulation by government at home.   

Australia is no outpost in prioritising economic diplomacy: Canada, the UK, and the Netherlands are examples of significant and like-minded nations pursuing similar goals to those outlined today by Bishop and Robb.  The key to success will be making sure that the policy doesn't become, in Bishop's words, 'the pursuit of Australia's naked self-interest to the potential detriment of others', but balances Australia's economic ambitions with broader and less self-centred aspirations for prosperity and peace in the region.


Since Fergus Hanson first polled Australians on the value of democracy in the 2012 Lowy Institute Poll, our findings about how Australians, particularly young Australians, view democracy have variously provoked astonishment, bewilderment, disbelief, worry and frustration. Our 2014 Poll, released early in June, sought to understand better the thoughts of young Australians by adding 150 more 18-29 year olds to our usual polling sample, making a total of 364 of that age group in our overall sample of 1150 Australians of voting age this year. The larger sample makes the error margin even smaller than in our previous polls (down to 2.9% on the overall sample and 5.1% on the sample of 18-29 year olds).

The larger sample confirmed what we found in our earlier polls: the majority of young Australians either don't think democracy matters or think some other system might in some circumstances work better.

Less than  half (42% actually) of 18-29 year olds say that 'democracy is preferable to any other kind of government'. Thirty-three percent say 'in some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable', and nearly one in five (19%) say that 'for someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of government we have'. 7% say they don't know when presented with these three options about their views on democracy.

On learning about our polling on democracy and young people, the Speaker of the Queensland Parliament, the Hon Fiona Simpson, convened some groups of young Australians to talk about 'Why democracy matters' at Queensland Parliament earlier this year. These two short videos (one above and one below; each about 3 minutes long) offer a pretty compelling insight into how these articulate and thoughtful young people think about democracy. One young woman put it this way:

I think we take democracy for granted. I don't think that we actually know what a world without democracy would look like.

If you're interested in why we continue to get these low results from young people about the value they place on democracy, then watch these clips. They're beautifully produced pieces featuring young Australian leaders eloquently expressing their ideas about democracy, our political system, and what matters to them.  The Speaker summed it up like this:

There's a difference between having a voice and actually making a difference, and that's why I think we need to learn from those who already at a young age have discovered the difference and who also hold the keys for how we can make democratic processes more open to people.