The fact that everyone's worst fears have been realised is no reason passively to accept the new electoral laws, but it does make some of the comments heard about them seem a little disingenuous. There are good reasons to decry the failure of the military government to observe widely accepted democratic principles and to acknowledge the clear wishes of the Burmese people. But no-one should act surprised that the laws are as restrictive as they are.

Indeed, given the tenor of a few comments heard over the past week, it is worth considering whether there might be some other reason why this issue has attracted so much attention, particularly from hard line opponents of the regime.

It is self-evident that, over the past 20 years, economic sanctions and other punitive measures levelled against Burma have failed to remove the military regime, or persuade it to abandon any of its core policies. It has refused to transfer power to a democratically-elected civilian government, or to engage in a substantive dialogue with the opposition movement and ethnic communities. Nor has the regime taken steps to improve its human rights record, release political prisoners (including Aung San Suu Kyi) or to introduce major economic reforms.

The harsh reality is that, despite all the pressures it has faced over the past 20 years, from both internal opposition forces and hard line foreign states, the military regime has become progressively stronger. It still faces some serious problems but, measured objectively against several criteria, the regime is now better off and more firmly entrenched in power than at any time since the abortive 1988 pro-democracy uprising. It would not be risking the transition to a new system of government if it was not confident of being able to control the process.

There are still some politicians and activist groups, however, who remain convinced that even stronger rhetoric and tougher sanctions will eventually bring down Burma's military regime, or at least persuade it to mend its ways. These advocates have strongly criticised the Obama Administration, and others like the ASEAN member states, for engaging with the military regime in an effort to ameliorate political, economic and social conditions in Burma. Critics of this approach have characterised it as naïve, while some have even branded it as immoral.

In these circumstances, it is worth asking whether some of the criticisms heard about Burma's new election laws — characterised by  US Senator Mitch McConnell as 'a farce' — represent at least in part an attempt to discredit the Obama Administration's policy of 'practical engagement'. By highlighting Naypyidaw's apparent indifference to US wishes, opponents of the Administration's more nuanced approach are able to press their case for a return to the hardline policies of the Bush era.

When it introduced its new Burma policy last September, the Obama Administration stated that political change in that country was going to be a long, slow and difficult process. It knew that there were going to be setbacks. It also accepted that, at times, President Obama would face accusations from his political opponents that Burma's generals were treating the US with contempt. And, indeed, over the past six months all this has proven to be the case. Yet this does not mean that the policy was misguided, or will easily be abandoned.

The US Government has publicly expressed its deep disappointment over the new election laws. It has stated plainly that, given their nature, Washington has no hope that the elections due to be held later this year will be credible. However, officials have also said that the US has not been surprised by the regime's failure so far to open up the political process. They have emphasised the continuing need for a strategic approach, taken in collaboration with like-minded countries, based on commitment, consistency and patience.

After all is said and done, perhaps the most obvious lesson to be drawn from the regime's new electoral laws is that meaningful political change can only come from within Burma, and from the Burmese people themselves. Whatever their policies, the ability of foreign countries and international organisations to influence internal developments will remain limited.

 Photo by Flickr user totaloutnow, used under a Creative Commons license.

To prove his point, King uses the Flesch-Kincaid method of determining ease of reading and applies it to Army documents that explain the recent Adaptive Army initiative, which plans to make Australia's army 'the best small Army in the world', according to the current Chief of Army. The Flesch-Kincaid method analyses a document and provides a score that indicates ease of readability. Flesch-Kincaid also identifies how many years of education would be required to understand what is being read.

The Adaptive Army documents fail on both counts, requiring the reader to possess between 4 and 7 years of university education just to understand what they are reading. This is problematic for a document that aims to drive cultural change in an organisation with an average education level at the Year 10 mark. For anyone who has ever read current Australian military publications the news that they are dense and incomprehensible will come as no surprise.

It is promising that not only can King write an article titled 'How Stupid Are We?' without being lynched by his military peers, but that he is part of an internal Army project called 'Towards a Smarter Army'. The ADF's tempo of the past decade may be producing more officers who understand that broad thinking and simple communications are required to solve military problems. This can only help in improving Australia's military thinking for both our Defence Force and those who work with it.

Photo by Flickr user Mark78_xp, used under a Creative Commons license.

Most importantly, China has lent muscle to Pakistan's military machine against India. In fact, the first formal step towards Sino-Pak defence cooperation was taken soon after 1965 Indo-Pakistan war. Pakistan's missile development programme was started in the 1980s with assistance from the Chinese.

Pakistan has benefited a great deal from Beijing's aid, which, unlike other aid providers, has come without strings. Their friendship probably reflects the commonly used refrain, 'my enemy's enemy is my friend' (South Asian giant India remains an adversary to both Beijing and Islamabad). So much so that on the eve of resumption of Indo-Pakistani talks in New Delhi on 25 February, Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Querishi said in Beijing that China has a 'blank cheque' from Pakistan for mediating between Pakistan and India. 

But India, which has ruled out any third party mediation in Indo-Pak affairs, has been circumspect of Sino-Pak ties. Last year it lodged a strong protest with China over announcing support for hydro power projects in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Media reports suggest Beijing is not pursuing the projects.

Photo by Flickr user dreamX, used under a Creative Commons license.

At the moment, very few foreign editors will seek angles like this from their correspondents. So the hard-pressed correspondents barely spend any time developing them. But they know they are there, just waiting to be drawn out.

During a recent visit to Malaysia, my colleagues and I on the board of the Australia-Malaysia Institute were introduced to the considerable problems facing sporting authorities there, starved of competent on-air sporting commentators and coaches. In the area of volunteering, they're struggling, with super-busy parents simply not seeing this as part of a parental repertoire and precious few underlying institutions like Little Athletics or Oz Kick. They're very keen to know how we've developed these services.

The common complaint of 'no time for anything but basic family and work' is deafening in the region, once you get beyond surface chit-chat. In fact, it's more keenly felt than in Australia, much to our surprise. This is surely food for good stories.

A key issue I always raise with people in the region is: 'tell us about social change in your community'. The stories come tumbling out, with passion and usually some fear. We may think we have issues with Australian identity confusion amid fast change. They're nothing by comparison with what's confronting our neighbours. But we don't report it like this, whereas it could be so much more inviting if we did.

So while I sympathise with the frustrations of some of The Interpreter's respondents about Australia's outdated notions of modern Indonesia or Malaysia or Thailand, merely calling for broader coverage won't do the trick. No amount of fine, nuanced reporting by Greg Earl from the AFR or Rowan Callick in The Australian will seriously shift the consciousness of the mainstream in either country until we start seeking what's common as well as what's different.

Then, and I suspect only then, will we reach what I judge to be a bold goal: a series from Andrew Denton on Asian characters (a la The Elders series) or Q&A from Jakarta. Then we would be cooking with gas.

Photo by Flickr user permanently scatterbrained, used under a Creative Commons license.

Fraser's diary is not specific enough to say when this would be, but a couple of things make me think that dinner was probably later than 7pm – more like between 8pm and 10pm, or between 6am-8am in Washington. In any case, at the outside we can say that the Bush phone call to Washington must have been between 5-8am Washington time. It is also possible of course that the call began before the NSC meeting, and that Bush spoke to people before the meeting got underway. But that is just speculation.

So then I tried to find out what time the NSC meeting was held. This was unexpectedly difficult to pin down, however a few matters make it clear that it was  an early meeting, and an emergency meeting.

First, Haig's media conference announcing the shift in US attitude was after the 'emergency meeting' but before lunch, because by the time Reagan had lunch later that day, the news was already well and truly out, and had been absorbed by the press pack. I attach two news reports, both published 1 May but datelined 30 April, that report Haig's media conference and events surrounding it. One is from the NY Times, and is footnoted in the book. The other is from The Age.

Also see this transcript of Reagan talking to newsmen at 12.59 on the 30th of April, in which Haig's announcement is referred to as having happened 'this morning'. The NY Times on the same day published a transcript of Haig’s remarks, datelined 30 April, which it describes as having been made 'this morning'.

Again, it has proved very hard to determine exactly what time in the morning this was, but the standard White House press briefings at that time were usually at 9.30am.

So, it seems that by at the latest mid-morning of 30 April, the key decision to support Britain had not only been made, but Haig had a prepared statement which he read out, in which both the substance and detail of the decision to suspend all military exports to Argentina, and other sanctions, and to 'respond positively' to requests for materiel support from Britain, was all laid out. This supports the idea that the decision itself was made relatively early in the morning.

I also found in the Thatcher archives a dinner-time speech which she gave in Britain on 30 April, in which she says:

Nor, as we learn especially today, this evening, has our friendship with the United States changed. It is once more in full bloom again (hear, hear) (applause). We are very grateful indeed to Mr Haig for his strenuous efforts to seek peace. But you know it is not always easy between a dictatorship which stands for subjugation of the people and a democracy which only flourishes by the wishes of the people.

Washington is five hours behind Britain. If Thatcher was making a dinner-time speech in which she mentions the shift in the US attitude, this corroborates the other evidence that Haig's statement was made early in the day – in time to be absorbed and commented on by lunchtime, Washington time, and evening in the UK.

Finally, there is the amazing Jim Rentschler's diary, available here on the Thatcher Archives website. Rentschler was the White House official responsible for handling the Falklands, and he accompanied Haig on his shuttle diplomacy leading up to 30 April. 

Rentschler was at the NSC meeting in question. Sadly he does not give a time for the meeting, but he does give a detailed account, which I have copied below. So far as the degree of Bush and Fraser's influence is concerned, the diary entry is not enlightening, and might be read as going against the idea that Bush's intervention was influential. Rentschler describes the conversation as 'desultory, with future historians unlikely to extract any zingers'.

Rentschler describes, and gives a transcript of, the record of the resolutions that were announced by Haig later that morning:

If ever a ship was in the sand, Haig's "peace shuttle" is it. The moment of South Atlantic truth is upon us this morning, and while I derive some faint satisfaction that a Reagan-chaired NSC comes down on the policy option I favor, that feeling ain't gonna do much for our interests in the Hemisphere. The discussion in the Cabinet Room is desultory, with future historians unlikely to extract any zingers from the verbatim I prepared later in the day (with the possible exception of Jeane Kirkpatrick's half-assed idea that "The Argentines will do anything to avoid war, they don't want it, they'll slip out of it, I would even anticipate a UN démarche which will settle the issue this weekend"; to which the President responds "Wouldn't it be nice if, after all these years, the UN actually did something to promote peace?").

There are a number of specific actions which emerge from this morning's exchange, and are you ready for this? – there is even a decision to make them a matter of permanent record – surely an unprecedented move for this NSC! Hence the draft NSDD I do up for circulation to principals entitled "U.S. Actions In The South Atlantic Crisis": "Pursuant to the decisions reached at the meeting of the National Security Council of April 30, 1982, we are taking, effective immediately, the following actions in connection with the dispute between the United Kingdom and Argentina over the Falkland Islands:

• Issuance of an NSC-approved press statement which summarizes the U.S. position in the South Atlantic crisis and includes an explicit pro-UK tilt and the announcement of concrete steps underscoring US determination not to condone the use of unlawful force to resolve disputes.
• The suspension of all military exports to Argentina. This action covers deliveries of all items in the pre-1977 – i.e., pre-Humphrey-Kennedy– FMS pipeline, primarily affecting spare parts in the amount of $3.9 million; it also covers the issuance of export licenses for Munitions List items (which will affect non-government as well as government end-users, thereby reaching a category not previously covered by Humphrey-Kennedy).
• The withholding of certification of Argentine eligibility for military sales (which includes the US decision not to act on license requests for dual-use items and related COCOM-type material).
• The suspension of new Export-Import Bank credits, insurance, and guarantees;
• The suspension of Commodity Credit Corporation guarantees (which affects agricultural products worth approximately $2 million).
• A private warning to Argentina that the measures announced do not encompass the full range of economic sanctions which the US has at its disposal and which could be applied depending on circumstances (note: under existing statutory proscriptions, third-country transfers of munitions and related items are already covered).

The other notable thing about the Rentschler diary (written shortly after the events described) is that, while it does not give a time for this meeting, the previous entries make it clear that it was not at all unusual for  key bodies and decision makers to meet at all hours of the day and night during this crisis. Indeed, he often comments on the lack of sleep, and the sense of urgency is palpable.

On the other hand, and against the idea that Fraser and Bush's intervention on 30 April was crucial, the possible damage to NATO from a US decision to back Argentina or remain neutral was clearly in Haig and Rentschler's mind from mid-April onwards, with Rentschler strongly favouring backing Britain.

In his entry of 16 April, Rentschler signals what the NSC meeting of 30 April will decide, and describes it as an endorsement of his own ideas of what should be done. But the attitude of Kirkpatrick, and the fact that Reagan's own mind was not made up, is also clear.

So, that is as far as I got. Fraser and I thought the record corroborated Fraser's memory sufficiently to include the anecdote. The extent to which his conversation with Bush, and Bush's call to the NSC, was decisive is more than I can say. Bush may have been flattering his host when he told Fraser that it had been decisive. Or Bush may have overstated or overestimated his own influence. Or the call may indeed have helped tip the balance between the competing considerations that Rentschler's diary identifies as preoccupying the Administration.

There is one way in which more information could be obtained. See this webpage, part of the Reagan archives. Under 'White House Staff and Office Files' there is Box 91284, which seems to be a record of the National Security Meeting in question. The budget for our book did not extent to a trip to the USA for me to go and see what's there.

So when the Japanese worry about the growing strength (including military strength) of China, they naturally look to the US for reassurance. That may make Japan appear less than 'equal' to the US, but it is internal factors that have prevented Japan from expanding its conventional military role and capacities.

That I think illustrates a more general point, which is that the role the US plays in regard to a particular country depends not only on the US but also on the other country. And in the case of China, the US is dealing with a huge and formidable country in the throes of dynamic change, uncertain both of the eventual shape of its internal development and of how it will fit in to the international community. 

That uncertainty manifests itself from time to time in confrontational behaviour towards the US, in Copenhagen for example. In that instance it seemed that it was not a case of the US failing to treat China as an equal, but of China treating the US and its president with scant respect.

How will these issues of equality and partnership be resolved? Hugh sees an Asian Concert as the answer, although rather surprisingly he doesn't 'think the EAS or other regional multilateral forums matter much', as 'they reflect, rather than shape, the regional order'. It might be that the US sees another alternative. For years, observers have seen a tension in US diplomacy between its recognition of the virtues of multilateralism and the advantages of bringing its great weight to bear in a one-on-one situation. Perhaps with China, seen as its only challenger in Asia and perhaps in the world, the US will emphasise the bilateral relationship — the 'G2'.

My own view is that, whatever strategy the US adopts, its main problem will be to devote enough resources — of time and attention as well as physical and financial — to the Asia-Pacific. 

Speaking of President Obama's coming trip to Indonesia and Australia, White House spokesman Robert Gibbs was reported as saying that the visits were important because 'the US has been absent from the Asia-Pacific region'. The current Administration is clearly trying to reverse that, but it will be very difficult given its military tasks in Iraq and Afghanistan, and its preoccupations with Pakistan, Iran and the Israel-Palestine issue.

Photo by Flickr user holeymoon, used under a Creative Commons license.

People like him fail to appreciate that journalists are equally besieged by others who are as passionate about Indonesia as he is. It is just that they want us to use other prisms like long term human rights achievements.

Those who think that daily media practitioners are an unreflective crowd might be interested to know that just as Stephen was penning his comments last Monday a group of Indonesian and Australian editors were sitting down for a two-yearly gathering.

It’s a commendable project of the Australia Indonesia Institute that has achieved the sort of easygoing long term interaction that we all aspire to for the relationship. Bosses, colleagues and political leaders are all fair game in a discussion about current events and how the media portrays them. 

Believe me, the 3 Cs were rolled out on both sides and no one was offended.

Photo by Flickr user London Summit's photostream, used under a Creative Commons license.

Government engagement with Indonesia that moves ahead of public opinion has repeatedly attracted domestic criticism in Australia. Admittedly, the human rights issues which were often the basis of domestic discontent with Australia’s Indonesia policy have largely dissipated, but there remain risks for any Australian political leader in undertaking ‘dramatic gestures’.

Perhaps what is needed instead is solid and incremental expansion in key areas, including closer economic relations and a new Colombo type education plan as Hanson suggested, which reach beyond the framework of current engagement which is predominately focussed on security concerns.

Australian travel advisories to Indonesia remain a fundamental impediment to closer ties with Indonesia, but Hanson’s suggestions that the warning system be modified to accommodate legitimate risk assessments while promoting safe travel, and that security warnings be made specific to regions of Indonesia are unrealistic given the nature of intelligence and the risk averse nature of governments generally.

There are enormous difficulties in determining legitimate risks from intelligence information, particularly for governments concerned about death and injury to Australian nationals overseas. Furthermore, region specific travel warnings would mean Indonesia’s capital, the heart of business and politics in Indonesia, would be on constant high alert.

The defence aspects of Hanson’s recommendation for developing an outward looking positive cooperation agenda are problematic. His suggestion that Australia consider a trilateral approach to training exercises with Indonesia’s Army Special Forces (Kopassus), including US special forces, fails to recognise Australia’s preference for bilateral defence engagement with Indonesia and a desire to avoid negative perceptions of Australia as US deputy sheriff.

Finally, the Lowy policy brief calls for a rethink of public diplomacy and suggests that both Australia and Indonesia agree to promoting ‘accurate, broader-based and positive images’. This is a worthy recommendation, but from an Indonesian perspective there are limits to improving public perceptions of Australia, when there is arguably greater benefit in redefining Indonesia’s global role through the G20 and in strategic partnerships with major powers, as well as Africa and the Middle East.

There are some encouraging signs of change. The UAE has tolerated open media coverage of the controversial Sheikh Issa case, the brother of the Ruler of Abu Dhabi who was tried for torture (with videotape evidence of Sheikh Issa beating and running over an Afghan man in a car). The court acquitted him but the case was at a least step in the direction of press freedom.

More progressive papers like The National in the UAE do their best to tread the fine line between perceived threats to nationalism and the critical reporting required for good journalism. 

Murdoch clearly has a commercial interest in seeing the liberalisation of Middle East markets but is likely to be waiting sometime for the rulers of these kingdoms to find themselves in the burning media spotlight Murdoch himself is used to.

Photo by Flickr user sirenmedia's photostream, used under a Creative Commons license.

I struck this view time and time again when I served with the US over many years. It may exist because it reflects the part-myth that we have constructed around ourselves, and part of a desire by the US to see good in everyone.

If we ever deserved such a reputation it may have come from earlier generations. Our reputation in World War I was superb. Our reputation in World War II was just as good, but there were times when MacArthur would not have shared Mullen’s view.

Our soldiers performed brilliantly in Korea at the tactical level. We created myths about our achievements in the Malayan Emergency when we only deployed small ground forces once the British and Malays had almost completely defeated the CTs. But I suspect it was Vietnam where we cemented the kinds of views that Mullen reflects here.

We did well in Phuoc Tuy province. I like to say that our soldiers fought brilliantly there until the day we lost the war. But the respect that many in the US hold us in now was earned in part by the sacrifice of 500 Australian lives, by the fact that we took responsibility for a province, and by the fact that our contribution was, at its height, a force of 8000 soldiers. Significant indeed.

It is my view that we did not cover ourselves in glory in Iraq during the counter insurgency. In fact, we probably harmed our strategic interests by being there and not fighting. In Afghanistan we have pulled our weight a little more because part of our forces are fighting, but our government has decided not to commit to an extent that we can support the Obama war effort at the theatre strategic level ('disrupt, dismantle and defeat') or at the tactical level ('shape, clear, hold, build and transition').

The danger in such fulsome praise is that we believe it. We are not experts in counterinsurgency (COIN) and we are not better than the best modern COIN forces in the world, the US and the UK. Perhaps the US is softening us up for something.

Photo by Flickr user Kylos85's photostream, used under a Creative Commons license.

The Korean peninsula is an area, or issue, with which both China and the US are deeply engaged. It's hard to be optimistic about outcomes from the Six-Party Talks framework, given the difficulty of the issue and North Korea's unpredictability, but it's also hard to maintain that the US needs to change its method of handling the issue in order to align with China more closely.

The Taiwan issue is perhaps one area on which the US might with advantage consider changing its attitude. The current arms sale row seems something of an anachronism, given the improved relations between Beijing and Taipei and the ever-increasing integration of their economies. 

There's a treatment of this question in the Jan/Feb 2010 issue of Foreign Affairs, in which Bruce Gilley contends (subscription required) that the US should support, not oppose, the 'Finlandization' of Taiwan, in the interests of promoting 'long-term peace through closer economic, social and political ties between Taiwan and China'. Such a change would not be easy; the US 1979 Taiwan Relations Act provides for continuing arms sales to Taiwan. But if it occurred it would certainly have further consequences for US strategy in the region.

It would be interesting to know whether a change of policy on Taiwan figures in White's view of what the US should do to adapt to the new situation and, whether it does or not, what is the set of policies he would like the US to adopt.

Photo by Flickr user imovermyhead, used under a Creative Commons license.

With this right to know comes a responsibility to be informed. To make defence transparency effective the Australian public needs to understand that when the Australian Army talks about cavalry, it doesn't mean horses. And it helps to have read about an Australian military campaign more recent than Gallipoli.

Outside of the commentary of a handful of experts, the current public defence debate often seems as informed as a discussion on health policy framed by watching a few episodes of House. Or a consideration of NSW state politics predicated on a few seasons of The Sopranos. Actually, scratch that last example.

The Sydney Morning Herald's drive for greater Defence accountability should be applauded. So too should be former Army Chief Lieutenant-General Peter Leahy for his willingness to engage in an intelligent discussion about funding priorities — as well as his willingness  to quote the work of the Lowy Institute.

Greater transparency in Defence spending is a good thing. It will help make the Department leaner and focus spending where it is needed most. Let's hope the Australian public welcomes it with informed criticism, rather than cheap shots at a Defence force which it doesn't fully understand.

Photo by Flickr user mdezemery, used under a Creative Commons license.

As I sat with his father and his sister, the local mayor and the state and federal members watching the match, with Matt's son, his brother, and a number of Matt's SAS mates among the spectators, I spent a few minutes thinking about the emotional side of conflict, about honour, bravery, mateship, success, failure. Perhaps we can justify some things that we were all involved in by the fact that Iraq voted again.

Now the hard work begins; forming a government and continuing to embed the institutions of Iraqi democracy as US forces leave. In a grossly imperfect world, this is still an extraordinary achievement by Iraq, the US and many others. Millions of people like Matt Locke in Iraq and in Afghanistan, through their often invisible contributions, have remedied our collective errors and made this possible. Let's not over-analyse it, at least for a few days, and just consider what an amazing achievement this is.

Photo by Flickr user brownbearphotography, used under a Creative Commons license.

While the Antarctic Treaty System precludes military activity on the continent, it is worth contrasting the Australian Defence Force's (ADF) approach to Antarctica with that of the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF). The NZDF regularly flies Air Force planes to Antarctica and has between 20 and 60 military personnel there to assist with logistics, support search and rescue efforts and maintain links with the US Antarctic Program. The NZDF has also conducted trials staging its P-3K Orion aircraft from Antarctica to support Southern Ocean surveillance in support of the Convention on Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources.

The ADF has no recent experience operating in Antarctica, thinking strategically about Antarctic security, or planning for contingencies in Australian Antarctic Territory. The running conflict between Japanese whaling ships and Sea Shepherd vessels in the Southern Ocean has sparked calls for Australian warships to be dispatched south and probably spurred hasty thinking about how to enforce Australian and international law in Australian Antarctic waters. Beyond that, the only military appreciation of Antarctica by the ADF seems to be found in an 1993 ADF Journal article that calls for military cooperation with the Australian Antarctic Division.

The likelihood of strategic abrasion in Antarctica is rising. The Antarctic Treaty System, which has done an excellent job thus far of preserving Antarctica for peaceful purposes, has been tested recently by friction between states regarding maritime territorial claims under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. While the 1991 Madrid Protocol bans mining in Antarctica until 2048, issues surrounding mineral exploration and extraction are likely to emerge again should global prices rise to levels where extraction from Antarctica would be commercially feasible.

Australia's 1987 Defence White Paper said Australia's national interest was to see a demilitarised Antarctica free from political and strategic competition. There has been little mention of Antarctic policy in Defence white papers since. Over twenty years later, major powers like China and India continue to enthusiastically expand their Antarctic operations. The recent increased militarisation of the Arctic by Canada and Russia forewarns similar strategic tension that could emerge in Antarctica should the fragile peace of the Antarctic Treaty System be disrupted.

Australian strategic planners would do well to not be caught napping.

 Photo by Flickr user Martha de Jong-Lantink, used under a Creative Commons license.

The Indian project is small compared to a Chinese project in Myanmar that began about three years back. But, aiming to match China's clout, India has met some of Myanmar's defence needs and assisted development projects.

The second project is the access to Bangladesh's Chittagong port, which will involve resuming a pre-partition road and rail link from Northeastern state of Tripura to the port city. Chittagong has one of the finest deep sea ports in South Asia. This project was agreed during Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina's India visit this January.

India's contribution to the Kaladan project is US$100 million and is proposed to be completed in four years. The bidding process began in February. Although Chittagong is a better port than Sittwe and connectivity would be faster, New Delhi will continue with the Sittwe-Mizoram link. This is to take care of any possible change in government in Dhaka that may deny access to Chittagong port.

Providing a corridor to India has been a politically sensitive issue in Bangladesh. However, after Hasina returned to power in December 2008, she decided to connect Bangladesh to the rest of the world.

Hugh says:

Knowing Jim as an old friend and valued colleague, I suspect he will be inclined to reply that, having committed ourselves to a job, we should do whatever it takes to finish it. In an operational or tactical commander, this kind of single-minded pursuit of an assigned mission is highly admirable. For a strategic-level decision maker, it is an abrogation of the responsibility to ensure that the ends justify the means.

I am sure it was Hugh's clumsy phrasing that leads him to imply that, with an operational or tactical background, I am not up to strategic-level decision making. No modern military worth its salt has, since about 1914, held up the 'single minded pursuit of an assigned mission' as a dominant quality in operational or tactical level actions.

This ignorance of the tactical tools of strategy is one reason why strategy in Australia since the 70s has been dislocated from operational and tactical means and has therefore displaced itself from reality. Go no further than every White Paper on defence since the end of Vietnam, that never created the means of achieving their own strategic ends.

You cannot separate tactical and operational issues from strategy – ends and means must be aligned all the way up and down. The only reason Australia's strategy has not been shown to be a failure is that it has not been tested – a very lucky country indeed.

Photo by Flickr user Kinky Fantastic, used under a Creative Commons license.

He also said the PNTL wasn't learning anything from its UN counterparts. After all, the commander asked, isn't the UN technically responsible for security? It was a daring rebuke to the logic of the UN's district-by-district handover. Newspapers quickly filled with calls for the return of the PNTL, seen as faster to respond and less hesitant to bring out its guns. PNTL has since returned to the streets, but the incident hurt the image of the UN police and further weakened the 'democratic policing principles' they are here to promote.

Neither the PNTL senior command nor the Government publicly spoke out against the district commander's move. The General Commander was busy leading a dubious 'mega-operation' against rumoured 'ninja' activity in the border districts — without any UN involvement, even though the international force retains executive authority in the area. (One leading NGO has also raised concerns over possible human rights violations.)

The Secretary-General's report is short on prescriptions to cure the ills of the Timorese police, but provides incisive diagnosis of its problems. Dili is back to 'apparent normalcy' since the 2006 crisis, but it argues the PNTL is not ready to give up UN support. The service remains weak in operational, administrative and management capacity, and lacks basic equipment. There are few clear, enforced policies on fundamentals such as the use of force. There is ample evidence of misconduct with no effective disciplinary mechanism. Police frequently have little understanding of the country's evolving criminal legislation.

Much work thus remains to be done, but the report also acknowledges the 'limited capacity of UNMIT police to contribute to the development of the PNTL', noting consistent difficulties in attracting staff with the right skills. The Secretary-General recommends a limited reduction in police presence by mid-2011. But the question is not how many police will be here but what they will be doing. Much remains to be defined regarding a 'reconfiguration' of roles as the handover proceeds.

Given this inability of UN police to influence outcomes, Crisis Group recommended in December that the UN hand over formal control sooner rather than later. This would bring the mission's mandate into line with the reality of policing in the country and hopefully prompt the Government, and the police, to take further steps toward solving problems only they can fix.

Future support from either the UN, Australia, Portugal, or even Indonesia will only work if the Government can be clear about its needs. It requires a comprehensive plan for the force's future development — a full independent assessment could be a first step. In the meantime, the Government, PNTL and UNMIT need to put aside public rancour and find common ground on 'reconfiguring' the role of the UN police if they are to remain an active player rather than a mere spectator in building the police in Timor-Leste.

Photo by Flickr user United Nations Photo, used under a Creative Commons license.

Global aid spending is no better. The OECD's Development Assistance Committee reported that in 2008, total aid spending by all rich OECD countries combined amounted to around $120 billion. This works out to around $30 per person when spread across the (roughly) 4 billion people in the poor countries which receive the aid – or around $2 per person per month. 

You don't get much for $2 per person per month, especially when you are trying to respond to a list of demands which includes disasters (Haiti), hunger, malnutrition, disease (tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, malaria), agricultural development, primary, secondary and tertiary education, water supply, sanitation, roads, electricity, ports, family planning, domestic violence, gender issues, corruption, democracy, elections, rule of law, drugs, money laundering and climate change, among others.

Photo by Flickr user Eifion, used under a Creative Commons license.

In situations amenable to non-intervention, military or otherwise, I support non-intervention. In situations where NGOs alone can achieve results, I strongly support their use. In situations where NGOs plus local lightly armed police or gendarmerie can achieve results, then use them. In situations where external forces are appropriate, then get it right and use them as part of an adequate package.

There are two 'near-constants'. The first is that the non-military people who make decisions about the use of military and non-military elements will almost always under-commit in the first instance. There are few exceptions; Colin Powell's successes in 1991 and in the use of massive force in Panama City come to mind. We could all wonder what might have been if Powell and not Rumsfeld had been the Secretary of Defense in 2003.

The second constant is that everyone will talk about the importance of the non-military element in all of this (under the name of interagency or cross-government or whatever), and it rarely happens. Powell could not get his diplomats and aid people out of their 'nice' capitals.

There are consequences of these 'near-constants' in situations that require the use of military force to establish security before non-military elements can be effective. First, the military is permitted insufficient initial capacity to establish security, as happened in Iraq and Afghanistan. This means the non-military decision-makers then need to commit more forces because they did not allocate the right level to begin with (perhaps this is where Sam's 'more' might come from). Secondly, the non-military elements do not materialise so we revert to (guess what) 'more' military.

Photo by Flickr user US Army Korea - IMCOM, used under a Creative Commons license.

...instead of viewing Copenhagen as the be-all-and-end-all for global climate policy, we should reconceptualise the significance of the conference in the following terms: as one line in an ongoing conversation between governments, markets and ordinary citizens; a conversation that should generate an intensification of concrete actions by each of these groups to reduce emissions.

I use the term 'conversation' as a metaphor for the interaction between the different types of actors I referred to in the quote. I am not suggesting that having a literal conversation among states should be a substitute for international negotiations that produce tangible results. I do, however, think that there is a tendency to overemphasise the importance of comprehensive international negotiations leading to the sort of 'major outcome' that many desire, and that this tends to come at the expense of focusing on domestic institutions, actors and processes, where most of the real power to implement change actually lies.

The poor domestic implementation of the Kyoto Protocol highlights this problem. Governments spent many years negotiating Kyoto, and when it was finally agreed it was indeed a 'major outcome'. Yet as a model for international cooperation on climate change, Kyoto is flawed because it is premised on the assumption that the climate can be managed in a top-down manner through targets and timetables while ignoring the challenges associated with climate policy implementation — which necessarily involves structural economic change at the domestic level. Unfortunately, most governments seem intent on replicating – in fact, magnifying – those flaws in the negotiation of a post-Kyoto international treaty.

The Kyoto experience reminds us that without domestic implementation, treaties are just words on a page. Sure, those words can be helpful in spurring action by governments, but it is only the latter that possess the power and legitimacy to respond adequately to climate change. In my view, therefore, much more intense interaction needs to occur among international institutions (ie. governments acting collectively), individual governments, the business community and citizens if we are going to achieve anything near success in prosecuting that response. That's what I mean when I say the climate conversation needs to improve.

Photo by Flickr user Susan NYC, used under a Creative Commons license.

Commitment to the non-binding Accord was tested for the first time at the end of January, by which time countries were invited to indicate whether they were associating themselves with the Accord. Developed countries were also invited to indicate their 2020 emissions reduction targets and developing countries their 'mitigation actions'. 

As of 8 February, some 94 countries (including the 27 member states of the EU) have associated themselves with the Accord and 64 countries have submitted targets or actions, including all major emitters. In one sense, this reflects a degree of progress: all domestic commitments have been compiled in one place for the first time.

But in another sense, the exercise turned out to be a hollow formality, as everyone just promised to do what they had already promised to do at or before Copenhagen. Major developed countries have simply restated their existing conditional targets (or target ranges) and the major emitting developing countries have submitted the 'actions' to which they were already committed (official submissions are available here; see this list for a useful summary). 

The so-called BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) have also stressed that their mitigation actions are 'voluntary', not internationally binding. 

There's clearly widespread political commitment to the Accord, but so far all it has done is shine a brighter light onto the status quo – and, in so doing, illuminated the many disputes and inadequacies that bedevil mitigation ambitions.

Disappointingly, there has been little indication of where the international process might go from here. Countries will inevitably continue negotiations towards a comprehensive set of international agreements in the lumbering UNFCCC process, but with no end in sight. There's some half-hearted chatter about the potential for a treaty at the next Conference of the Parties in Mexico later this year, but that seems optimistic in the light of Copenhagen. Countries have yet to even agree a work program of pre-Mexico meetings for the rest of this year.

The possibility of advancing international climate policy in other fora (eg. the G20, the Major Economies Forum, and entirely new institutions focused on smaller pieces of the mitigation puzzle) is a much more exciting one, as Greg Picker and I argued after Copenhagen. Officials from the main countries have reportedly been holding discussions behind the scenes in which such alternative processes have been discussed, but it seems countries are a long way from figuring out exactly what these might entail and how (if at all) they would relate to the Accord and to the UN process.

Maybe there will be some forthcoming announcements charting a bold new direction for international climate change negotiations. As it stands, however, the 'conversation' at the inter-governmental level appears subdued and directionless.

Photo by Flickr user fernando zarur, used under a Creative Commons license.

Spectacular attacks in Kabul linked to rapid media statements are an old trick for the Taliban. They've refined their methods based on media results from similar attacks on Kabul government buildings in February 2009 and an earlier Victory Day attack on President Karzai in April 2008. While the attacks make for headlines around the world that bemoan the lack of security in Afghanistan, they don't really change the broader security situation in Afghanistan much at all.

What the Taliban's spectacular attack strategy does do is create events tailor made for media. This strategy is integral to creating the perception that the Taliban is winning in Afghanistan.

The reality is that there are several good reasons for why perception of momentum should rest with the Afghan and Western security forces: the US has committed to raise troop levels by nearly 30%, the war is finally being resourced on an appropriate level, and an increasing commitment of civilian and aid resources is matching the military increase in tempo.

But the US and ISAF have had little success in spinning their story. General McCrystal's own initial assessment report to the US Secretary of Defence outlines some of the inadequacies in the ISAF strategic communications effort that he labels 'ill-equipped and under-resourced'.

The ramifications of losing the battle for perception are much more serious now that the Afghan Government and the international community have decided to enthusiastically pursue a program of reconciliation and reintegration with the Taliban. CSIS analyst Anthony Cordesmann notes in this podcast from July 2009 that attempted reconciliation with Taliban elements will be dangerous if public perception is that the Taliban are wining. Reconciliation in that light, he believes, will only offer insurgents valuable time to regroup or an opportunity to exploit Afghan Government weakness.

In May 2009 Zabihullah Mujahid granted a rare TV interview to CNN's Nic Robertson. Mujahid had his back to the camera but his hands gave away what kind of man runs the Taliban's war of spin. They were not the hands of a hardened hill fighter the likes of which Australian forces regularly encounter in Uruzgan.

Instead they were the smooth, well-kept hands of a professional – most likely fluent in several languages, eloquent, and well connected within media and political circles in the Af-Pak region. In a climate in which the Afghan Government is talking reconciliation, it remains to be seen how long it will be until Zabihullah Mujahid turns his face to the camera. Victory in the battle for perceptions might just be the re-creation of the Taliban as a legitimate political force, with Zabihullah Mujahid as its legitimate chief spokesman.

Photo by Flickr user elycefeliz, used under a Creative Commons license.

There is no real gain in this kind of narrow emotional exchange because we have not addressed the real issue of what people call 'The Iraq War'. To have pulled out of the war after the invasion would have compounded the errors of starting it – yet so many people were incapable of assessing the counterinsurgency separately from the invasion. This caused immense problems in then waging the counterinsurgency.

To have expected perfection in the first year of the war (when so many chances of an early termination were missed by statesmen because once again they refused to commit adequate resources in a coherent strategy) would be to expect something of this war that has never evidenced itself in any other war – no war goes well to begin with. 

And what almost everyone misses is that, if more countries had supported the US and UK in their efforts at containment for the full period, the war may not have occurred. As Michael Walzer points out in a foreword to a new edition of his classic 'Just and Unjust Wars':

The states that opposed war on the grounds that containment was working were not themselves making it work…Had there been many states or even just a few more states, enforcing the embargo, insisting on inspections and flying planes over northern and southern Iraq, the unilateral abrogation of the containment system by the US would not have been possible (or at least it would not have been as easy as it was).

Which brings us back to Chris Kenny. Chris argues that our PM should encourage the President to take a 'stronger, less populist path to maintain US influence and power…' Of course, the PM cannot take Obama on, for the same reasons that we all are a bit to blame for the Iraq war — because we did not support containment when it had a chance of success in containing both Iraq and the US.

If PM Rudd encourages President Obama to toughen up when Obama visits in March, the President might just start by asking Australia to put its money where its mouth is, and provide a meaningful contribution to operations in Afghanistan. And then we would hear more moaning from those who moaned about 'The Iraq War'.

Photo by Flickr user Ammar Abd Rabbo, used under a Creative Commons license.

Israel's representative underlined his country's concerns about NPT membership. Evans implored Israel to look forward, not back. A small step forward for Israel would be to articulate concerns in a formal dialogue, something Evans managed last year when he convened a meeting in Cairo attended by representatives from Israel, Iran and the Arab League. In short, NPT membership is not a show-stopper and acceptance of this point would be progress.

Similarly, Evans told the Indian representative to the UN in Geneva that, rather than focusing on the intransigence of others, any movement towards signing the CTBT would be progress.

The French representative underlined her country's freeze on nuclear weapon numbers and the dismantling of its nuclear testing facilities. For Evans, however, progress would see France reconsider its unworkable two-tier approach that advocates for reductions and a halt in testing while not formally committing to total nuclear disarmament.

Evans was making the utterly practical point that introspection by those countries with nuclear weapons is the first step. And no matter how small the resulting step, this is progress. Evans concluded by reminding his audience: it's important not to make the best the enemy of the good when it comes to nuclear disarmament.

For example, Andrew says you need to understand the army culture to understand why armies want tanks and artillery (I thought you would also need to understand the nature of combat). Each part of the RAND study has an element of truth but it is a shame Andrew did not list the fourth relevant culture in Defence force structuring, the civilian defence bureaucrat.

The predominantly civilian bureaucratic culture that I perceived in FDA was just as strange as the three Service cultures that Andrew refers to and has as many generalisations. It was characterised by:

• An assumption that civilian intellect would always triumph over military experience.
• A belief that air and maritime tactics were so simple that anyone could understand them and land tactics so bizarre that they were not even worth addressing.
• An inability to understand that strategy is based on sound tactics and sound tactics is based on ideas, people, equipment and training.
• The belief that the end product of the department is the written word to the minister rather than usable military capability.
• A childlike fascination for simplistic military history leading to a belief that there are simple answers to complex problems.
• And finally, a cavalier attitude to the creation of effective military capability based on the fact that to many members of FDA, it was all just a clever bureaucratic game.

Of course, contestability of advice is required, and it should be both a uniformed and civilian function. But why should we focus only on an FDA style of contestability? To solve Defence's problems, I would look just as closely at strengthening the joint commanders at the expense of the Services, accountability of leadership, or alignment and consistency of strategies, to mention just a few.

Photo courtesy of the Department of Defence.

He called for a new model of development, one less artificially dependent on the métropole. 'You must not be afraid of your neighbours', he said.

France's presence in the Pacific has been constructive and generally stabilising over the last 15 years, owing to France ceasing its nuclear tests and implementing democratic changes in its Pacific entities. Regional leaders have recognised this, welcoming the French entities as 'associate' members of the Pacific Island Forum. 

But there are cracks emerging. French Polynesia has been wracked with instability, largely because pro-French groups refuse to accept the extent of electoral support for the pro-independence leader Oscar Temaru. The entity is almost entirely dependent on France to pay for the artificially high economy created during the testing program. 

New Caledonia has also seen local divisions, with a weakening of pro-France representation in the local Congress by a new, more extreme independence party. France remains committed to funding the handover of important responsibilities and benefits under the 1998 Noumea Accord, but the handover schedule has slipped.

At the same time as he made his comments, Sarkozy announced further statutory reform in French Polynesia, to change electoral processes yet again. It will be important for stability that these changes do not have the same effect as other statutory changes in recent years, that have diluted the weight of votes for the pro-independence forces.

For New Caledonia, where up to three referenda on the future status and transfer of the five final 'sovereign' powers are to take place from 2014 to 2018, Sarkozy affirmed France's 'total loyalty' to all partners of the Accord, whether pro-France or pro-independence. At the same time, he said discussions must begin so that the results of the referenda foreshadowed by the Accord will be approved by a 'very large majority'. 

With the pro-France group currently  in the (recently reduced) majority, this supposes that talks will result in winning over many of those who currently support independence. Sarkozy's explicit ruling out of independence for France's overseas entities raises questions about the claimed impartiality of the French State as a signatory to the Accord.

Sarkozy also foreshadowed changes for Wallis and Futuna, the tiny archipelago which has been administered, unchallenged, under a 1960 statute right up to the present. He said he was prepared, from this year, to examine propositions for modernisation, but again, 'within the framework of the Republic'.

Canberra is comfortable with France's presence as a partner in the region, and will welcome the intentions for the French collectivities to become more engaged economically. But it should be wary of instabilities arising from any roll-back of democracy, such as by new statutes in French Polynesia or partisan implementation of the Noumea Accord processes; and of any consequent negative reactions by regional leaders, not to mention economic consequences for Australia should France resile from its economic commitments.

Photo by Flickr user gunthert, used under a Creative Commons license.