Over the past several weeks there have been conflicting reports about the Lao Government's controversial plans to build a dam on the Mekong River's mainstream at Xayaburi, with The Economist's 'Banyan' column of 5 May noting that the Thai construction firm, CH Karnchong, had notified the  Bangkok stock exchange that work on the dam had begun in March.

Similar reports have led to vigorous protests from Cambodia, with Sin Niny, Vice-Chairman of Cambodia's National Mekong Committee, threatening action against the dam in the international court and the country's minister for water-resources protesting to his Lao counterpart. Objections to the dam's construction have also come from Vietnam's National Mekong Committee though not, so far as I can tell, from government ministers. The protests from Cambodia and Vietnam have been matched by those coming from a range of NGOs and environmental groups.

But amid the sound and fury and the claims by CH Karnchong that it is going ahead with the dam, the Lao Government is stating that its critics are wrong and that it has no plans to build the Xayaburi dam, at least for the moment. What CH Karnchong has been doing is only preliminary work around the dam site, Lao spokesmen have said. But what happens in the future may be another matter, since, in the words of Lao Vice Minister of Energy and Mines Viraphonh Viravong:

Andrew Selth is a Research Fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute.

On 25 April, the US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs examined US policy toward Burma. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held similar hearings the following day. Both heard testimony from officials and influential Burma-watchers.

Kurt Campbell, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and, in the minds of many, the chief architect of the Obama Administration's current approach to Burma, made a number of key points in his comments to the House Committee. These include the following:

1. With regard to the reforms made since March 2011 by President Thein Sein, the US believes that this 'nascent opening' is real and significant. In contrast to much of the commentary published to date, however, the US believes that this process is 'fragile and reversible'. As Hillary Clinton said on 4 April, 'the future of Burma is neither clear nor certain'.

2. The US welcomes the progress made in negotiations between Naypyidaw and Burma's various ethnic communities, but Washington remains concerned that 'the impact of Burma's reform efforts has not extended far beyond the capital and major cities'. The continued fighting in Kachin State and human rights violations against the Rohingya minority, for example, remain major concerns.

Giovana Arrarte attended the Lowy Institute's third China Changing Lecture last Thursday evening (recording now available here), and writes:

Last night after listening to the thought-provoking presentation of Dr David Daokui Li, 'Is China Ready for Global Economic Leadership?', several questions came to my mind.

On his presentation, Dr Li seems to strongly emphasise the importance of the 'social and cultural' issues when analysing China's role in the global economic leadership arena. In this respect, some of the sentences used by Dr Li such as 'China will act slowly', 'China will do it piece by piece', 'China will use actions rather than words', 'China will act in is individual way, the Chinese way', 'no debate, just do it', 'Change needs to be gradual, not explosive' seem to have a deeper and very important meaning in understanding how China may undertake its strategic leadership role.

In listening to the sentences above mentioned, I could not avoid thinking that perhaps, from a Chinese perspective, 'the West' needs to understand better the Chinese way of thinking and avoid applying traditional Western thinking models and values in order to  better understand how China may act in a given situation.

Foxconn is the electronics manufacturer that has become emblematic of China's economic rise and its export-led growth model.

It produces cheap goods the world wants and creates hundreds of thousands of jobs for Chinese migrant workers, who send their earnings back home to needy relatives. But working conditions at Foxconn's factories have become somewhat notorious, partly for good reason, but also because of willful exaggeration by Western observers.

Here's a rare inside look at one of the factories:

(H/t TDW.)

If yesterday's speech by Prime Minister O'Neill, given to up to ten thousand protesters who packed out Sir John Guise Stadium in Port Moresby, is anything to go by then protesters have achieved political change.

O'Neill was forced to address the stadium of protesters who threatened to march on parliament if the Prime Minister did not arrive to receive petitions from the trade union congress, University of PNG students and local NGOs. He agreed to repeal the controversial Judicial Conduct Act (on the condition the Chief Justice steps down) and agreed to stick to the general election timetable (although a short delay was flagged).

As the Prime Minister spoke, many in the stadium tweeted, added updates to Facebook and posted photos to discussion groups and blogs so that the protest could be followed live around the world. 

Via Karabuspalau Kaiku (on Facebook).

The confluence of PNG's desire for political change with some of the world's most efficient, accessible and widely used social media tools has been remarkable in a country where almost 9 out of 10 Papua New Guineans live in rural or remote areas, GNI per capita is only $1300 and internet penetration is a tiny 2%. 

As a comparison, Libya, a country with a similar population (6.3 million people) where the use of social media continues to be key in political movements, has a internet penetration of 5.7% and GNI per capita almost ten times that of PNG ($12,320). Libya's 473,000 active Facebook users vastly eclipses PNG's 77,780; both countries continue to record extraordinary growth in Facebook users, and over the past year the PNG total has more than doubled.

Back in February I looked at social media activism in the Pacific and asked 'What's next?'. Well, now we know.

When TIME Magazine made 'The Protester' its 2011 Person of the Year, few could imagine that months later, a little-known Pacific Island wedged between Australia and Asia would be in the throes of its own mass protest. And while this protest does not necessarily signify the beginning of a 'spring' or 'revolution' (such claims were quickly dismissed by PNG's influential tweeters) there are similarities, including in the use of the same digital tools that analysts claim facilitated the Arab Spring.

The political power of social media has always been a difficult concept to comprehend, particularly for those who have not grown up surrounded by the swelling collective of social networks that exist today.

Events yesterday in PNG involved  thousands of Papua New Guineans taking to the streets (the main rally assembled at Sir John Guise Stadium in Port Moresby) in protest against last week's vote in parliament that deferred the upcoming election by six months. This protest provides an excellent example of how social media can be used to respond to an incident by strategically coordinating a substantial event with the aim of demanding political change.

For those interested in the details and analysis of yesterday's protest, PNG's blogs trump most regional newspapers (and come with photos, video and links to related info). The best include the Masalai blog, Alexander Rheeney's PNG Perspective and The Garamut.

Via Spoon & Tamago (a rather wonderful blog about Japanese design) comes this trailer for a documentary about Japan's video-game arcades:

The independent film-makers are still trying to raise money to complete their movie. Learn more here.

Scott Flower is a McKenzie Fellow at the University of Melbourne. He is regularly engaged by multinational companies as a risk management consultant to major resource projects in PNG.

Over the last month, rarely a day has passed without some drama in Papua New Guinea's political landscape. Many of these events point to the likelihood of instability during the 23 June elections. Should the PNG Government and its regional friends fail to address the evolving political and security challenges in the next three months, the elections will probably be marred by escalating violence, a collapse of electoral integrity and the erosion of local and international confidence in the quality of PNG's democracy.

On the back of a still boiling constitutional dispute regarding the legitimacy of the O'Neill Government, in the last week things appear to be going from bad to worse. PNG's Police Commissioner, Tom Kulunga, and two senior officers were arrested on contempt of court charges, mass student protests in Port Moresby followed laws passed by parliament giving it the ability to suspend senior Supreme and National Court judges perceived to be biased, and Opposition MPs continued to avoid parliamentary sessions as part of their protest to be recognised as the legitimate government.

More worrying from a security perspective is Prime Minister O'Neill's vow on 25 March to declare a State of Emergency in Hela province to protect PNG's LNG project, upon which the country's future economic development hinges. 

The PNG Government and the Electoral Commission have previously claimed that security forces would be withdrawn from the LNG project area in order to cope with security operations for the election. Implementing a State of Emergency in Hela will tie up these resources, which are much needed to provide security around the election.

Security forces managing the election in the highlands provinces already have their work cut out for them, given the proliferation of homemade shotguns in the region. In the last six years, I have taken many trips up and down the Highlands Highway, and I have never seen as many homemade shotguns being flaunted publicly as I did driving from Wabag to Mt Hagen in January this year. 

Graeme Smith is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the China Studies Centre, University of Sydney and a Visiting Fellow with the State, Society and Governance Program in Melanesia Program, ANU.

When the nationwide anti-Asian riots of May 2009 reached the Highlands of Papua New Guinea, the targets were the same as those of earlier riots in Port Moresby and in Lae. Shops run by newly arrived migrants from the Fujian province of China were burnt and looted. Police responded with volleys of tear gas in West Goroka.

Beyond the barbed wire-encased stores and kai bars, Goroka was home to another Chinese population. Over a hundred workers were erecting a seven-storey dormitory at the University of Goroka (the white building in the background; photo by the author).

Tipped off by the Fujianese shopkeepers, the Chinese builders told university staff that a mob was on the way, and they were spirited into the university library. When word spread, a throng of students was waiting for the looters at the university entrance, informing them in non-academic language that no one was going to touch their Chinese, who were building their dormitory. To my knowledge, this was the first instance of a pro-Chinese demonstration in the Pacific.

With Chinese retail investment providing fuel for nationwide riots, Chinese mining investment characterised as 'neo-colonial slavery', and the Lowy Institute maintaining criticism of China's Pacific aid program, why is the Goroka project different, and what implications does this hold for Australia?

The first possibility is that the company involved in this project, Guangdong Foreign Construction (GDFC), is a better corporate citizen. But this does not seem to be the case. Before winning the contract in Goroka, GDFC built student dormitories and teachers' houses in Rabaul, at the University of Vudal. This project, supported by a Chinese Government grant, became notorious when staff and students from all over PNG were housed there for the 2008 Intervarsity Games. They saw flaking paint, cracked ceilings and shoddy fittings. It was Chinese aid and construction at its worst, down to the bright red roof.

Andrew Selth is a Research Fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute and author of Burma and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Not If, But Why, How and What.

For nearly four years, activists, journalists and sundry other Burma-watchers have been waiting with keen anticipation for the US State Department to issue the annual reports on Burma that were formally mandated by an Act of Congress in 2008. It was expected that these reports would provide comprehensive, authoritative public statements on a range of issues that have long been mired in controversy.

As noted on The Interpreter last April, the preparation and release of these reports was one of the first tasks set for the US Special Envoy to Burma, who was finally appointed in August 2011 under provisions of the same Act.

The State Department has just released its Burma reports for 2009 and 2010. They are helpful, as far as they go, but are likely to raise more questions than they answer. Indeed, they are significant more for what they do not say, than for what they do say.

Under the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta's Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008, the State Department was required to report annually to the foreign relations committees of both the House of Representatives and the Senate on all military and intelligence aid provided to Burma's ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). WMD and related technology, materials and training were singled out for special attention.

The two reports just released are notable for their brevity and their reticence. Each is only one page long, even though half the page is taken up with an introduction and an overview which repeats much of the content. In neither of the reports do the words 'nuclear' or 'missile' appear even once, and 'intelligence' is only referred to as part of the reports' terms of reference, set out in the introduction.

There are indeed good reasons for asking, as James did yesterday in reply to my piece, how the Angkor Archaeological Park (above) spends the entrance fees it charges foreign visitors. Eric Campbell's investigation of this issue for ABC TV raised many still-unanswered questions.

That said, there is a pressing need for additional funds to be allocated to cope with what has now become a mass tourist destination, and an Australian gift of the order of $1 million is no bad thing, even if issue of corruption attends the administration of the Park, as with so much else in Cambodia. Constant maintenance is required to maintain the temples, as is the presence of guards to prevent further theft of cultural artifacts.

Understanding all does not necessarily mean forgiving all, but it's worth remembering that, whatever was the case forty or so years ago, Cambodian pride in the Angkor temples is now widely held. In these circumstances, the gift seems both appropriate and likely to have been well received. If it goes some small way towards ameliorating the problems caused by mass tourism, so much the better.

If there are grounds for concern about Australian gifts to Cambodia in light of the country's reputation for endemic corruption, the announcement that the Government is contributing a further $1.61 million to support the work of the Khmer Rouge Tribunal (ECCC) certainly is a basis for it.

James writes:

The piece on Angkor Wat and Bob Carr's recent donation of taxpayer money raised my interest, as someone with many years experience in this country.

The Angkor temples ticket operation is run by a private businessman with close links to the ruling party. Over 2 million visitors pay at least $20 each (tickets are $20 per day or $40 for 3 days) to visit the temples each year. That's somewhere north of $40 million each year, most of which should be allocated to the preservation and restoration of the temple complex (less administration and management fee).

What exactly is $1 million supposed to do when there is around 40 times that raised at the front gate already each year?

We would be better off not contributing to the system that allows for corruption and theft of large amounts of this revenue by those who sell the tickets, as explained by Eric Campbell of Foreign Correspondent in 2008. 

It's unusual enough to have a single item about Cambodia in the Australian media, and yesterday there were two.

First, an allegation that one of Prime Minister Hun's nephews is linked to drug trafficking and money laundering (the man in question has issued a denial). And, secondly, the announcement that our newly appointed Foreign Minister, Senator Carr, has been touring the Angkor temples, where he announced that Australia would make a welcome donation of $1 million to assist Cambodian authorities in dealing with what is now a massive tourist influx of upwards of 20,000 daily visitors to the archaeological complex.

Whatever his considerable political skills, Hun Sen does not seem to be blessed by his relatives, particularly his nephews, who have been regularly in the news for behaviour ranging from assault to involuntary manslaughter. At a gathering of the Hun Sen clan in 2009 he warned his nephews and other relatives about their behaviour.

And then there is Senator Carr's visit to the Angkor temple complex, which DFAT tells readers in a press release is a '700 year old temple complex.' Now, it may be a case of shooting in fish in a barrel to draw attention to the error here, but at a time when there is concern to be 'Asia literate' (I much prefer the Asialink terminology of 'Asia capable'), DFAT can't even get its dates right.

Conventional dating for the Angkor complex begins in 802 of the Common era and ends some time after 1431. The temple Senator Carr visited, Ta Prohm (pictured), dates from 1186. The most famous of all the temples, Angkor Wat, dates from the first half of the eleventh century. By the time DFAT chooses to date the complex, Angkor was in decline and almost all of the temples we see today had been built. Someone in the RG Casey Building needs to do their maths.

Photo by Flickr user Peter Nijenhuis.

Dr Morris Jones, who has written previously for The Interpreter, is an Australian space analyst.

The announcement of an imminent satellite launch by North Korea has sent the international community into a frenzy. There is no need to reiterate most of the debate that has since appeared amongst foreign policy wonks, but one recent point does need a rebuttal.

US Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell has briefed our newly installed foreign minister on the upcoming launch. Unfortunately, some of the subsequent news reports (and certain headlines) have the potential to cause unnecessary fears in Australia. They suggest that Australia is literally in the line of fire for this launch.

It is a matter of record that the launch will fly roughly southwards from the Korean peninsula, on a trajectory that will take it over waters east of the Philippines. If the rocket functions correctly, the satellite will pass over Western Australia on its first orbit.

Hard hats are regularly worn in Western Australia by mining workers. I would suggest that there is no need to don them for the North Korean satellite launch. It is most, most unlikely that any material from this launch will impact in Australia, regardless of the performance of the rocket. A nominal launch will see nothing at all. A failed launch will almost certainly miss us entirely, and we will not even have a North Korean satellite flying above us.

The satellite launch certainly deserves the attention of the international community, for reasons known to anyone who reads this blog. However, shoddy news reporting does not serve us well.

Photo by Flickr user same_same.

Dr Daniel Woker, former Swiss Ambassador to Australia (2008-12), writes:

Malcolm Cook's 'five sound principles...prominent in Rudd's approach to the Asia Pacific' are spot-on. But, the fifth as formulated is way too modest and defensive. Australia is not just a 'non-major power'. In soccer terms it belongs into the region's exclusive 'Challenger League' (Korea, Indonesia, Australia), second only to the Asia Pacific's Championship League (Japan, China, India). Thus of course Australia has 'to work hard to ensure (its) interests are taken into consideration'. But it can, and sometimes does, do more and do it actively to ensure that the regional order is to its liking.

Let's have a look at some recent and future initiatives where Aussie imagination can, and did, make a difference. 

Take the Asia Pacific Community (APC), which was a first big step in the right direction. It cannot be said enough that the EAS (East Asia Summit; equaling APC plus Russia) is the region's delayed realisation that the APC — whatever quibble there was and still is regarding its diplomatic preparation and execution in 2008 — struck the right balance of who should, and should not be included in an Asia Pacific structure of the future. ASEAN and all ASEAN+ solutions below the threshold of  EAS are too small and APEC too large to truly represent the interests that matter in, and for, the region.

Geraldine Doogue is host of ABC Radio National's Saturday Extra program.

In 2010 I suggested in this space that a good way of forging better understanding between Australians and other citizens of our region was to report common dilemmas facing all our societies, rather than emphasising the policy gaps between us.

I suggested that in the areas of health, nutrition, attitudes to drugs, family authority and community volunteering, Australia and, say, Malaysia or South Korea shared lots of challenges that were keeping their authorities up at night. As globalisation arrives at all shores, the need for citizens to adapt super-fast, keep communities eating well, exercise, balance work and home, manage technology plus relationships stretches all societies. These are works-in-progress, with much still to be resolved.

Surely this makes for good story-telling. My argument is that it certainly competes with the more traditional 'look-for-the-exotic-bit-of-difference' that has dominated our journalism in the First World; the notion of seeking out the tale (often accompanied by arresting imagery) that proves that the  gaps between developed and developing countries are still (reassuringly) wide. 

In fact, there's much that is shared in the broad, if not in the detail. I do believe this changed approach could contribute significantly to positioning Australians better within the region. To my delight, I saw perfect evidence of it in a brilliant film, 'A Separation', last Saturday night.

Made by an Iranian director Asghar Farhadi, 'A Separation' sketches the breakdown of a middle-class Iranian marriage (plus 11-year-old daughter) in contemporary Tehran. It pitches this family against a working-class Tehran family via a woman who comes to look after the man, his daughter and his Alzheimers-ridden father after the wife leaves.

This morning one of the region's foremost experts on China's military, S Rajaratnam School of International Studies Senior Fellow Richard Bitzinger, dropped by the Lowy Institute to meet with some of our experts. He was kind enough to give me a few minutes for an interview, and we began by talking about regional perceptions of China's military rise. Are fears of Beijing's expanding military capabilities particularly acute in Australia?

Later on, I also ask Richard to describe what kind of military China actually wants to build in the next 10 and 20 years (above, China's new J-20 fighter prototype), and what America's reaction will be. 

Photo courtesy of Chinese Military Aviation.

In only his third media release as Foreign Minister, Senator Bob Carr has today announced (together with the Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Competitiveness) that Australia will open 'as soon as possible' a new Consulate-General in Chengdu, western China.

As Mr Carr explains, Chengdu is a 'major gateway' to inland China, a threshold the Australian Government has only today resolved to cross. Although China is now our largest trading partner with nearly one hundred cities of populations exceeding five million, Australia has had until now only three diplomatic posts there, and those only on the coast: Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou. The Chengdu post will serve a population of more than 14 million, will service the Sichuan province of 80 million, and will be Australia's first diplomatic undertaking in inland China (Austrade already has a presence there, but it doesn't offer diplomatic or consular services).

This new post is a positive move and a recognition that Australia's international network needs significant rebuilding if Australia is to maintain its prosperity and protect its international interests.

Interestingly, DFAT Secretary Dennis Richardson, in last night's final hearing in the ongoing Parliamentary inquiry on Australia's overseas representation, gave no hint of any announcement, saying only that an expansion of Australia's representation in Western China was 'being considered', along with a new mission in West Africa. Perhaps today's announcement was made to end the speculation that followed Kevin Rudd's farewell remarks to DFAT, in which he heralded new posts in western China and Francophone Africa. Or perhaps it was an attempt to move on from last week's escapades in the Pacific. 

Whatever the reason, this should be seen for what it is: a small step in the right direction, where giant leaps are required. The investment of one new post in western China is a fraction of the reinvestment required in Australia's overseas network. Our 95 missions (96 if you add the new Chengdu post) covering 193 UN member states falls lamentably short of the OECD average of 133 missions. That's 37 missions below the average, despite Australia having the 13th largest economy in the world.

Photo by Flickr user JanneM.

Ed. note: This post follows on from Fergus Hanson's assessment of Rudd's China legacy.

'Good principles, mixed execution' summarises Kevin Rudd's approach to the Asia Pacific region, and Australia's place within it, during his tenure as prime minister and then foreign minister. 'So far' has been added to the headline, as political leaders can have more than one stint at the top, even when they have been removed by their own.

Five sound principles were prominent in Rudd's approach to the Asia Pacific. All of these featured in the Howard Government's approach also:

1. The Asia Pacific and not Asia was the proper region to situate Australia. 
2. The People's Republic of China is and will be the leading regional power in Asia.
3. Managing the tensions of the 'rise of China' within the existing US-led Asia Pacific security order is the great strategic challenge.
4. Major Asian states, including India, deserve a larger global voice and the health of global institutions depends on this being achieved.
5. Non-major powers like Australia need to work hard to ensure their interests are taken into consideration in any changes to the regional order.

As noted early on by Rowan Callick, the execution of these principles, in terms of stronger bilateral relations with key Asia Pacific powers and acceptance of Australia's regional policy initiatives, was mixed.

Even if China was prepared to abolish capital controls and accelerate the creation of deep capital markets in order for the renminbi to become a reserve currency (see part 1 of my post here), the renminbi would probably remain a small part of official reserve holdings. The Japanese yen, for example, has never become a significant reserve currency, despite having the preconditions.

Not that this matters much. Persuading some foreigners to buy renminbi bonds would mean some inconvenient upward pressure on the exchange rate and a very marginal lowering in foreign borrowing costs, for a country that has no need to borrow overseas.

Thus the advantages of being a reserve currency simply aren't worth the price. The only clear benefit from consciously fostering the renminbi as an official reserve currency is one of prestige. Hence we are likely to see renewed efforts to have the renminbi included in the IMF's Special Drawing Rights basket: a symbol that China has 'arrived' in some sense, but of no practical significance.

But besides being the major reserve currency, the US dollar has other valuable international functions. Most international trade is denominated in dollars. The paperwork for imports and exports are made out in dollars, which makes things easier for Americans, with smaller transaction costs and less risk of being caught in exchange rate shifts. Commodity prices are usually denominated in US dollars, again with some short-term accounting advantages for Americans, although the fundamental price is set by the overall world demand/supply relationship.

Today the Lowy Institute launches what I think is one of the most compelling and challenging polls we've ever conducted. It was a survey carried out across Indonesia following up on a poll we did there in 2006. The changes the poll records are remarkable, and responses to a series of new questions challenge some entrenched stereotypes about Indonesia.

But first, consider just how bad relations are with our most important neighbour. At a political level, there has been a spectacular failure to capitalise on Indonesia's remarkably smooth democratic transition and its pro-Australian President.

Instead, the relationship with Indonesia has been repeatedly trashed for temporary domestic political advantage. Whether it is asylum seekers, cows or Australian drug smugglers, Indonesia is treated like a miscreant Pacific atoll, not a country fundamental to Australia's future prosperity and stability with a population ten times our size and a larger economy in purchasing power terms. When the Government panicked and cut all live cattle exports to Indonesia, Indonesian officials weren't even consulted. Likewise when the Coalition announced it was going to turn back boats.

The tone of the relationship is often completely back to front, with a focus on how many threats Indonesia poses and how much aid we give it. Take this line from the introduction to the relationship on the DFAT website: 'Australia and Indonesia cooperate in practical ways on a wide range of international issues, including counter-terrorism, illegal fishing, people smuggling, avian influenza, climate change and interfaith dialogue.'

Or, my personal favourite, this speech from 2008 titled 'Australia-Indonesia Relations: A New Partnership for a New Era' by then Foreign Minister Stephen Smith, which characterised this approach under three headings: security cooperation, regional disaster response and Indonesia's development challenges. And that was delivered to an Indonesian audience.

The idea that the renminbi will become an important reserve currency, perhaps displacing the 'exorbitant privilege' enjoyed by the US dollar, has been given added impetus by a blueprint for China's international capital reforms just published by the Chinese central bank, the People's Bank of China.  

The current commentary suggests a two-fold conclusion. The renminbi won't displace the dollar as predominant reserve currency any time soon. But the renminbi will become more important in international transactions, and China's growing international capital linkages have important implications for us all.

Whatever 'exorbitant privilege' the US dollar had as the predominant reserve currency in the quarter-century following World War II has largely disappeared, thanks to floating exchange rates and free international capital movements. 

The US dollar already has rivals for reserve-currency status and the world adapted easily to this. The dollar has gone from being over 80% of official reserves in the 1970s to being just over 60% now. Until recent fumbles, the euro was making a strong bid to be an alternative (but secondary) currency for official reserves, making up 25% in 2003, up from 18% only a few years earlier.

The UK demonstrates that reserve currency status can be largely lost without changing much: the decline of sterling mirrored, but didn't exacerbate, the UK's declining place in the world and the end of the British Empire.

What would China have to do to make the renminbi a reserve currency?

Jim Della-Giacoma is South East Asia Project Director for the International Crisis Group, based in Jakarta. The photo in this post, of The Nay Pyi Taw copy of the Shwedagon temple, is by the author.

In some parts of the world, the secret ballot is still known as the Australian ballot. It was a democratic innovation first used in elections by the Parliament of Victoria in 1856. In Myanmar, the struggle over when and how it can be used is giving us a glimpse into the evolving dynamic between the country's legislature and executive. It is more evidence that the way the country is being governed is changing, right down to the village level.

In September 2011, the Government submitted to the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (or Union Assembly) the Ward and Village Tract Administration Bill. It proposes, among other things, that each group of ten households would be required to submit the name and personal details of a person living in their ward or village tract who meets the criteria to be an administrator. The original bill said these nominees would then be selected through a 'negotiated selection system', but this was amended by lawmakers to have them chosen by a 'secret ballot system'.

When the bill was sent to President U Thein Sein for approval, it was returned to the parliament with the proposal that this change be reversed and the original clause on negotiation be adopted. On 22 February, according the privately-owned Myanmar Times, legislators in the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw or bicameral Union Assembly voted down the president's proposal 278 to 236, with 12 representatives abstaining. 'Only (the) secret ballot system can reveal their true wishes for selecting a leader of a ward or village tract. A negotiated selection system cannot prevent inappropriate use of use of influence to affect the result', said U Aung Thein, representative for Ywarngan.

Some believe this independence is fueled by a growing personal rivalry between the President and parliamentary leaders, all of them reformers. Others see the military staying out of politics and votes as long as their core interests are left alone. Either way, what is now self-evident is that the bicameral Union Assembly is taking a life of its own and it is not just the 'rubber stamp' legislature many imagined it would be.

Whatever you might think of Kevin Rudd, he was certainly active internationally, both as Foreign Minister and as Prime Minister. But what were his achievements and what will his legacy be?

This post is intended to kick-start a discussion of what Rudd achieved in foreign affairs and begins with his China policy. We want to hear from you too, so please write in: blogeditor@lowyinistitute.org .

A major aspect of the Rudd years was China. At the time of the Chinese Olympic torch protests in Australia, I received an unusual call to come to the Lodge on an unrelated matter, and remember waiting for some time as Rudd dealt with the shenanigans the Chinese were pulling. When eventually we sat down to talk, it was not hard to discern that the Chinese were clearly (and seemingly pointlessly) rubbing the new PM the wrong way.

But almost from the get-go the media got Rudd wrong on China. Far from being the Manchurian Candidate, WikiLeaks cables revealed him to be as clear-headed about China and Chinese negotiating strategies as he was in private during that meeting at the Lodge.

According to officials, Rudd led serious Cabinet-level contemplation of Australia's approach to its single largest trading partner, and although it has not been made public until today, produced the first ever (and still secret) Cabinet-approved strategy mapping out our approach to China.

Under his watch, Australia also produced a highly ambitious Defence White Paper, setting up what is essentially a Marine Expeditionary Force designed to be plugged directly into any major US operation in the Pacific (read defence against China). And although it was his successor as PM who ultimately oversaw the delivery, Rudd must be credited with laying some of the groundwork that has seen the US establish what is basically a permanent military base in Australia. 

But Rudd was not all muscle and no diplomacy. His Peking University speech was an attempt to engage the Chinese Government in a new style of dialogue. And he allocated $100 million to establish a China Centre at the ANU that should aspire to be the world's leading research centre on the subject.

Everything was very friendly today in the joint press conference between Australia's and Indonesia's foreign and defence ministers in Canberra. This was a chance for new Foreign Minister Bob Carr to meet his counterpart Marty Natalegawa, and Carr held his phone aloft to reporters to show that they had swapped numbers.

But an op-ed today by the Indonesian Foreign Ministry's Director of Information and Media, PLE Priatna, in Indonesia's main Indonesian language national daily Kompas, explicitly timed to coincide with Natalegawa's visit, painted a much more nuanced picture of Indonesia's position. It was a statement that the two countries must have a 'special and close' relationship, but not simply on terms of Australia's choosing.

'Australia must be good neighbours with Indonesia', Priatna said. Carr and the Australian Government must convince the Australian public, Priatna continued, that 'only through egalitarian, mutually beneficial cooperation on equal terms would Australia gain a place in Indonesia'.

Priatna characterised bilateral relations as 'quite strong', but qualified this by cataloguing frequent 'startling' Australian policies. These were:

Jim Della-Giacoma is South East Asia Project Director for the International Crisis Group, based in Jakarta. Photos in this post are by the author.

Recent changes in Myanmar are too numerous to list, but they are remarkable to anyone who knows the country. The National League for Democracy has re-registered, its supporters wave its flag on the streets of Yangon (see photo below), and Suu Kyi addresses rallies in the capital Nay Pyi Taw. Her once banned image is everywhere in Yangon (see above). By-elections for 48 seats will be held on 1 April and while they may not be perfect, they are expected to be free and fair enough to see NLD members sitting in the next parliamentary session, including Suu Kyi.

Australia's new Foreign Minister, Senator Bob Carr, came to office last week promising policy continuity, including on Myanmar, the country still called 'Burma' in Canberra. But is now the time to hold the line when the country is changing so rapidly?

Canberra needs to ask whether its goal is best achieved by continuing with sanctions or whether progress can best be achieved by recognising developments on the ground and moving, in tangible ways, to partner Myanmar's leaders rather than confront them. It will be time for full government-to-government relations. Lifting or suspending all sanctions should be the first step along this path.

PNG is once again going through a governance-sapping exercise of self-interested politics. Since February last year, when then Prime Minister Somare was suspended from office for two weeks following a decision by the country's Leadership Tribunal, Papua New Guineans have witnessed an increasingly tumultuous tug of war between the country's political leaders. The latest incident in this power struggle was the arrest of the country's Chief Justice on 6 March.

For some observers, this political standoff is a unique event with significant ramifications for the future stability of the country. I suggest it is not unique. It is simply a different expression of an enduring characteristic of PNG politics: the ability of the parliamentary process to be spectacularly rambunctious and to startle the neighbours – notably Australia.

PNG's politics are highly competitive. Tribal and clan loyalty, along with personal connections, shape the political context – not party platforms. PNG's political history is littered with leadership challenges, votes of no-confidence, scandals and prime ministers forced to step aside.

So the hand on the tiller of government is never quite steady enough and often not sure of the direction it should be taking the country because it is too frequently diverted by power struggles. It's this inattention causing the real damage, as the core task of government – to protect the nation and provide basic services – is left behind by the political mêlée.

PNG won't meet any of the Millennium Development Goals by 2015. It is the only Pacific island country facing this prospect. This is despite the fact that, of all Pacific Island countries, it is in a very strong macro-economic position with expected economic growth of 8% this year.

The speech Hillary Clinton gave in Washington last week to mark the 40th anniversary of Nixon's visit to China didn't get much attention. Other than Linda Jakobson's short post, on which more below, I've seen no reference to it here in Australia or in US media.

But the speech deserves careful attention, because some of what it says about the US-China relationship is very different from what President Obama said here in Canberra last November. It gently but unmistakably steps away from Obama's insistence on the preservation of US primacy in Asia and his rejection of any negotiation with China on their respective roles. So it might reflect the beginnings of a serious debate in America about the wisdom of trying to contain China rather than accommodate it. 

Much of the speech is boilerplate, of course, but Clinton didn't talk as much as she has previously about preserving American leadership as the key to Asia's future (for example, in her October 2010 speech in Hawaii). 

More importantly, she several times said that Asia will need a new order which will be very different from the status quo, plainly implying that America's role will therefore be different too. She also clearly suggested that this new order will have to be negotiated between China and America, and admitted that this will be unprecedented for America, and very hard to do. Here are some sample quotes:  

All this adds up to a very different kind of relationship than the one we had...For two nations with long traditions of independence, deeply rooted in our cultures and our histories, these are unusual circumstances to say the least. They require adjustments in our thinking and our actions, on both sides of the Pacific. And so, how do we respond to what is not just a new challenge to our two countries, but I would argue, an unprecedented challenge in history?

We are, together, building a model in which we strike a stable and mutually acceptable balance between cooperation and competition. This is uncharted territory. And we have to get it right, because so much depends on it.

Interdependence means that one of us cannot succeed unless the other does as well. We need to write a future that looks entirely different from the past. This is, by definition, incredibly difficult. But we have done difficult things before.

These are small steps, admittedly, but they lead in a very different direction from Obama's Canberra speech. 

The Australia-US alliance is at the forefront in any discussion by Australian policy-makers and specialists about regional security issues. The announcement during President Barack Obama's visit to Australia in November 2011 of an agreement to rotate US Marines in and out of Darwin was viewed by both the Australian Government and Opposition as not only strengthening the decades-old alliance, but also a reflection of the importance of Australia-US ties.

The view from Washington, DC appears to be a bit different. Australia got somehow left out when US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton last week listed US treaty allies in Asia. Clinton was elaborating on how the US is strengthening its ties in the region during a speech on 7 March in  honour of the 40th anniversary of Richard Nixon's historic trip to China in 1972. She mentioned Japan, Korea, Thailand and the Philippines but made no mention of Australia. Clinton's exact words were:

All of this effort has taken place within a larger regional push to strengthen our ties throughout the Asia Pacific. We’ve enhanced our relationships with our treaty allies Japan, Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines. We’ve broadened our relationships with other emerging powers, including India, Indonesia, Vietnam and Singapore. We've strengthened our unofficial relationship with Taiwan. We’ve reengaged with Burma. We’ve invested in regional multilateral institutions, including the East Asia Summit and ASEAN. We’ve increased our economic engagement, updated our regional military posture and amplified our advocacy for the rule of law and universal human rights. In short, we are working around the clock to do everything we can to defend and advance security and prosperity throughout the Asia Pacific. And having that positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relationship with China is vital to every one of those objectives.

The Fiji Government has a history of making poor decisions whenever there appeared to be a slight willingness in Australia or New Zealand to re-assess approaches to Fiji. The deportation of diplomats or Fiji Times publishers at inopportune moments made it impossible for foreign ministers in Canberra and Wellington to take decisions that appeared to reward Fiji for bad behaviour.

For the first time in some years, the stars may be aligning for a change in the relationship: Bob Carr's appointment as Australian Foreign Minister and a constructive and positive announcement from Commodore Bainimarama this morning on a constitutional consultations process create an opportunity.

Bainimarama outlined a comprehensive consultation process on the new constitution that appears to be open and inclusive. He indicated that he has taken the advice of international constitutional experts, referring in his announcement to the well regarded handbook, Constitution-making and Reform: Options for the Process, authored by internationally renowned constitutional expert Yash Ghai, the ANU's Anthony Regan and others. 

He also announced the establishment of a five-member Constitutional Commission, chaired by Yash Ghai, and an inclusive and democratic Constituent Assembly.

This announcement appears to put aside concerns that the population would be presented with a compromised draft constitution and that consultations would be limited. It may not be perfect – it would perhaps be better if a referendum was in the offing – but it has all the appearances of a credible process and the process itself might throw up better ideas.