Lowy Institute

As tensions over China's fortification of islands in the South China Sea continue, the last couple weeks saw several conferences held on the issue. This week, Lowy Institute Nonresident Fellow Bonnie Glaser attended The Aspen Security Forum and wrote on what possible military uses the PLA might intend for the islands:

If a military conflict were to break out, the land features as well as the ships and aircraft operating from them would be vulnerable to attack, but in peacetime and in a crisis, they will provide China with the capability to hold US forces at risk at a farther distance than it can at present. This could have implications for a US effort to come to Taiwan's defence. A US carrier battle group sailing from the Arabian Gulf or Indian Ocean that was coming to Taiwan's aid would have to pass through the South China Sea. In addition, in wartime, the need to attack these sites and the aircraft and ships deploying from them would divert US assets from performing other missions. 

The debate over our latest Lowy Institute Paper, Condemned to Crisis?, continued this week. Before I post the best of the reviews, I believe this section of author Ken Ward's response should be aired first:

At the outset, however, I feel obliged to point out that there is an all-important question mark in the title. I will probably go on defending the survival of this brave question mark for a long time to come. It has already been exposed to relentless attack. Its defiant presence is meant to signal that I do not believe the relationship with Indonesia is doomed to crisis. 'Crisis-prone' refers to the past, not necessarily the future.

What I believe rather, is that we should expect difficulties and clashes of national interest to arise from time to time between Australia and Indonesia for various reasons, and I am urging Australian political leaders to adopt more temperate language in public to help prevent such bilateral differences from deteriorating or escalating into crises.

Jakarta Post journalist Endy Bayuni made the argument that Indonesians are not as 'culturally sensitive' as Australians think:

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Need more evidence that Indonesians are not that culturally sensitive? Indonesia has never bothered even to try to reciprocate Australia's repeated statements that it is the most important foreign relationship, something that in Eastern culture would be considered as downright rude. Remember the 1970s' notorious French song Je T'aime Moi Non Plus, where the woman in the duet passionately says she loves the man, but he remains indifferent and is only interested in a more casual affair? That's how awkward some Indonesians feel each time we hear Australian leaders utter their foreign policy mantra.

Reviewing Ward's work, Stephen Grenville reminded us there have been times when Indonesia and Australia have been at odds, but the relationship recovered:

The supposed wise heads in Canberra tell us that these little tiffs in the relationship are normal and quickly forgotten. This is wrong. The relationship is like a marriage, with accumulated never-forgotten slights. We did better in the past, retaining working diplomatic relationships during Konfrontasi while simultaneously fighting Indonesia in Borneo. This diplomatic dexterity made it possible to quickly build close relations after 1966. We need to try harder, and the starting point is to recognise that this is worth doing.

Andrew Parker from PwC was more optimistic:

But if we want to be more than just bystanders we will have to seriously rethink our engagement model. Indonesians do not get up in the morning and look south for guidance. They look north, as we do. China, Japan, Korea, the US and Europeans are well ahead of us.

We can choose to continue down a path punctuated by the recurring crises that Ken so compellingly argues are inevitable. The alternative is to double-down on our investment. This will require courage and a healthy measure of leadership if we are to reset the relationship for the next 25 years. We can and must do better – we simply can't afford not to.

But we need more investment in education and knowledge, both in Australia and Indonesia, says Catriona Croft-Cusworth:

We don't need a nation of Indonesia specialists just to improve relations with our neighbour. But we do need to support a basic level of knowledge about Indonesia that will help rid us of the stereotypes and prejudices that colour discourse about the country among our public, media and politicians. It's astonishing that Ward should even have to advise Australia's political leaders to avoid using language that 'Indonesians may construe as seeking to reimpose "coolie" status on them', and to 'talk about them in public in a more appropriate manner'.

Moving on from Indonesia, Matthew Dal Santo pointed to the intriguing idea of a 'United States of Europe':

For Berlin, then, the ideal form of European political and fiscal union would offer indirect, but reliable, control over the fiscal policies of other Eurozone members to ensure their 'competitiveness' and the euro's long-term stability, but the retention of national control over those issues that underpin Germany's position as Europe's paramount power. 

Malcolm Cook had a short post on the state of Japan's 'defence normalisation':

However, Japan is still far from a normal external security actor and alarmist talk of Japanese remilitarisation tells you more about the ideological predispositions of the accuser than of present reality. Yet, it's clear that Japan is again becoming a more proactive and independent security actor in East Asia in both words and action. It is also increasingly focused on the threat from China and is finding growing support from regional countries with similar concerns.

How has university education affected the views of China's foreign policymakers? Merriden Varall:

CCP dominance, and the strength of these particular worldviews, go hand in hand. Cultural explanations for beliefs and behaviour should not be removed from their political context, but need to be understood as constructed, created and utilised by those in power – this is true around the world, and certainly in China. While the Chinese population is overall growing wealthier, travelling more, being educated overseas and generally more exposed to the world, we must not assume this will bring a change in ideas and worldviews.

Shashank Joshi on the death of Mullah Omar and the burgeoning Afghan peace talks:

Even if those in favour of talks can ride out the consequences of this news and sustain the dialogue with Kabul, they could see increasing dissent, and even defection, from their commanders in the field. ISIS has increasingly sought tochallenge the Taliban's authority in the south and east, hoping to co-opt disgruntled Taliban commanders. ISIS's presence remains limited, and its Afghan leader was killed in a drone strike earlier this month. ISIS faces a radically different sectarian and political environment to that in Syria or Iraq, and has made few inroads so far. But the group would exploit any chaos in the Taliban ranks.

Tensions are growing between Vietnam and Cambodia over their disputed land border, says Elliot Brennan:

ASEAN, the UN and other governments should support and indeed insist on the speedy resolution of the border dispute. While it could be settled in the Hague, much like the 2013 settlement of the Preah Vihear case, this would be a lengthy process which would ignite more nationalism. And Hun Sen is all too aware that the longer the process drags on, the more it plays into the hands of the opposition ahead of promised elections in 2018. For its part, Hanoi would be happier with the current Hun Sen Government than an unknown and seemingly anti-Vietnamese one in Phnom Penh,  though it would no doubt prefer a government less influenced by Beijing.

 A two-part series from J Michael Cole on Taiwan's upcoming presidential election and the prospects for the DPP and KMT:

Tsai's China policy therefore looks rather similar to that of the KMT's Ma, who throughout his presidency made the 'status quo' a principal pillar of his own China policy. Tsai and Ma nevertheless differ in one key aspect, and that is the controversial '1992 consensus,' of which its 'one China' clause is unacceptable to her DPP constituents. Still, Tsai has promised the continuation of constructive relations with China – in other words, she is giving precedence to substance over technicalities such as the 'platform' on which cross-strait dialogue will occur.

Despite the criticism heard in the more conservative wing of her party, who accused her of engineering the 'KMT-ization' of the DPP, Tsai is currently at the apex of her power, with opinion polls showing a comfortable lead against the KMT candidate or any combination of opponents. 

In part 2, Cole looked at what Beijing might do in the event of either a KMT reelection or the victory of the DPP:

One way in which Beijing could react is to 'punish' the Taiwanese for making the 'wrong' choice in the polls by choosing Tsai over the more pro-China KMT candidate, Hung Hsiu-chu.  Such a policy could include an economic embargo of Taiwan or more coercive measures. One strategy could be for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the KMT to do everything in their power to discredit the DPP administration. This could help aid a return for the KMT in the 2018 municipal elections and the 2020 presidential elections. However, such efforts would be mitigated if the DPP also wins a majority of seats in parliament (the legislative elections are being held concurrently on January 16).

Turkey changed its policy on Syria this week, bombing both ISIS and Kurdish forces in northern Syria in an effort to create 'safe zones'. Rodger Shanahan on what 'safe zones' actually entail and their potential policy complications:

The 'naturally occurring' safe zones may allow some Syrian refugees to return to Syria, but how would these people survive? What humanitarian assistance would be provided to them and by whom? Who would provide the governance and security functions within these zones? What would be the Syrian Government's approach to them and what would the international community do if the Assad regime sought to reassert its authority over the parts of Syrian territory cleared of ISIS? Nature and politics abhor vacuums, and once safe zone(s) are created, there will always be someone who seeks to take advantage of them. The UN certainly has some concerns about the prospect of a safe zone, particularly given the lack of detail released to date.

Finally, a response from Robert Kelly to his ongoing debate with Van Jackson of Georgetown University on South Korea's grand strategy:

The problem of course is that this is just not sustainable. North Korea is not going away, and no amount of ‘global Korean’ activity can change that, as we will all be reminded next time North Korea does something outrageous, like pick a fight in the Yellow Sea or send a drone over Seoul. North Korea has not lashed out in awhile, but with the Winter Olympics coming to South Korea in 2018 and their spiraling nuclear program, it's not hard to imagine friction. Indeed it would be unusual if the North were to not misbehave.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user Official U.S. Navy Page.

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The view from Phnom Penh

Cambodia-Vietnam relations have long been turbulent. Occupation, conflict and political meddling have been hallmarks of the relationship, and disagreement about the border has long been a bone of contention. Last year a group of 600 protesters burned a Vietnamese flag outside the embassy in Phnom Penh, earning a strong rebuke from Hanoi.

Tensions have continued to simmer since. In June, Cambodian activists clashed with Vietnamese villagers in Svay Rieng province, which lies between Phnom Penh and Ho Chi Minh City, while Cambodian police looked on (raw footage here; read an excellent article on anti-Vietnamese sentiment in Cambodia here). This week, tensions have also bubbled over around maritime borders.

Both Hanoi and Phnom Penh are seeking a speedy resolution to demarcate the problematic land border. The process is 80% complete. Yet as it draws closer to being finalised there is an increasing risk of further problems. Following a three-day meeting in early July, the two parties agreed to complete the demarcation 'very soon'.

But given the highly politicised nature of the issue, that deadline may prove difficult to meet. The border dispute is testing Cambodia's Prime Minister Hun Sen. Memories are long and many Cambodians still see him as a Vietnamese puppet (he was part of the the government installed  by Hanoi following the Vietnamese overthrow of the Khmer Rouge in 1979). Anger will grow if the border deal isn't seen as favourable. 

Sam Rainsy, the opposition leader, has for almost two decades employed xenophobic rhetoric against the Vietnamese.

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In 1998 he campaigned on a ticket to expel the yuon, a derogatory Khmer term used for the Vietnamese. Little has changed since. In 2009 Rainsy led a group of activists on a visit to disputed territory along the Vietnamese border where they uprooted a demarcation post. This populist move saw him sentenced to two years in jail, after which he fled into self-exile until in 2013, when he received a royal pardon, returning to contest the elections. His tactics haven't changed. Disputes with Vietnam are the oxygen for much of his and the Cambodian National Rescue Party's popularity. 

The CNRP claims that current negotiations over demarcation are using Vietnamese maps and are thus unfavourable to Cambodia. Such claims play well with many Cambodians, and Hun Sen has looked to quell such assertions by requesting maps from the UN drawn up during French rule.

Worryingly, decades of skirmishes between Cambodia and Thailand around the disputed territory of Preah Vihear Temple may indicate to some Cambodians that violence gets results. This concern is exacerbated by the fact that Cambodia is undergoing a period of heightened political uncertainty. The 2013 elections left Hun Sen weakened, with the opposition nearly doubling its share of seats in the national assembly. Months of subsequent political deadlock resulted in concessions being granted to the CNRP. The Opposition has increased its influence in politics and is frustrating Hun Sen's usually firm control, and the border issue could further strengthen support for the CNRP. Coupled with persistent grievances toward deep-rooted corruption, inequality and the enrichment of the elites that support Hun Sen, this could create a perfect storm for the ruling Cambodian People's Party.

Hun Sen, a master strategist who has maintained a grip on power for three decades, has recently made moves to strengthen his own hand. In July, 11 opposition activists were jailed for 'insurrection' for their role in last year's protests, and a law that will restrict the operations of NGOs (and inhibit their criticisms of government) was passed.

In recent weeks Hun Sen and his defence minister have warned the military to be vigilant and ready to suppress any attempt at a 'colour revolution'. Much of the oxygen for such a 'revolution' could come from the border dispute, particularly if there is anger over any perceived ceding of territory to Vietnam.

Phnom Penh isn't the only party that wants to see the back of the demarcation process.

For Hanoi, resolving border disputes is one way of hitting back at what it feels is its growing isolation. Both Cambodia and Laos are increasingly influenced by Beijing, thanks to significant Chinese investment. Hanoi worries that Cambodia, which many see as a quasi-vassal state of China, could be manipulated to create problems along the border with Vietnam. Such concerns have lingered since 2012 when Phnom Penh prevented any ASEAN unity against Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea. Vietnam worries that Phnom Penh could escalate the border dispute as a distraction from any incident with China in the South China Sea. In such a situation, Hanoi could be in hot conflict with its two biggest neighbours on two very different fronts.

Hanoi's sense of isolation has no doubt factored into its attempts in recent years to develop a more proactive and open foreign policy characterised by a long-held motto of 'fewer enemies, more friends'. Most telling is the recent warming of relations with the US – last month's visit to Washington by the general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam was a first. 

ASEAN, the UN and other governments should support and indeed insist on the speedy resolution of the border dispute. While it could be settled in the Hague, much like the 2013 settlement of the Preah Vihear case, this would be a lengthy process which would ignite more nationalism. And Hun Sen is all too aware that the longer the process drags on, the more it plays into the hands of the opposition ahead of promised elections in 2018. For its part, Hanoi would be happier with the current Hun Sen Government than an unknown and seemingly anti-Vietnamese one in Phnom Penh,  though it would no doubt prefer a government less influenced by Beijing.

How the border disputes are resolved will be an important indicator of Cambodia's stability and how Vietnam and Cambodia can work together on an issue of mutual interest.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user Emad Ghazipura.

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The Asia Pacific is the most dynamic digital landscape in the world, home to the fastest adopters of new technologies and the largest concentration of mobile and social media users. An escalation in online activism, changing cyber dynamics, developments in digital diplomacy and the exploitation of big data are shaping the region's engagement with the world.

  • How Western companies and governments are using Weibo (and its 600 million users) to seize opportunities in China. Who's doing well? Apparently Tourism NZ and condom seller Durex.
  • India's police are asking citizens to use live-streaming app Periscope to report crimes.
  • A political party in Taiwan and an unnamed news agency in Hong Kong are among the latest victims of the recent attack on Italian cybersecurity firm Hacking Team.
  • This podcast details Singapore's booming subculture of Instagram influencers.
  • Technology manufacturing is taking off in Vietnam, and tech companies are investing in training the next generation of Vietnamese workers.
  • The PLA announced it has developed the world's 'smartest camera' (more detail in Chinese language media here).
  • Today, the Taiwanese Government begins taking entrepreneur visa applications from foreign nationals in an attempt to position itself as a major Asia-Pacific hub for tech and innovation.
  • Will Taiwan's low cost of living lure over expats from Asia's top tech hubs, Japan, China and Singapore? 
  • How does Chinese state media keep citizens angry at Japan? Clickbait nationalism.
  • Businesses in PNG are being impacted by e-commerce, mobile technologies, cloud computing and the 'Internet of Things'.
  • FireChat, the preferred app of Hong Kong's Umbrella Movement protesters, has thrown down the gauntlet to WhatsApp with its new off-grid encrypted texting feature. You don't need a mobile network, wi-fi connection or even a Sim card. This video shows how it works:

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Indonesia's President Jokowi will welcome Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Jakarta today, making it his third meeting with an international leader this week. Jokowi hosted British Prime Minister David Cameron on Monday and visited Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong on Tuesday in a bid to strengthen ties and promote investment in Indonesia's slipping economy. 

In the first two bilateral meetings, Jokowi encouraged the UK and Singapore to diversify investment and increase trade with Indonesia, even as his government raised import taxes on a long list of goods this week. The contrast between Jokowi's welcoming words to foreign leaders and his increasingly nationalist stance at home has reportedly puzzled investors. Jokowi held talks with 31 major British business leaders who accompanied Cameron on his visit and joined a Singapore-Indonesia business dialogue to deliver his message. He is expected to make a similar invitation for Turkey to boost economic ties when the two leaders hold a Turkey-Indonesia business forum in the coming days.

Aside from business talks, relations were pleasant between Jokowi and his counterparts from the UK and Singapore.

Lee invited Jokowi to visit Singapore's Botanic Gardens, where a new orchid hybrid was named after Jokowi's wife, Iriana. Cameron toured Jakarta's mosques and markets, delighting social media and the tabloids by taking a selfie while sharing banana fritters with an Indonesian celebrity.

Meanwhile, Singapore's environment minister, in front of his Indonesian counterpart, urged for action to be taken on the subject of haze from Indonesia's forest fires affecting health in Singapore, and critics prompted Cameron to ask about the fate of Lindsay Sandiford, a British citizen now on death row in Bali.

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Cameron claimed that he did raise the issue of the death penalty with Jokowi in private, but was pessimistic that his plea would help Sandiford achieve a lesser sentence. The 59-year old woman, who is often referred to sympathetically in the press as a 'British grandmother', has been on death row in Indonesia for two years. Australia's unsuccessful pleas for mercy for its citizens has given the UK little confidence about finding a diplomatic solution. Sandiford has instead appealed to celebrities like Richard Branson and Russell Brand to support her case. With or without diplomatic and celebrity support, Sandiford's execution may be postponed a while longer. Indonesia's Attorney General's Office announced this week that scheduling the next round of executions was not high on its list of priorities, saying 'We hope that it was clear through the first and second round of executions that we will be firm and not tolerate any drug violations.'

However a few days later, the Attorney General's Office confirmed that Filipina drug convict Mary Jane Veloso would not be freed, regardless of legal proceedings in the Philippines. Veloso, who has attracted the most public sympathy in Indonesia of those currently on death row, gained further support during Ramadan when she was visited in jail by popular Filipino boxer and Congressman Manny Pacquiao. Her execution was scheduled for after the Islamic holy month, which ended two weeks ago, but no date has been confirmed. It could be that Jokowi is toning down the more aggressive sides of his nationalism now that he is becoming more serious about seeking foreign investment.

Capital punishment was not a diplomatic obstacle this week for Singapore, which also enforces the death penalty. The city-state agreed to several areas of cooperation with Indonesia, from tourism to anti-corruption efforts and counter-terrorism.

Turkey abolished the death penalty in peacetime in 2002, and under pressure from the European Union banned it completely in 2004. However, Erdogan has previously said he would consider reinstating it, indicating that Indonesia's record on the issue will not be a problem for his talks with Jokowi in the coming days. The two leaders are expected to find common ground as leaders of Muslim-majority democracies and presidents who found their beginnings in city-level governance.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user Number 10.

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As was laid out in part 1 of this two-part series, barring major unforeseen developments between now and voting day on January 16, 2016, it is likely that Tsai Ing-wen will become Taiwan's first female president.

China stated in its recent defense white paper that 'the root cause of instability (in the Taiwan Strait) has not yet been removed, and the "Taiwan independence" separatist forces and their activities are still the biggest threat to the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations.'

Taking this into account, how Beijing will react to the likely election of Tsai will be the determining factor in whether cross-strait relations during the next four or eight years of DPP rule will be characterised by continuity or renewed tensions. Who in Beijing succeeds in taking the lead on the Taiwan 'issue' will also have an impact on future developments.

One way in which Beijing could react is to 'punish' the Taiwanese for making the 'wrong' choice in the polls by choosing Tsai over the more pro-China KMT candidate, Hung Hsiu-chu Such a policy could include an economic embargo of Taiwan or more coercive measures. One strategy could be for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the KMT to do everything in their power to discredit the DPP administration. This could help aid a return for the KMT in the 2018 municipal elections and the 2020 presidential elections. However, such efforts would be mitigated if the DPP also wins a majority of seats in parliament (the legislative elections are being held concurrently on January 16).

Additionally, with the encouragement of PLA's General Political Department Liaison Department, pro-unification forces that have spread across Taiwan in recent years would conceivably play a greater role if the DPP came back to power, especially if the Party wins a majority in parliament. Read More


Given the years that pro-unification actors have had to establish their networks in Taiwan the state apparatus is probably no longer in a position to monitor, let alone counter, all their activities. Elements from the 'deep blue' and pro-unification civil society could also decide to mimic the Sunflower Movement and use civil disobedience to undermine the DPP administration, which would contribute to social unrest.

More overt action by Beijing, however, could be counterproductive. As the missile crisis in 1995-96 made perfectly clear, direct Chinese coercion can backfire, and instead of deterring the Taiwanese it can convince them to dig in their heels. In this case it would imply the acceleration of Taiwanese nationalism and the deepening of anti-China sentiment. Taiwan's reaction to recent CCTV footage depicting a military exercise simulating an assault on a structure that bears a striking resemblance to the Presidential Office in Taipei is a case in point.

As such pressure would threaten to undo the years of rapprochement and growing interdependence that flourished under President Ma, we cannot automatically assume that Beijing would take such risks and decide to 'punish' Taiwan. It is therefore possible that like Tsai, Beijing would seek continuity. Although Beijing's ability to get what it wants through traditional channels would be greatly diminished with her election, and could therefore compel it to activate pro-unification sub-state forces. 

It's also important to put the possible return of the DPP to power in its proper geopolitical context. There is growing disillusionment around the region with Beijing and with its territorial assertiveness, and its intensifying crackdown on its civil society is not winning it any friends.

Consequently, if she acts carefully, Tsai could find herself in a much more enviable position internationally – or at least in Washington – than former President Chen, who chose to press ahead with his quest for symbols of statehood at a time when the international community was still optimistic about the future prospects of a more benign, if not entirely democratic, China.

Despite the current numbers suggesting a DPP victory, many things can happen in six months, and the KMT, for all its faults, is a survivor – and an extraordinary wealthy one at that.

In the event of a KMT/Hung Hsiu-chu victory, the outcome of the legislative election will be important, as the balance in parliament would affect the ability of the executive to implement (or impose) its policies. A KMT victory with a DPP majority in the Legislative Yuan would probably neutralise a Hung-led administration, just as the KMT majority succeeded in undermining president Chen during his two terms. If this situation were to occur, Hung would be unable to impose her policies – unless she decided to act more like her authoritarian counterparts in Beijing. However, as we saw when President Ma crossed certain red lines on China, Taiwan's civil society would once again spring into action if it perceived that Taiwan's way of life was being threatened. 

The same applies, with greater prospects of major social unrest, in the even less likely scenario in which the KMT wins both the presidency and a majority in the legislature. This would be construed by both the conservative (pro-unification) forces in Taiwan and Beijing as a sign of 'universal' support for Hung's ideology. In such a context, the super-empowered youth that rose against the authorities in 2014 and succeeded in derailing President Ma's plans would be expected to take action again, with a high likelihood of escalation. 

In the scenario of a president Hung who controls both the executive and legislative branches of government, the level of fear among young Taiwanese – who, as some repeatedly told this author, have no other passport and must therefore live with the consequences – would increase exponentially. Such fears could be mitigated if once elected, President Hung softened her China policies and surrounded herself with moderate ideologues. While this looks unlikely, elected officials generally tend to move towards the 'center' once they are elected.

Under the current conditions, by adopting a more centrist position with the greatest appeal to the majority of Taiwanese, the DPP seems the likeliest to ensure social stability in Taiwan if elected. Hung's KMT would likely prove the most destabilising – simply because the DPP has been better at assessing what the people want and gauging the temperature of Taiwan's nationalism.

Whether Beijing understands the constraints that democracy places on political parties, and how it reacts when this yields results that are probably not to its liking, will be the determining factor in the stability of the Taiwan Strait for years to come.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user tomscy2000.

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13 Hours follows the story of six private security contractors during the 2012 attacks on the US diplomatic compound in Benghazi, Libya, where US Ambassador Christopher Stevens was killed. The political controversy around the incident continues three years on.

Michael Bay directed the movie and there is already some talk of it being his Black Hawk Down.

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The Indo-Pacific is a strategic system encompassing the Indian and Pacific oceans, reflecting the expanding interests and reach of China and India as well as the enduring role of the US. The Lowy Institute's International Security program presents a weekly selection of links illuminating the changing security picture in this increasingly connected super-region.

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With the high likelihood that Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) will regain the presidency in the January 2016 elections, many analysts have predicted a return of tensions in the Taiwan Strait after eight years of relative stability under the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) administration of President Ma Ying-jeou.

DDP Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen and Professor Lo Chih-Cheng walk with supporters down Renai Road, 2014 (Flickr/tomscy2000)

Whether a DPP victory in those elections would indeed mark a return to hostilities will be largely contingent on how Beijing reacts to this likely development.

From the outset it's important that we clarify what the DPP under its Chairperson and presidential candidate, Tsai Ing-wen, is not. Unlike her predecessor Chen Shui-bian, who served two terms from 2000-2008, Tsai has taken a more subdued approach to cross-strait relations. She has chosen instead to focus on domestic matters and to consolidate the nation. When pressed to explain her cross-strait policies, Tsai has adopted a more centrist position than her predecessor by vowing to maintain the 'status quo' under the current constitutional framework of the Republic of China (ROC) and to seek continuity in the relationship with Beijing. 

In other words, despite the alarmism in some circles, Tsai will not suddenly declare de jure independence for Taiwan, an act that Beijing has made clear would provide 'justification' for the use of force.

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Moreover, by avoiding the issue of the 'independence clause' in the party charter and instead using the Resolution on Taiwan's Future, which states that the ROC/Taiwan is already an independent state as her basis for Taiwan's relations with China, Tsai was signaling that she did not intend to make cross-strait relations a major factor in her campaign.

Tsai's China policy therefore looks rather similar to that of the KMT's Ma, who throughout his presidency made the 'status quo' a principal pillar of his own China policy. Tsai and Ma nevertheless differ in one key aspect, and that is the controversial '1992 consensus,' of which its 'one China' clause is unacceptable to her DPP constituents. Still, Tsai has promised the continuation of constructive relations with China – in other words, she is giving precedence to substance over technicalities such as the 'platform' on which cross-strait dialogue will occur.

Despite the criticism heard in the more conservative wing of her party, who accused her of engineering the 'KMT-ization' of the DPP, Tsai is currently at the apex of her power, with opinion polls showing a comfortable lead against the KMT candidate or any combination of opponents. 

If the KMT was to have any chance of defeating Tsai, it would have to field a formidable candidate, someone who has the ability to harness the forces of a society that is increasingly assured of, and vocal about, its Taiwanese identity, as the Sunflower Movement made perfectly clear in March and April 2014. 

Instead, the KMT picked (and on 19 July confirmed) Hung Hsiu-chu, the deputy legislative speaker whose China policy, as it is understood, seems to go against all the trend lines in society. Hung's views on China and Taiwan are such that a number of KMT legislators – from both the 'mainlander' and 'Taiwanese' factions – threatened to quit the party, while others openly criticised it and as a result were expelled.

Seeing a crisis in the making, party elders of the KMT did their best to convince Hung to tone down her rhetoric, an intervention which became necessary after she stated her espousal of a 'one China, same interpretation' (一中同表) policy that not only contradicted the official KMT position of 'one country, different interpretations' (一國兩憲), but seemed to echo Beijing's position on the matter. Her announcement that, if elected, she would sign a 'peace agreement' with China and possibly end arms procurement from the US alarmed many people within the KMT, not to mention within the rest of Taiwan, while her flip-flopping on whether the ROC existed – Hung initially said that recognising the ROC would create 'two Chinas,' which was 'unacceptable' – raised eyebrows in many circles. After being pressured by party members, Hung eventually reverted to the KMT's favoured 'one China, two interpretations' and 1992-consensus formulas, while proposing a 'one consensus, three connotations' (一個共識,三個內涵) platform and assuring us that she would press Beijing to recognise the legitimacy of the ROC Government. 

Hung had nevertheless revealed her ideological foundations and it was difficult to imagine that the apparent softening of her stance wasn't anything more than a tactic to reassure the public ahead of the election.

Although Hung is perfectly entitled to her views in democratic Taiwan, they are nevertheless a problematic position to adopt prior to January. The fact that her beliefs seem to be diametrically opposed to the consensus that has been built across Taiwan, and that they dovetail so perfectly with the position of the authoritarian regime on the other side of the Strait, is probably enough to ensure defeat for the KMT, which currently finds itself in a state of crisis. 

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Mullah Omar is the Lazarus of the international jihad. The one-eyed Taliban leader has been pronounced dead at regular intervals over the years, with each occasion prompting furious denials from Taliban officials and, in due course, a missive purporting to be from the man himself.

But this time is different. The Afghan president's office has released a statement saying that Omar died in April 2013. Other Afghan officials have attributed the claim of Mullah Omar's death to their counterparts in Pakistan, where Omar is widely believed to have been under the protection of that country's intelligence services.

What is significant is the timing, for the Taliban faces an internal power struggle, in part over budding Pakistan-brokered peace talks with the Afghan Government, and due to the growing challenge from ISIS in Afghanistan.

In many ways, the Taliban has been fragmenting for years. The authority and legitimacy of older Taliban leaders, who established themselves in the 1990s, has waned. The US-led kill-capture campaign against mid-level commanders gave rise to what one study called a generation of 'more ideologically motivated and less nationalistic...and therefore less pragmatic' leaders with little memory of an Afghanistan at peace and less inclined to compromise with Afghan Government. More recently there have been several reported power struggles at the top, pitting senior leader Mullah Akhtar Mansoor, who has supported peace talks, against various figures said to oppose them, including Mullah Omar's 26-year-old son Mullah Yaqub and sacked military commander Abdul Qayum Zakir.

It is those talks, which began in the Pakistani town of Murree on 7 July and were scheduled to continue on 31 July, which would be most immediately affected were the news of Omar's death to be confirmed and acknowledged.

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In 2012, former State Department adviser Vali Nasr told the New Yorker's Steve Coll that Omar was crucial because 'there is no legitimacy to a Taliban decision without him. He is the Ho Chi Minh of the war. If you have him, if you hold him, you control the whole organization'. While this may exaggerate the degree to which the Taliban obeys a formal hierarchy, perceptions of Omar as a moral arbiter – especially in his role as 'commander of the faithful' – is crucial.

This is why, on 15 July, Mullah Omar 'endorsed' the peace talks in a supposed Eid message, smoothing over an argument between the Taliban's Qatar office and its leaders in Pakistan. Dead or alive (one senior Taliban figure openly acknowledged that Omar had 'no control' over the message), Omar's perceived imprimatur for the talks and for specific envoys has given the process a degree of coherence and credibility. It has encouraged the hope, however modest, that what might be agreed in Pakistani hotels could, eventually, translate into changes on the ground in Afghanistan. Even with Omar deemed alive, it was far from clear what proportion of Taliban commanders and fighters would abide by any settlement. But acknowledging his death would challenge the legitimacy of those who claim to speak on their leader's behalf. Indeed, those dissatisfied with the course of events may have leaked the news precisely for this reason.

Even if those in favour of talks can ride out the consequences of this news and sustain the dialogue with Kabul, they could see increasing dissent, and even defection, from their commanders in the field. ISIS has increasingly sought to challenge the Taliban's authority in the south and east, hoping to co-opt disgruntled Taliban commanders. ISIS's presence remains limited, and its Afghan leader was killed in a drone strike earlier this month. ISIS faces a radically different sectarian and political environment to that in Syria or Iraq, and has made few inroads so far. But the group would exploit any chaos in the Taliban ranks.

For the past fourteen years, Mullah Omar has been an unseen, ghostly presence over the war in Afghanistan. It is the idea – the myth – of Omar, rather than his everyday leadership, that matters. Formal acknowledgment of his loss could change the direction of this long war. The irony is that the West might come to regret the splintering of a group they fought for over a decade, both for its impact on peace talks and for the opportunities it has created for new and more radical actors like ISIS.

Photo by Flickr user thierry ehrmann.

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Lowy Institute Paper

Debating Condemned to Crisis?

8 of 8

By Ken Ward, author of Condemned to Crisis?, a new Lowy Institute Paper published by Penguin Australia. 

At the book launch for Condemned to Crisis? in Canberra last week, Anthony Bubalo described my text for the first time (at least for the first time in my hearing) as an 'essay'. This is my own preferred description of it. I also see it as subjective and selective, faults that can, I hope, be forgiven in an essay.

I chose to focus on the diplomatic relationship between the two countries as this was the arena in which my reliance on public data seemed to be the least crippling a constraint. Had I tried to write about the bilateral defence relationship, for example, I would have been forced to carry out many confidential conversations that I could not have reported adequately, if at all.

I will respond to the first several contributors to this debate in turn. At the outset, however, I feel obliged to point out that there is an all-important question mark in the title. I will probably go on defending the survival of this brave question mark for a long time to come. It has already been exposed to relentless attack. Its defiant presence is meant to signal that I do not believe the relationship with Indonesia is doomed to crisis. 'Crisis-prone' refers to the past, not necessarily the future.

What I believe rather, is that we should expect difficulties and clashes of national interest to arise from time to time between Australia and Indonesia for various reasons, and I am urging Australian political leaders to adopt more temperate language in public to help prevent such bilateral differences from deteriorating or escalating into crises.

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I am grateful to Aaron Connelly for drawing readers' attention to my second chapter. I see it not only as the least bad chapter, but also as the one that I would least likely need to revise if I chose to revisit this subject several years from now. I believe that there is no reason to reduce any of the investment that Australia makes in understanding Indonesia, and young Australians should certainly be encouraged to study Indonesian. I find it very disappointing, on the other hand, that the Indonesian Government doesn't encourage young Indonesians to study Australia more. 

I agree that 'administrative ballast' can help to prevent small problems from degenerating into crises. We will need a lot of ballast to counter the danger that ambassadorial withdrawals, of which we have had three in the last decade after traversing 60 years without a single one, might be upgraded into ambassadorial expulsions.

Hugh White suggests that I may be 'a little impatient' with speculation about the future. I am sorry if I have given this impression. I myself have benefited greatly from speculating about the future. I began studying both Indonesia and the Indonesian language a full half-century ago and still enjoy writing about Indonesia and speaking Indonesian even now. That was a bet on the future that really paid off. 

What I feel we need to do is distinguish speculation about the future from statements of what we can be pretty sure will take place.

E.H.Carr wrote towards the end of What is History? that what bothered him most was 'the loss of the pervading sense of a world in perpetual motion'. Then he ended the book with these words targeting various conservative writers: 'I shall look out on a world in tumult and a world in travail, and shall answer in the well-worn words of a great scientist – "And yet ...it moves".' I use this quotation for a slightly different purpose to Carr's. Let us by all means speculate about the future, particularly in this context, about how rich and powerful Indonesia will become over the next few decades, but let us also be ready to adjust our viewpoint if the world 'in perpetual motion' moves in a somewhat different direction.

Hugh goes on to suggest that I may be content with the relationship as it is and that I merely want it to be better managed. Admittedly, I am guilty of having set myself a limited objective in my essay. This is to get across the point that it is urgent for our political leaders to learn how to address their Indonesian counterparts and talk about Indonesia in public. I see little value in adopting ambitious goals now before that message has been absorbed. But a quick perusal of the DFAT Indonesia Country Strategy paper and of the website of our embassy in Jakarta shows that 'the relationship as it is' is no mean thing at all.

Furthermore, I do have my own ambitions for the relationship. For example, I would very much like to see sooner or later an Indonesian-speaking foreign minister in Australia. We have not even had many Indonesian-speaking ambassadors. An Indonesian-speaking foreign minister might find it easier to reach that cosy and agreeable state of being 'santai' (relaxed, easy-going, unstressed, even 'cool') with Indonesian counterparts that is so valued in personal relationships among Indonesians themselves. Having a prime minister who can speak a foreign language I see as less important. Sir Anthony Eden, for instance, combined a sophisticated grasp of Persian with a disastrous Middle East policy. 

Putting aside the question of the Indonesian language, I am heartened by Foreign Minister Julie Bishop's commitment to MIKTA, the dialogue or partnership linking the five middle powers, Mexico, Indonesia, the ROK, Turkey and Australia. This could evolve into an effective way of discussing issues with Indonesia in an environment immune to any bilateral stresses. 

I feel that Greta Nabbs-Keller has grasped my overall approach remarkably well. What I am arguing for is a style of public communication with Jakarta that steers comfortably, but unerringly, between the extremes of the insulting and the ingratiating. It is bewildering to me that in recent times some of our leaders have managed to be both insulting and ingratiating with equal facility. 

I am glad that Greta brought up the question of the rather mysteriously small size of the Indonesian community in Australia. To go back to the concept of 'ballast', I think the fact that very few Australians can have any daily contact with Indonesians robs community attitudes to Indonesia of some much-needed ballast. I am also grateful to Greta for mentioning Rhonda and Ketut. Rather than using this story to draw attention to Australian insularity, however, I see it as a missed opportunity for Indonesia to exert some soft power. Had the Indonesian embassy asked for my advice, I would have recommended that it contact the advertising company concerned and discuss possible future collaboration. Making Indonesia appear 'sexy' in the eyes of a mass Australian audience would surely be a worthy goal for that country's cultural program.

While I agree with much that Stephen Grenville has written, I believe that, just as one shouldn't judge a book by its cover, one shouldn't judge it by its title. I don't find the text itself 'despairing'. 'Downbeat' I can perhaps live with. Stephen reads more into my reference to New Zealand than I intended. I have been arguing that the impact of the cultural differences between Australia and Indonesia have been exaggerated. After all, there is little prospect of vast numbers of Australians and Indonesians joining forces in some common endeavour, in which their mutual ignorance of each others' cultures might create terrible misunderstandings and wounded amour-propre on one side or the other. The number of Australians who need to acquire some appreciation of Indonesian etiquette and protocol norms is not very large. Here I am surely being upbeat and confident, rather than despairing.

It is true, as Stephen points out, that I devote little space to Papua. I haven't been to that part of Indonesia since 1969, when I had the good fortune to meet SBY's future father-in-law. I didn't feel that I had anything new to say on the subject. Stephen's paragraph on Papua contains nothing from which I would dissent. Stephen ends his post with the observation that our 'diplomatic dexterity' during the Sukarno era made it possible for us quickly to build a close relationship with the successor regime. This is indeed true, but let's not forget that half a million Indonesians had to meet their deaths before our diplomatic dexterity obtained its just reward.

Andrew Parker argues that Indonesia has never been more important to Australia than it is now. I disagree. Indonesia was most important to Australia during Konfrontasi, because there was a danger that our undeclared war with Indonesia, which Stephen refers to, could escalate into open warfare. It is very important for our relationship that this didn't eventuate. Fear of war is why I was unhappy that SBY withdrew two ambassadors from Canberra during his tenure. Nor did I clamour for Ambassador Grigson to be withdrawn from Jakarta following the recent executions. Withdrawing one's ambassador is the lowest rung on the ladder of escalation towards breaking off relations and, worse, declaring war.

The only other comment I wish to make about Andrew's post is that, while there is a strong case for arguing that Australia should be Indonesia's preferred partner in dealing with the challenges he identifies, I don't see any way of persuading President Joko Widodo of this point of view. Maybe we will be luckier with his successor, whoever he or she may be. This is not a counsel of despair. Sukarno once explained that he hadn't withdrawn his ambassador from Canberra despite our clashes with Indonesian troops in Borneo because he accepted that Australia, unlike his main foe, the UK, was here to stay. This hasn't changed.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user Tony Abbott.

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  • Vanuatu’s leader of the opposition Edward Natapei has died. The former prime minister has been remembered as a leader who was able to bridge the gap between Western and Pacific political styles. 
  • The UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression and opinion has expressed concern about the rule of law in Nauru, as Pacific Islands Forum Secretary General Dame Meg Taylor meets with Nauru government and opposition MPs.
  • Australian lawyers weigh in on controversies on Manus Island and Nauru. 
  • Blogger Martyn Namarong explains some of the complexities around the Ok Tedi mine suspension in PNG’s Western Province. Revenue from the mine provides for around a quarter of the government’s budget. 
  • Great interactive from the Sydney Morning Herald on the newest island on Earth, which sprang up from a Tongan volcano in January.
  • In her first speech post-Westpac, Gail Kelly spoke about her recent trip to Vanuatu as an ambassador for Care Australia, highlighting the challenges ni-Vanuatu women face.
  • On the Aus-PNG Network, Benson Saulo explains how his Indigenous Australian and Papua New Guinean heritage has influenced his life.
  • Solomon Islands NGO Youth@Work has released the first digital edition of its youth magazine, YOSI
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Long resisted by the US for its impracticality and because it was considered too big a concession to Turkish interests, the concept of a 'no-fly zone' in northern Syria now appears to have morphed into a so-called 'safe zone'. The plan, as far as it appears to have been enunciated, involves US and Turkish aircraft (flying from Incirlik in Turkey) and possibly Turkish artillery assisting as yet unknown Syrian opposition forces to clear ISIS from as yet unknown swathes of northern Syria. Once areas are cleared of ISIS, the safe zone(s) will develop naturally, according to the Turkish foreign minister. An interesting concept.

There is often a substantial gap between announcements and execution, but this proposal has the potential to significantly change the dynamic in Syria, and possibly muddy the waters further. Here are some concerns, in the absence of much detail:

Who makes the 'safe zones' safe?

Air power alone can't do it, so there has to be a significant ground component, supported by air strikes, to seize and hold territory. While there has been some commentary that the hitherto ineffectual Free Syrian Army may be strengthened (yet again) in order to do the job, this is unlikely to occur quickly, opening up the distinct possibility that the safe zone could be held and cleared in part by anti-ISIS jihadist groups, of which there is no shortage in northern Syria.

One could even mount an argument that the recent media appearances by jihadist groups such as Ahrar al-Sham and Jabhat al-Nusra on al-Jazeera and in The Washington Post (which I have commented on previously) have been about positioning themselves as 'acceptable' jihadis. When the New York Times describes the plan as involving the use of 'relatively moderate' insurgent groups rather than simply 'moderate' groups, it's time to start worrying.

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Things rarely occur 'naturally'

The 'naturally occurring' safe zones may allow some Syrian refugees to return to Syria, but how would these people survive? What humanitarian assistance would be provided to them and by whom? Who would provide the governance and security functions within these zones? What would be the Syrian Government's approach to them and what would the international community do if the Assad regime sought to reassert its authority over the parts of Syrian territory cleared of ISIS? Nature and politics abhor vacuums, and once safe zone(s) are created, there will always be someone who seeks to take advantage of them. The UN certainly has some concerns about the prospect of a safe zone, particularly given the lack of detail released to date.

Turkey isn't doing this for altruistic purposes

The Turkish Government has long stood accused of not doing enough to combat ISIS because President Erdogan saw Assad as the primary enemy, and because of the Government's Islamist proclivities. But now with the ISIS bombing of the town of Suruc and ISIS attacks against Islamist groups over whom Anakra has more influence, Turkey finally sees a need to join the West's campaign against the group. With the signing of the recent Iranian nuclear agreement as well, Ankara may well have concluded that it is time to accelerate its role in Syria before the easing of sanctions gives Tehran a freer hand to assist Damascus. So while Turkey may not actually occupy these safe zones, the fact that Ankara will control all the entry points means Turkey effectively controls them, and will be able to support those groups who wish to fight Assad rather than ISIS. For Ankara, this is potentially a big win.

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To new readers, this is part four in a running debate between me and Van Jackson of Georgetown. Van (we are friends) originally argued that the group of countries pushing back on China in the South China Sea (SCS) could use South Korea’s extra weight. I responded that South Korea, as a middle power, can bring little to bear on the SCS tussle and that such intervention might heal the emerging rift between North Korea and China.

Van then responded that the current Sino-North Korea split is likely exaggerated, and that too much focus on North Korea blinds South Korea to its other regional interests. In this round, I will argue that North Korea must dominate South Korean foreign policy, on both national security and humanitarian grounds, and that Seoul brings so little to the SCS fight that even the modest glimmers of a Chinese-North Korean split is worth its reticence.

South Korean Grand Strategy

In the end, as Van says, the root of our debate may be disagreements over South Korean grand strategy.

Van seems to fit in what one might call the ‘Global Korea’ school. Global Korea was a notion for South Korean strategy first pushed by former President Lee Myung Bak. Lee sought, with strong support from the US and the Washington DC think-tank scene, to re-imagine South Korea as a ‘responsible middle power’ with global interests. Lee was the first Korean president to draft a ‘national security strategy’ (here is the most recent) based on the American model. He got South Korea involved in the struggle against Somali piracy, and Washington think-tanks wrote the expected salutations of Korea’s expanding horizons, which, not surprisingly, dovetailed with American preferences. Korea, for example, would be a more vocal participant in the war on terror.

None of this is really wrong. But much of it changes the subject from the issue which everyone, not just South Koreans, are burned out with but nonetheless will not go away: North Korea. Call this the ‘North Korea first’ school of Korean strategy. When North Korea is gone, then Global Korea makes sense. Until then, it's important that Seoul stay the course.

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South Korea needs to take serious ownership of the North Korea problem, and I worry that it does not. South Koreans are increasingly wary of unification given the huge costs. North Korean defectors in the South - heroes to my mind - often face social discrimination. South Koreans get far more animated discussing Japan in their foreign policy than North Korea. Missile defense, which seems strikingly obvious to the analyst community, is nonetheless very contentious in Seoul. Civil defense for nuclear scenarios is not taken seriously. The South Korean military has regular problems with abuse, hazing, corruption, and glitzy, prestige-driven procurement choices. It's not properly structured for post-unification stabilisation or ready for a COIN scenario in the North. Nor was it able to takeover its own defence despite years of lead-time. Most Western analysts of Korean security I know worry about ROK Army readiness, and fear that the US defence guarantee has blunted Korean strategic thinking.

In my own experience in Korea, I routinely find my students, colleagues and friends are simply exhausted with North Korea. This is entirely understandable (most analysts are too). South Korea is a modern, globalised place. Like the rest of us, South Koreans want to watch their HDTVs, travel, gab on their cellphones, find a cool job and otherwise live the sorts of modern, fun lifestyles they see in Western television. No one wants to hunker down for a long, grim, expensive head-to-head contest with grey, gloomy, reactionary North Korea. And Global Korea’s appeal is precisely that. It places South Korea in the company of states Koreans want to be peers with – the US, Japan the EU – not bizarre, backward, fatiguing North Korea.

The problem of course is that this is just not sustainable. North Korea is not going away, and no amount of ‘global Korean’ activity can change that, as we will all be reminded next time North Korea does something outrageous, like pick a fight in the Yellow Sea or send a drone over Seoul. North Korea has not lashed out in awhile, but with the Winter Olympics coming to South Korea in 2018 and their spiraling nuclear program, it's not hard to imagine friction. Indeed it would be unusual if the North were to not misbehave.

In short, South Korea needs to get out front on North Korea. North Korea should not be pushed onto the US, China, the Six Party Framework, the international community and so on. South Korean politicians need to be upfront on the costs and risks, and argue vigorously that they are worth it. South Koreans need to be reminded that, as seductive as Global Korea is, the Cold War is still on in Korea, and that North Korea is their historic burden. Yes, that really sucks, and yes, the rest of us can help at the margins. But firstly and largely, this is a South Korean problem, which means more leadership, more defense spending, more preparation for North Korean occupation and reorganisation and more honesty with the public to groom support for this historic project. And to her credit, President Park's Administration has moved on some of this. She has reiterated the goal of unification, faced down the North in one of its typical ginned-up faux crises in 2013, and has pushed the Chinese hard on the issue.  

Korea, China and the South China Sea

Van makes a few other points worth debating:

  1. I argued that South Korean reticence on SCS helps the widening rift between China and North Korea. Van may be right that this is not due to South Korean diplomacy, but that does not alter my point that if South Korea does step into the SCS flap, that step will push China back toward Pyongyang. So long as North Korea and China are scrapping, we should not rock the boat, and if Park can keep that ball rolling by schmoozing the Standing Committee, so much the better.
  2. Van argues that North Korea could probably find a way to survive without Chinese aid. I am extremely sceptical of this. North Korea’s economy is such a disaster that it almost certainly requires regular, large subsidies, as it did throughout the Cold War from the USSR, and since then from China among others. The only time North Korea stood on its own, a brutal, self-created famine followed. Van suggests maybe Russia could step into the gap. But Putin’s Russia is dwarfed by China and has little regional presence. China is the irreplaceable lifeline, as Kim Jong-Un’s last-minute decision to skip the Moscow WWII festivities suggests.
  3. Van suggests that China only acts on its national interests defined by cold realpolitik. I agree. But interests come from identity and perception, and there is growing evidence that the Chinese are rethinking the value of the North Korean buffer. Specifically, moderates in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Chinese international relations academia have intimated for years now that the North Korean alliance is not balance-positive for Beijing because it fuels the American pivot and pushes Seoul and Tokyo toward the US. Abandonment will not happen soon, but the easiest way to smother this emerging debate is for South Korea to strike an openly anti-Chinese position.
  4. Finally, I still see little evidence that South Korea can make much of a difference in the SCS. It's a medium-sized power and distant from the area. What matters is the response the littorals, especially Vietnam and the Philippines, plus the larger, over-the-horizon states – the US, Japan and India. I see no obvious reason to jeopardise this long-sought, very valuable cooling Sino-North Korean relationship for one more small weight on the regional scale. 

Photo courtesy of Flickr user Expert Infantry.

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It's increasingly clear that China intends to use its artificial islands in the South China Sea for military purposes.

Admiral Harry Harris, commander of US Pacific Command, delivered this assessment on a panel that I was privileged to be part of at the Aspen Security Forum last week. Harris described the newly-created islands as potential 'forward operating posts' for the Chinese military. Beijing hasn't denied that it will use the outposts for military functions, but it has emphasised plans to provide public goods such as maritime search and rescue, disaster prevention and mitigation and meteorological observation. 

What are the potential military uses of China's artificial islands and do they pose a threat?

First, the outposts in the Spratly Island chain will undoubtedly be equipped with radars and electronic listening equipment that will enhance China's intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and maritime domain awareness capabilities. The newly built 10,000-foot runway on Fiery Cross Reef will accommodate virtually every aircraft in China's inventory, and hangers are being built that appear designed to host tactical fighter aircraft. As Admiral Harris stated, 'A 10,000-foot runway is large enough to take a B-52, almost large enough for the Space Shuttle, and 3,000 feet longer than you need to take off a 747.'

China will be able to operate surveillance aircraft, airborne early warning and control aircraft, unmanned aircraft, transport planes, tanker aircraft and fighters. Depending on what platforms and systems are deployed on these outposts, China could have the ability to monitor most, if not all, of the South China Sea on a 24/7 basis.

These enhanced capabilities will provide China with advantages over its weaker neighbours and pose challenges to US military activities in the region.

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China may declare an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over part or all of the area within its nine-dashed line claim. To enforce such a zone would require several airstrips in various locations in the South China Sea. China has been expanding its runway on Woody Island in the Paracel group from approximately 7500 feet to almost 10,000 feet. Recent satellite imagery indicates that China may be preparing to build yet another airstrip on Subi Reef in the Spratly chain. In November 2013, China unilaterally set up an ADIZ in disputed waters in the East China Sea. At the time, a PLA major general confided to me that the Chinese military has long had plans to establish an ADIZ in all of China's near seas, including the East China Sea, Yellow Sea, and South China Sea.

China will likely use the Spratly outposts to extend its anti-access/area denial envelope farther southward and eastward into the Philippines Sea and the Sulu Sea. Runways will enable the People's Liberation Army, Navy and Air Force to extend the operational ranges of aircraft based on the mainland and Hainan Island to encompass the entire South China Sea and beyond. Chinese capability to observe and respond to US military operations in the region will be significantly increased. Chinese aircraft will be positioned to intercept US and other foreign aircraft far from the Chinese coastline. The time required for Chinese aircraft and ships to reach the Malacca Straits, in the event of a blockade of this major trade artery, will be significantly reduced.

According to Admiral Harris, the US has not yet seen China place anti-ship cruise missiles or supporting gear on the islands, but such capabilities could be deployed in the near future along with surface-to-air missiles. In addition, the harbour at Fiery Cross Reef is better suited to submarine basing than the shallow waters at Hainan Island where the PLAN's fleet is currently based. Within a few kilometres from shore, the waters quickly drop to a depth of 2000 metres.

If a military conflict were to break out, the land features as well as the ships and aircraft operating from them would be vulnerable to attack, but in peacetime and in a crisis, they will provide China with the capability to hold US forces at risk at a farther distance than it can at present. This could have implications for a US effort to come to Taiwan's defence. A US carrier battle group sailing from the Arabian Gulf or Indian Ocean that was coming to Taiwan's aid would have to pass through the South China Sea. In addition, in wartime, the need to attack these sites and the aircraft and ships deploying from them would divert US assets from performing other missions.

In the event that China decides to dislodge other claimants from their outposts, the PLA will have greater capability to do so. Helicopters, amphibious landing craft and mobile artillery batteries could be used to conduct assaults on nearby land features. Alternatively, China could opt to put pressure on rival claimants to abandon some of their outposts. For example, it could attempt to disrupt resupply operations to isolated features that lack self-defence capability, such as Second Thomas Shoal, where a contingent of Filipino marines is stationed on a decaying World War II military ship. In early 2014, Chinese coast guard ships twice tried to block civilian Filipino vessels from resupplying the marines deployed on the Shoal. 

Policy Recommendations

Calls for China to halt its artificial island building in the Spratlys have not been heeded. Completing the island projects as quickly as possible is apparently a high priority for Beijing, given the frenetic pace of dredging in the past year and half. However, there is still a possibility to put a cap on militarisation of the islands by China and the other claimants. The deployment of offensive power projection capabilities by any claimant would be dangerous and destabilising. The US should help to facilitate an agreement that restricts deployments by all claimants to strictly defensive capabilities on all outposts in the South China Sea.

The growing uncertainty created by China's artificial island building and the purposes for which the new features will be used should motivate ASEAN, or at least a sub-group of ASEAN members with deep interests in maritime security, to draw up a draft of a Code of Conduct (CoC) that contains risk-reduction measures and a dispute resolution mechanism. China is evidently unwilling to make progress with ASEAN on a CoC in a reasonable time frame and it's time for others to push this forward. If China and ASEAN are unprepared to finalise and sign a CoC, then a coalition of the willing should proceed on its own and try to bring the others along later.

The US and like-minded countries should conduct freedom of navigation patrols around China's artificial islands that were originally submerged reefs. UNCLOS provides that artificial islands do not qualify as 'islands' under the Convention because they are not naturally formed areas of land surrounded by and above water at high tide. Therefore, artificial islands are not entitled to any maritime zones. Since 1979, the US has carried out the freedom of navigation program to protect maritime rights throughout the world. Conducting such patrols in the Spratlys would signal to China and the region that disputes must be managed peacefully and in accordance with international law.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user Official U.S. Navy Page.

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Lowy Institute Paper

Debating Condemned to Crisis?

7 of 8

I couldn't agree more with Hugh White's commentary on Ken Ward's new book Condemned to Crisis? published by the Lowy Institute and Penguin Australia. White argues that Australia must build its relationship with Indonesia based more on how it perceives its northern neighbor is developing, rather than on historical experiences.

White agrees with Ward that Australia's approach to Indonesia is outmoded and needs rethinking. Ward argues that Canberra must discard the long-held policy mantra, embraced by all prime ministers since Paul Keating, that 'no country is more important to Australia than Indonesia.' 

Both Indonesia and Australia have changed since then, and this hasn't been fully reflected in the way they conduct relations, perhaps more so on the Australian than the Indonesian side (which deserves a separate article). While both White and Ward recognise the changes that have taken place in post-Suharto Indonesia, they fail to grasp the implications for bilateral relations and for the geopolitical environment in Asia.

White rightly postulates that Canberra's approach to Indonesia should take into account two facts. First, that Indonesia's economy is growing so rapidly that it will become bigger than Australia's and hence more powerful, and second, that Indonesia's rise has implications for the geopolitical order in Asia.

But White and Ward have underestimated the internal changes that have occurred within Indonesia which are equally dramatic, and which have inevitably changed the way Indonesia looks at itself and at its place in the region and the world. These changes have implications for Indonesia's foreign policy and for all of its foreign relations, including with neighbours like Australia.

If Ward and White represent the typical Canberra foreign policy community view, then Australia is misreading Indonesia.

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Both assume that cultural sensitivity still matters, with Ward suggesting that Australian politicians had better be careful in what they say, or they risk offending Indonesians. Prime Minister Abbott tried the cultural sensitivity approach in trying to persuade President Jokowi for a stay of execution against two Australian drug traffickers this year. When that failed, he changed tack and became more abrasive. That the executions went ahead suggests that cultural sensitivity made no difference.

Indonesia today is vastly different from Suharto's Indonesia. It's a far more open and democratic society. Everything is discussed and debated in the open, and social media has made the public debate fiercer, if not sometimes unethical. This means that Indonesia has become thoroughly desensitised, and its people and leaders can take all kinds of insults without being in the least offended. Whatever Australian politicians, and the notorious media including talk back radio hosts, say about Indonesia, far worse things have been said by Indonesians about themselves. They'll be sure to respond with equally if not more harsh words. But then that's free speech. 

A more open Indonesia has stopped taking Australian insults seriously. They would surely not affect bilateral relations. Over the years, Indonesia and Australia have moved on from the days when a single issue (East Timor) undermined their entire relationship. Or from being too personalised, as in the way Suharto retaliated to personal insults or Keating 'coddling' with the dictator. Even President Yudhoyono measured his retaliations in 2013 when he learned he and his wife had been targets of Australia's wiretapping operations.

Indonesians have also come to accept that their country becomes a punching bag in every Australian election for Jakarta's 'lack of cooperation' in tackling human smuggling. But as soon as a new prime minister was elected (or re-elected in the case of John Howard), the first thing they'd do was visit Jakarta and pacify its leaders to cooperate on human smuggling. They would blame their own press for exaggerating their criticisms of Indonesia during the election campaign. 

A democratic Indonesia is doing exactly the same. In the 2014 elections, foreign countries became convenient targets for politicians, aware that they could not respond or defend themselves. But as soon as the new government took power, they had to be responsible and tone down their xenophobic rhetoric. You can only hurt your foreign relations so far. Admittedly, Abbott went the furthest of all prime ministers in dealing with Indonesia, but look at where relations are today.

Yes, Indonesia's economy has been growing and that is altering its position in the region and its relations with its neighbours. But a more important change is that Indonesia is a far more open and democratic nation, albeit not a perfect one (but then what country is?) Yes, a re-reading of the report Seeing Indonesia as a normal country by Douglas E Ramage and Andrew MacIntyre, as suggested by another commentator in this debate, Greta Nabbs-Keller, may be warranted.

Need more evidence that Indonesians are not that culturally sensitive? Indonesia has never bothered even to try to reciprocate Australia's repeated statements that it is the most important foreign relationship, something that in Eastern culture would be considered as downright rude. Remember the 1970s' notorious French song Je T'aime Moi Non Plus, where the woman in the duet passionately says she loves the man, but he remains indifferent and is only interested in a more casual affair? That's how awkward some Indonesians feel each time we hear Australian leaders utter their foreign policy mantra.

Let's all move on and be more realistic about each other.

Photo courtesy of Flickr user Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

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