The growing militarisation of the South China Sea
Cambodia's coming 'colour revolution'?: Border dispute with Vietnam tests stability
Indonesia: 'Crisis-prone' refers to the past, not necessarily the future
Taiwan-China relations (part 1): Continuity or renewed tensions?
North Korea should dominate South Korean foreign policy, and there's no way around that
Taiwan-China relations (part 2): Beijing is the determining factor
How to keep stormy Australia-Indonesia ties on an even keel
This week in Jakarta: Diplomacy, deals and the death penalty
Mullah Omar dead? Afghanistan peace talks under threat if news is confirmed
India's Gurdaspur terrorist attack: Location, timing and method
What if Beijing and Washington understood each other perfectly...but still clashed?
Julie Bishop talks soft power at the Lowy Institute, but where was digital diplomacy?
The stories we never hear from Papua
Don't blame Obama for ISIS
China's worldview, in six parts
South China Sea: Washington says one thing but Beijing hears another
Putin's pivot: The Russians are coming to Asia
Was India's special-forces raid into Myanmar a signal to China and Pakistan?
Al Jazeera poll shows alarming levels of support for ISIS
Shangri La Dialogue: Ash Carter strikes determined, reasonable tone
US: Your money where your mouth is
US-New Zealand relations: Back in from the cold
5 November 2010 11:28AM
So, the Fed's
has now set sail. A little while back I
that this could make life more complicated for policymakers in emerging markets. Here are two new
worrying about the same thing.
before that there are some good parallels between Greece’s current problems and the collapse of Argentina’s currency board. This
from the San Francisco Fed takes a look at some of the lessons from the Argentine experience (H/t
I know I link to Martin Wolf’s
in the FT a lot, but normally he’s just so damn good, even when I don’t agree with his conclusions. For a while now I’ve been thinking I should write something about how the current debate over global imbalances echoes Keynes’s concerns during the original Bretton Woods meetings, albeit with the role of Washington reversed from its original part as disdainful current account surplus economy to its new one of resentful current account deficit economy. I still haven’t got round to it, but meanwhile
Martin’s latest, which takes that idea as its starting point. Related: Ken Rogoff on the US as
A topic I do seem to spend a fair amount of time writing about is the international economic consequences of the
rise of China
. My focus here is usually external — what this trend means for the rest of us — and I largely rely on others to keep me current with what’s going on inside the world’s second largest economy. One valuable resource here is the World Bank’s China quarterly update: the latest edition is
In the past I’ve linked to some
of attempts to track the links between international economics and politics (part of my ongoing interest in geo-economics). Here’s an interesting-sounding
which tries to see if China’s threats to punish countries for meeting the Dalai Lama shows up in trade data. (H/t
And here’s some more on the political and economic linkages, with Simon Johnson
about links between foreign money and the US mid-term elections.
You may also be interested in...
Economic history makes a comeback
The failure of the TPP matters, but not for economic reasons
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