Thursday 14 Nov 2019 | 20:41 | SYDNEY
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About the project

The aim of the Lowy Institute’s Migration and Border Policy Project is to produce independent research and analysis on the challenges and opportunities raised by the movement of people and goods across Australia’s borders. An important goal of the research will be to put Australia’s experiences in a broader regional and global context.

The Project includes workshops and roundtables which bring together external experts and government officials in an effort to build genuinely strategic approaches to complex migration and border issues. It also includes annual Border Policy Research Fellowships in which an officer of the Department of Immigration and Border Protection will undert­ake research on migration and border policy issues at the Lowy Institute.

The Project is supported by the Australian Government’s Department of Immigration and Border Protection.

Latest publications

Calling time on the 457 migration two-step

This is the third post in a series that follows an Expert Workshop in Digitisation, Skills and Migration hosted by the Lowy Institute earlier this month in collaboration with the Department of Immigration and Border Protection.

In April, when Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull announced that he was 'abolishing' the 457-visa and replacing it with two new 'temporary skills shortage' visas, many dismissed the changes as cosmetic. The implications, however, are far reaching, not just for Australia’s temporary migration regime but also for the way the nation selects future permanent residents and citizens.

Over the past two decades, the 457 visa has become a significant pathway to permanent residence in what eminent Australian economist Professor Bob Gregory has described as two-step migration. The ideal two-step scenario looks like this. After failing to find an Australian qualified to fill a specific vacancy in their enterprise, an employer recruits a temporary foreign worker with the relevant skills and experience. The worker performs well in the position, enjoys working for the business and likes living in Australia. After two years, the employer sponsors the migrant’s shift from a temporary visa to permanent residency.

Immigration department statistics show that in 2015-16 around 50,000 temporary migrants on 457 visas became permanent residents. In 75% of cases, this transition from temporary to permanent status ran via employer sponsorship under the Employer Nomination Scheme or the Regional Sponsored Migration Scheme. In most other cases, 457 visa holders would have successfully applied for skilled independent migration without support from their employer. In this way, over time, about half of all previous temporary 457 visa holders have become permanent residents of Australia. Most of the rest departed our shores, while a small percentage have remained in the country long-term on a succession of temporary visas. Looked at from another perspective, about 40 per cent of the 128,550 places in Australia’s annual (permanent) skilled migration programme are filled by temporary migrant workers who are already living in Australia filling full-time positions in local firms on 457 visas.

Two-step migration has significant benefits for productivity because it facilitates better matching of skills to positions than one-step migration. Before the introduction of 457 visas, skilled migrants would often be granted a permanent visa before arrival in Australia. Visas would be issued under the points system, which was the government’s attempt to match the annual skilled migration intake to its expectation of the number and types of professionals the economy would need in the year ahead. Migrants would often land in Australia and then search for a job to match their qualifications. Frequently, however, they might end up taking a position in which their skills were not well utilised. (We are all familiar with the scenario of engineers driving cabs, for example.) This might have been because government assumptions about the labour market were incorrect, or because those assumptions had been overtaken by a change in business conditions. Alternatively, migrants might have set their sights on living in Sydney, while the shortages in their profession were located elsewhere. Under the two-step migration model, employers recruit candidates directly into vacant positions, initially on a temporary basis, and a 457 visa is only issued when there is job to be filled. Employers will only sponsor a 457 visa holder to become permanent if the job is ongoing and if the migrant proves to be a good long-term fit for the enterprise.

This strength of the 457 visa program was also its weakness, however, because employers’ role as sponsors increased their power relative to migrant workers, particularly in cases where temporary migrants were keen to settle in Australia permanently. There have been numerous cases of workers tolerating underpayment, excessive working hours and unsafe conditions because they fear getting offside with an employer who is the gatekeeper on their pathway to permanent residence.

Putting the temporary back into skilled migration

The temporary skills shortage (TSS) visa scheme that replaces the 457-program will narrow the pathway to permanent residency without addressing this problem of exploitation. Two classes of temporary visa will be offered under the new system: short-term and medium-term.  

The short-term visa is valid for two years and can only be renewed once, for a maximum stay of four years. It does not offer a route to permanent residence. The problem of employer leverage over migrant workers remains because the temporary migrant is entirely dependent on the employer for their visa and its one-off renewal. If workers complain about underpayment, abuse or unsafe conditions, they risk losing not only their job but also their temporary right to live in Australia.

The medium-term visa offered under the new TSS scheme does provide a potential route to permanent residence via employer sponsorship. But whereas 457 visa holders had to spend two years with an employer before being eligible to apply for permanent residence, under the new TSS scheme they will have to work for a minimum of three years. This extends the period in which migrant workers are vulnerable to pressure from their boss.

Whether a migrant will be eligible for a short-term or a medium-term TSS visa will depend on their occupation, but both visas are more restrictive than the 457 visa, for which 651 occupations were eligible. For the new short term visa, 216 occupations have been culled while another 59 that remain on the new list have been restricted in some way (visas for some jobs will only be available in regional Australia for example). Some of the changes to the list are cosmetic, since many delisted occupations – such as goat farmer or antique dealer – were never used to bring in migrant workers anyway. But the removal of a pathway to permanent residence for all short-term visa holders marks a significant departure from the previous two-step system.

The list of medium-term visa occupations is even shorter, just 183.  These are occupations that have been 'assessed as being of high value to the Australian economy and aligning to the government’s longer term training and workforce strategies.' This is a more significant culling of the occupation list, since some of the most frequently used 457 occupations have been excluded, including the three most common jobs of cook, restaurant–cafe manager and marketing specialist.

Moving toward a guest worker system

At first glance, it might seem sensible for the government to make a distinction between occupations that are valuable enough to the Australian economy to warrant a pathway to permanent residence and those that are not. But it is in exactly such detail that problems arise. Take the example of aged care assistants. The role requires only a certificate level qualification and so might be seen as inappropriate for a temporary skilled visa. Surely we can train Australians to fill these jobs? Yet things are not always so clear-cut. Fronditha provides care to Melbourne’s ageing Greek community and needs Greek-speaking workers to provide linguistically and culturally appropriate care. It cannot recruit such workers locally and has brought them in on 457-visas under a labour agreement with the federal government, sponsoring the workers for permanent residence after four years in the job. If aged care assistants can be brought in at all under the new system, they will only ever be eligible for short-term visas and have no pathway to permanent residence. This means that rather than building up a reliable skilled workforce, Fronditha will constantly have to recruit and train new temporary workers. It is hard to see how this benefits the enterprise, the migrants, or Australian society.

The government’s changes to temporary skilled migration are being sold as a way of ensuring Australian workers get priority over foreign workers in employment. But this is taking aim at a problem that only existed on the margins. Foreign workers on 457 visa make up less than one per cent of the total labour force, and the number of visas issued has been falling in a slowing economy, so there is no evidence that 457 visa holders are displacing large numbers of Australian workers. This issue, such as it exists, is better addressed via a price signal, by increasing the visa charges employers pay to hire foreign workers so as to provide greater incentive to recruit locally.

Meanwhile the changes fail to address problems of exploitation in the 457 scheme and may indeed compound them.

Splitting the 457 visa into two streams also moves Australia towards a two-tiered system of temporary skilled migration: the medium term visa holds out the conditional prospect that you may eventually be accepted as a full member of Australians society, while the 'short-term' visa makes clear that your status will only every be temporary. This moves Australia away from the immigration two step and towards a guest worker system, in which some migrants can never be Australian.

Digitalisation, migration and the future of work

This is the second post in a series that follows an Expert Workshop in Digitisation, Skills and Migration hosted by the Lowy Institute earlier this month in collaboration with the Department of Immigration and Border Protection.

The 'Fourth Industrial Revolution', as described by World Economic Forum Chairman Klaus Schwab, is characterised by a range of new technologies that are fusing the physical, digital and biological worlds. A lot of attention to date has focused on robotisation, driverless cars, cyber-weapons and biotechnology, and other developments: in this context, the effects of automation and its impact on jobs have been widely discussed. Less appreciated, however, is how digitalisation is affecting the future of work.

The digitalisation of documents, photos, personal data, social networks and just about everything else has paved the way for learning machines to translate this data and perform tasks that were once the realm of humans. This transition is in turn driving the transformation of everything from retailing procedures and corporate organisation to how we plan our cities and cure our sick.

Digitalisation has also enabled significant changes in employment. Skilled occupations are now much more accessible on a global scale, as well as more temporary and compartmentalised in nature. Workers can participate in the digital economy at any time from any place.

So why bring migration into the conversation? Migration is an important component of Australia's economic future, having been long used to fills gaps both low-skilled and high-skilled roles. Digitalisation will impact both. While migration has long been thought of as the physical movement of humans from one place to another, we are now witnessing a form of virtual labour migration. Work is crossing national boundaries through online capital, labour, and information flows.

Unfortunately, the significance of this online labour is poorly understood, not least because conventional labour market statistics are ill-suited to measuring work that is transacted via online platforms. It's often understood as 'trade', 'subcontracting', or 'outsourcing'; not as 'labour migration', a term reserved for physical migration. An entire transformation is taking place almost unobserved by policy-makers and statisticians. 

One of the first (and few) economic indicators that we do have for the online gig economy is the Online Labour Index, developed by researchers at Oxford University, which tracks online labour projects. Over the past year the Index has experienced rapid and volatile growth, as shown below. The biggest sources of online vacancies (as of September 2016) were 'in' the United States (52% of the global total), followed by the United Kingdom at 6.3%, India at 5.9%, Australia at 5.7% and Canada at 5%. What is striking is that this growth occurred in the context of stagnant conventional labour markets. What is also striking is that the highest demand was for skilled work in areas such as software development, technology, and creative and multimedia tasks. It isn't just automation changing the future of work, but digitalisation and virtual labour migration as well. Many of the assumptions that underpin our current system need rethinking.

Perhaps most importantly, our assumptions about migration are being challenged. What were once perceived as controllable national borders are much more porous than we'd like to admit. This is proven daily by the sheer volume of data, capital and information that flows across our national boundaries unimpeded. And as the aging population of developed countries creates a new competition for the (youthful) best and brightest, we can't assume that a ready supply of highly skilled labour will always be eagerly awaiting offshore. Likewise, not all migrants may seek citizenship as their end goal. There is a younger generation of professionals entering the workforce who see themselves as mobile and global, with a transnational identity. They want to be able to move between countries, not just take a one-way trip to a new passport.

The trend towards increased mobility (both virtual and physical) must be a key consideration for policy makers. If work visits are shorter and more frequent, then the process to gain a visa shouldn't take longer than the stay itself. If future workers are going to be self-employed or hold a portfolio of jobs, then having a visa that is tied to a single employer, or cumbersome to transfer as employment conditions change, also creates an unwelcome barrier to labour mobility. Even the paperwork to document the many jobs that a worker has held in the past may need revisiting. And if self-employed entrepreneurs are a key part of the new economy, how do they fare in policy considerations? Governments rely heavily on signals from employers to inform them what skills are in demand. The risk is that programs informed only by traditional employer intelligence may be missing trends in alternative modes of work. And in a world where start-ups companies are increasingly important, how can the red tape that currently stops small (and regional) businesses from sponsoring skilled workers be amended?

Evidence regarding skills gaps, who is employed by whom, and where value is being generated is crucial to inform effective policy across categories of employment, education and migration and beyond. As stated above, there is still no true measure of the value of the 'internet' and technology-enabled services. It is the unique nature of digital goods that make them so hard track. Who is working to create the means to monitor and keep track of new trends? Are we thinking big enough in terms of what data we collect in a digital age?

There are mixed views on the degree to which the fourth industrial revolution will truly transform our lives. But this isn't about predicting the future. It is about testing today's assumptions in order to be ready for tomorrow. Given the complexity and inherent uncertainty about the future, it doesn't make sense to just pick a single strategy and wait to see if it works. Government needs to become more comfortable with pursuing a portfolio of solutions that allow for ongoing experimentation, learning, and adaptation. Admitting uncertainty and taking on a portfolio of experiments doesn't mean not having any strategic direction. It means creating a system that can learn for itself, based on real time feedback. Disruptions will likely unfold over decades rather than months but we have choices to make, with many possible solutions, and a lot of rapid learning to do.

Migration and border policy links: Safe zones, Thailand’s workers, settling for Cambodia and more

  • Another Syrian refugee originally aiming for Australia has been voluntarily resettled in Cambodia. Writing for the Asian Correspondent, Max Walden unpacks Cambodia’s protection framework.
     
  • Kate Hodal discusses the alarming measures taken to silence migrant worker abuse claims in Thailand’s poultry export industry.
     
  • The Kaldor Centre’s Jane McAdam lists seven reasons why the UN Refugee Convention should not include climate refugees.
     
  • Geoff Gilbert and Anna Magdalena Rüsch have authored a Kaldor Centre policy brief detailing the legal and practical considerations essential to the creation of ‘safe zones’ for refugees and asylum seekers.
     
  • Writing for Broadly, Louis Staples examines the experiences of LGBTI asylum seekers in immigration detention.
     
  • Read Migration Policy Institute’s spotlight analysis of refugee and asylum resettlement policy under the Trump administration.
     
  • Writing for Brookings Institute, Diana Quintero and Michael Hansen consider the inadequacy of current teacher training programs in responding to the growing populations of English Learners in US schools, a result of two decades of mass immigration.
     
  • The International Organization for Migration (IOM) Iraq and Georgetown University has published a report outlining durable policy solutions to internal displacement in Iraq.
     
  • Click here for a Migration Compact reading list compiled by the IOM’s Research Leaders Syndicate.

Getting migration right when government is no longer in sole control

This is the first post in a series that follows an Expert Workshop in Digitisation, Skills and Migration hosted by the Lowy Institute earlier this week in collaboration with the Department of Immigration and Border Protection.

 

Migration policy, what drives immigration trends, and the impact of migration are all poorly understood in Australia. In an era when questions of migration are becoming more difficult due to a confluence of economic, cultural and security events and trends, greater engagement from government and others is required to promote better public understanding.

The election of Donald Trump and Brexit due in part to anti-migrant sentiment, the 7-Eleven scandal, the backpacker tax, the abolition and replacement of the 457 visa, the Lindt siege and broader conversations about jobs and housing; these have all contributed to an increased public interest in migration. Transforming this into more substantial political engagement will be difficult.

The most obvious barrier is the disjuncture between public opinion and governments on the power to regulate migration flows. It is a commonly held belief in Australia that the government strictly controls the number and type of immigrants allowed into the country. Indeed, governments of both persuasions have promoted this understanding, with John Howard’s ‘we will decide’ election statement being the most visceral piece of evidence.

The reality, however, is quite different. There is no switch to flip in terms of stopping immigration. While governments before the mid-1990s were able to exercise quite precise control over the number of migrants entering Australia, this power has been softened by the deregulation of immigration flows. As Peter Mares outlines in his recent book, Not Quite Australian, the advent of structural temporary migration programs shifted the impetus away from government setting quotas and selecting migrants towards a much larger role for non-government actors: business; universities; and migrants themselves.

While governments promote their capacity to vet future immigrants via security and character checks, the issue of asymmetric information is almost impossible to overcome. A person may receive a student visa with no intention of studying but instead seek work and permanent residency. An increasingly common requirement – the ‘genuine temporary entrant’ – is, at best, a box-ticking mechanism. No bureaucrat processing a visa application can ascertain the true intentions of a potential migrant. In addition, a large and growing population of temporary migrants places pressure on the government to allow a generous allocation of permanent residency visas each year.

It is understandable that successive governments have been reluctant to explain these big changes. There is real short-term political risk that could be easily framed by political opponents for their own advantage. The link between immigration, government control and sovereignty in the public debate is laden with strong opinions and biases.

Further, governments should not wear all of the blame here. Multinational businesses, universities and the science community have all failed to properly explain the role skilled migrants play in their organisations today. The importance of human capital in 2017 relative to 20 years ago is immeasurable. Yet it is difficult to think of concrete examples instead of clichés to illustrate this magnitude of this change. Why don’t we know more about the role of migrants in training Australians, generating innovation, integrating global supply chains or importing new management techniques?

Some industries are almost completely reliant on migrant labour. One example is the horticultural industry. Backpackers and Pacific seasonal workers now account for anywhere north of 90% of seasonal horticultural workers in Australia. This is not necessarily a negative trend. But the concerning feature is the lack of formal consideration by government and other actors in developing migration policy. In the case of horticulture, this could be seen in the 2005 introduction of a second working holiday visa. All of a sudden backpackers were working for residency outcomes and not wage incentives. This has had a profound effect on the shape and structure of the horticultural labour market. Recent exposes and research on the industry show the dangers of this approach.

Governments still have an important role to play but what was once absolute control has been replaced by oversight and management of a complex web of regulation. And while businesses and others have sought the benefits of migration over the past decades, they have failed to demonstrate its importance.

We need a better understanding of what drives migration flows and the economic, social and security effects of migration. Simple government calculations will no longer suffice to support migration policy. Constant reaction to events instead of proactive consideration of the broader environment will result in awkward and costly policies. Looking to the future, there are at least two big long-term migration trends Australia will have to grapple with that need a proactive approach.

One is demand-based. As Australia’s population ages, labour demand from employers will shift, based on changing consumption habits. Occupations associated with aged care and personal health services will rise as a share of the labour market. Many of these jobs will not be highly skilled. One response could be dramatically higher wages to attract workers into these positions. However, this will have fiscal costs - given the role of government in aged care - and productivity costs. It is more likely a combination of slightly higher wages and more opportunities for immigration will be required to meet increased demand from employers in these sectors. At the moment, there is very little consideration of how this will affect Australia’s migration framework. Better understanding of consumer preferences, labour needs, and qualification requirements are needed to ensure migration doesn’t become a default, reactive response.

Another massive change will be the composition of migrant flows, what we might term a supply shift. For example, China’s worker to population ratio is set to shift rapidly – from 8:1 today to 2:1 by 2050. This will have a massive impact on its emigration profile and, given China has been one of the top two citizenship countries for new Australian immigrants since 2000, for us too. For example, higher education is Australia’s premier service-based export worth $20 billion annually. But just how competitive and sustainable is this export – in terms of cost and quality – when the largest single country consuming the product is facing such a dramatic shift in the profile of its younger population? Understanding and engagement into other markets, as well as consideration of what role migration incentives can play – such as the link to permanent residency – require better analysis and research.

Among many other questions, both of these will require a hands-on policy response by governments and other actors now central to Australia’s migration framework. We need to consider what tools might be necessary to inform future decisions and whether what has worked in the past will continue to be effective in the future.

Migration and border policy links: ASIO on refugees, Cyclone Mora, US foreign workers and more

  • Cyclone Mora has caused extensive displacement in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, India and Myanmar and destroyed some Rohingya refugee camps in the region.
     
  • In response to assertions made by Senator Hanson during last week’s estimates hearing in the Australian Senate, ASIO Chief Duncan Lewis has said there is no link between refugee status and terrorism.
     
  • The Kaldor Centre’s Sangeetha Pillai considers the recent case of Plaintiff M96A/2016 v Commonwealth and the constitutional limits of mandatory immigration detention in Australia.
     
  • Writing for Border Criminologies, Mayaan Ravid argues that border control in ethno-national states can be used to predict policy development in civic-national states.
     
  • To assist current Global Compact consultation, the International Organization for Migration has put together a paper reviewing past global migration initiatives, pointing to areas of convergence and tension.
     
  • Writing for the BBC, Katie Beck discusses the reasons behind - and implications of - the growth in the investment citizenship industry.
     
  • Read Claire Felter’s CFR Backgrounder on US foreign worker programs.
     
  • The Northern Institute’s Dr Andrew Taylor unpacks population trends in Northern Australia, noting the impact of ineffective migration policy.
     
  • In collaboration with University of Hamburg academics, Greenpeace Germany has published a report on the relationship between climate change, environmental degradation and migration.
     
  • On 8 June in Sydney, the Kaldor Centre and King and Wood Mallesons are co-hosting a panel discussion on the nexus between displacement, environmental disasters and climate change. Panellists include Professor Jane McAdam and Dr Brooke Wilmsen.

 

Migration and border policy links: Dutton's fake refugees, resettlement, disaster displacement and more

  • The Australian Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, Peter Dutton, has announced a crackdown on ‘fake refugees’ and plans to deport asylum seekers unable to provide sufficient documentation by October.
     
  • US Department of Homeland Security officials have commenced ‘extreme vetting’ interviews on Manus Island as a part of the US-Australia refugee deal.
     
  • Listen to Migration Policy Institute’s webinar on refugee resettlement, drawing on a recent report, Taking Stock of Refugee Resettlement.
     
  • Writing for Border Criminologies, Efrat Arbel considers reform to Canada’s immigration detention policy regime.
     
  • The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre has published its Global Report on Internal Displacement.
     
  • See what IOM is doing in Myanmar and Vanuatu to protect against disaster displacement.
     
  • The second informal thematic consultation session for the Global Compact on Migration was held on 22-24 May in New York focusing on migration push factors, from climate change to conflict.
     
  • The University of Oxford’s Migration Observatory has published a pre-election commentary on migration policies put forward by the UK’s three main parties. Writing for the Financial Times, Chris Giles analyses the economic consequences of winding back immigration to the UK.
     
  • Two years after the discovery of a mass grave on the Malaysia-Thailand border, Rebecca Schectman unpacks Malaysia’s human trafficking problem.
     
  • The Atlantic has published Alex Tizon’s reflection on his family’s slave Lola, a poignant piece which points to past and present-day exploitation of domestic workers.

Migration and border policy links: Theresa May’s policy promises, private sponsorship, the global slave trade and more

  • The Kaldor Centre's Khanh Hoang unpacks Australia’s private sponsorship program for refugee and humanitarian entrants.
     
  • On 6 June, The Ethics Centre is holding a debate in Sydney on the Refugee Convention. Grab your tickets here. Panellists include Jane McAdam, Erika Feller and Greg Sheridan.
     
  • Writing for DevPolicy, Henry Sherrell considers two breakthroughs in Australia’s horticultural labour market.
     
  • Under the Trump administration, US federal immigration arrests have increased by 38%. Brookings Institute’s Shibley Telhami discusses the results of a recent survey focusing on American attitudes to President’s Trump’s early policies, from refugee management to the travel ban.
     
  • Watch Overseas Development Institute’s expert panel on refugee rights, access to work and protection frameworks.
     
  • Amid ICC concerns about a growing slave trade, the World Bank’s Omer Karasapan highlights the challenges faced by migrants and asylum seekers in Libya. For data visualisation and an insider look at the region’s migration pathways, check out MSNBC’s special report.
     
  • United Nations University Research Officer Julia Blocher considers the need for the Global Compact to adopt a holistic view of the nexus between migration, environmental change and the economy.
     
  • Read about Theresa May’s pre-election policy promises on immigration and social policy.
     
  • Listen to the International Migration Institute’s podcast comparing integration patterns of English-speaking migrants in Turkey and Turkish-speaking migrants in England.
     
  • Oxford University’s Border Criminologies has published two posts this week on detention practices: read Andrew Crosby’s analysis of solitary confinement in Belgian immigration detention centres and Mary Bosworth’s discussion of detention policy in a time of mass mobility.

Migration and Border Policy links: Filipino domestic workers, the UN migration compact, the Australian budget and more

  • The Australian Federal Budget handed down this week shows the Department of Immigration expects to cut 245 full time jobs and spend $60 million to enhance biometric capabilities.
     
  • Read the Kaldor Centre’s take on what the 2017-1018 Budget means for Australian refugee policy. 
     
  • Consultation on the UN's Global Compact on Migration began this week. Watch the 1st informal thematic session here.
     
  • International Migration Institute’s (IMI) Laura Stielike has published a working paper critiquing the relationship between migration and development.
     
  • In The New York Times, Ruth Margalit discusses the experiences of Filipino domestic workers in Israel.
     
  • Writing for Oxford University’s Migration Observatory, Dr Carlos Vargas-Silva and Robert McNeil track net migration policy in the lead up to the UK election.
     
  • The American Immigration Council has released a report detailing the costs of expedited deportation of asylum seekers.
     
  • Daniel Fisher examines the securitisation of the Morocco-Spain border in this post on Border Criminologies.
     
  • A recent European Court of Justice decision has raised questions about a derived right of residence for non-EU parents in relation to their EU citizen children.
     
  • Writing for IMI, Dr Emre Eren Korkmaz examines the potential costs of modern visa regimes.

Migration and Border Policy links: ASEAN fail, the Refuge fuss, SEZs and more

  • At the 30th ASEAN Summit, member states were unable to reach consensus on the Declaration on the Promotion and Protection of Migrant Workers' Rights, despite lobbying from migrant-sending states Indonesia and the Philippines.
     
  • The Department of Immigration and Border Protection told Senate Estimates that it has spent an additional $22 million on the US refugee deal.
     
  • Writing for The Monthly, Klaus Neumann, Anne McNevin, Antje Missback, Damir Mitric and Savitri Taylor discuss the need for Australia to take a rights-based approach to asylum seekers.
     
  • Read the Kaldor Centre's policy brief on asylum seekers at sea and current approaches to border control in Europe and Australia.
     
  • Doug Irving draws on the frontline experiences of RAND's Giacomo Persi Paoli to highlight key tenets of the Mediterranean 'migrant crisis'. Writing for Border Criminologies, Mediterranean Hope's Alberto Mallardo reflects on the role of the Humanitarian Corridors project in the region.
     
  • Listen to the Peace Research Institute Oslo's panel on the key recommendations emerging out of Refuge, a recent publication by University of Oxford's Alexander Betts and Paul Collier dividing the policy community.
     
  • On 11 May, the Overseas Development Institute is hosting an expert panel on Special Economic Zones and the right to work for refugees. You can register to attend or watch online here.
     
  • Writing for the Cato Institute, Alex Nowrasteh argues the merits of US President Donald Trump adopting an Eisenhower-like approach to illegal immigration in the US.
     
  • The Pew Research Center highlights key US H-1B visa trends.

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